Canada

Does the Post Office Deliver in Today's Urban Culture?

Fanis Grammenos — Wed, 03 Apr 2013 01:38:38 -0400

The postal service has been ravaged by enormous deficits and massive layoffs. It will inevitably see the closing of thousands of buildings. Planners have taken notice. Countless journalists have lamented the loss of post-office buildings, praised their often remarkable architecture and called for pressure to save them. These buildings are catalysts of “community”, the authors have suggested, citing the chance encounters of townspeople. Something is profoundly wrong, we are told, when community incubators are eradicated.

Certainly, the loss of these buildings signals the decline of an economic sector and inevitable job losses. Is it possible, though, that the focus on post office buildings overlooks contemporary urbanism? Could it signal inattention to the evolution of “community,” and an obsession with the 19th century?

The Evolving PO: The post office building pictured at the opening of this article began its life in a traditional Canadian village of the 1860s. The 1800s was an era of the small entrepreneur and family business; fewer than 20% of families relied on a paycheque, compared to 80% today. The timber-merchant owner of this enterprise lived in a sprawling, classical style house that boasted status and refinement. By contrast, his 650 square foot store was a humble wood building. Even though its sign advertized dry goods groceries, it provided much more — it was a virtual mini-department store — including a postal service. It also supplied credit for up to a year, because farmers paid all their bills in the fall, after harvest. A similar pragmatic and profitable strategy of blending services now prevails in the K-mart, Wall-Mart and Target superstores.

The idea is simple: a single service means only one source of revenue for the owner and single purpose trips for his customers. Neither is efficient, particularly in a small, walkable town. The store’s role as a community catalyst in comparison to the local tavern or church remains a matter of speculation.

This 1891 example (below), is a stylish, elaborate 2000 square feet building in a town of 3,000 people, during the era of government-run postal service. Nearly four times larger than the first, it retails no other goods. Railway expansion, a bustling regional economy and a total reliance on postal delivery for communication, boosted business in Canada to annual revenues of $4,600 by the time this building surpassed its predecessor; a venerable sum when average daily wages were $1.50. The vast difference in building quality, size, civic importance and services, can be easily explained by the brisk business, the revenue size and, importantly, government ownership. Status and state symbolism could be financed with pride.

Not for long. By the late 1960s only half of the 33 ornamented buildings in Ontario were still standing and none were owned by the government. The loss and shift in ownership had little to do with planning. A new urban culture of instant, and distant, paperless exchange had emerged that forced the transition to the next “building”.

The Village Option: Today, it is not uncommon to see locations where the postal service counter occupies a miniscule portion of a small drugstore on the ground floor of a 20-storey apartment building. It resides on a principal artery, but without street facade, not even a sign announcing it. As in the village example, the service is only one of many the building houses: habitation, car park and a chain drugstore that offers the gamut of goods including convenience foods and drinks. Management’s “building” choice has reinvented the village option, where the PO is not housed in a separate building.

In his turn, the retailer, opting to rent space for a postal service, knew the benefit of luring customers by mixing services on the same premises. The new urban condition, by now in full swing, puts the postal service in an appropriate symbiotic niche, reflecting its cultural status and economic value. The uncertain “community” incubator role that it might have played in the 1800s cannot be discerned in its current form.

The postal service trajectory is not unique. The 20th century saw the decline of the church, the pub, live theatres and classic movie theatres.

Of all the buildings that are presumed to play a catalytic community role, none rivals the church. Historically, innumerable towns sprang up through faith groups. Church buildings were their focus and intellectual well-spring. Nonetheless, the 20th century treated the church no differently than it did the pub and the post office.

By 2005, of the 60% of US citizens who said they were religious, less than 20% attended church regularly. Attendance among US Roman Catholics fell from 75% to 45% in the last 60 years. In the UK, annual church attendance stands at 12%, in Sweden at 5%, and in Denmark at 3%. These are striking figures for an institution that has been a cornerstone of “community”. The outcome of this abstention is inevitable: churches are demolished or converted.

Should the Pub Get a Sub? Pubs in Britain were closing at the rate of 27 a week in 2007 and 2008, continuing a downward trend that affected their small town numbers disproportionately. The media lamented the loss of a celebrated social tradition and, with it, exquisite examples of architecture and interior design.

This loss of building-and-function raises the question of preservation, which leads to the question of subsidization. Should the pub get a sub to support its important value as social cement? Should other such buildings and their functions be subsidized? Some planners think so, in sharp contrast to the historic Protestant ethic of self-reliance.

In a 2002 Urban Land article we read: “... In any case, the main street in a new urbanist community should not necessarily be considered a profit center; instead, it plays the role of the principal amenity.” And further on, “...However, had the [main street] shops been located there [where traffic is heavy], the regional traffic may have overwhelmed the small main street and undermined its role as a social condenser of the community.”

This view permeates the pro-preservation articles on post offices and pubs. It implies that social incubator functions may well deserve a subsidy, and may function better when protected from heavy traffic. In contrast to this view is the vast array of traditional village and towns of exemplar urbanism, where a thriving Main Street is also a main thoroughfare through the town.

A New Era: The loss of post office, church and pub buildings does not stem from some wrongheaded, antisocial planning philosophy that needs to be debunked, denigrated and disposed of. It is simply symptomatic of cultural, technological and economic shifts that go way beyond the realm of urban planning. To stop the loss of post offices, for example, it would be imperative to rescind the use of e-mail, fax and phone, an absurd proposition. For the salvation of the church, it might mean a new wave of proselytizing that would result in commitment to attendance, also a bizarre projection.

Subsidies, protestations and benevolent planning decrees are hardly the answer for either existing or new communities. The urbanist’s “community” dilemma dissolves when the transition to a new era is recognized and embraced. Rather than compulsively hold on to “community’s” past loci, let's stir the imagination toward its emergent places.

Fanis Grammenos is the founder of Urban Pattern Associates (UPA), and was a Senior Researcher at Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation for over 20 years, focused on housing affordability, building adaptability, municipal regulations and sustainable planning. Research on street network patterns produced the innovative Fused Grid. He holds a degree in Architecture from the U of Waterloo.

Photos by the author.

Toward More Competitive Canadian Metropolitan Areas

Wendell Cox — Wed, 16 May 2012 01:38:20 -0400

The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCN) and the Canadian Urban Transit Association (CUTA) have expressed serious concern about generally longer commute trip times making Canadian metropolitan areas less competitive. Each has called for additional funding for transit at the federal level to help reduce commute times and improve metropolitan competitiveness.

The Right Concern

The concern over commute times is well placed. Economic research generally concludes that greater economic and employment growth is likely where people can quickly reach their jobs in the metropolitan area. Five of the nation's six major metropolitan areas (Toronto, Montréal, Vancouver, Ottawa-Gatineau and Calgary) have average one-way work trip travel times that are among the highest in their size classes among 109 metropolitan areas in the more developed world for which data is available. Only Edmonton has an average commute time that is among the shortest (Table 1).

Table 1
Average One-way Commute Times: Major Metropolitan Areas
Compared with International Major Metropolitan Areas
Major Metropolitan Area	One-way Commute Time (Minutes)	Overall One-way Commute: Rank out of 109		One-way Commute: Rank in Population Class
Major Metropolitan Area	One-way Commute Time (Minutes)	Overall One-way Commute: Rank out of 109	Population Size Class	One-way Commute: Rank in Population Class
Toronto	33	97th	Over 5,000,000	11^th out of 19
Montréal	31	90th	2,500,000 - 5,000,000	19^th out of 23
Vancouver	30	86th	1,000,000 - 2,500,000	60^th out of 67
Ottawa-Gatineau	27	60th	1,000,000 - 2,500,000	55^th out of 67
Calgary	26	58th	1,000,000 - 2,500,000	50^th out of 67
Edmonton	23	15th	1,000,000 - 2,500,000	15^th out of 67

The Wrong Answer

Yet the solution – more transit and funding for transit – misses the mark. Transit does many things well, but it does not reduce commute times (Figure 1). According to Statistics Canada, average commute times by transit in the Toronto, Montréal and Vancouver metropolitan areas are from 30 per cent longer to nearly double those of average automobile commuters (Note 2). Some 58 percent of car users (drivers and passengers) reach their work locations in under 30 minutes, something accomplished by merely y 25 percent of transit commuters. Overall Toronto commute times are longer than either Los Angeles – famed for its traffic – as well as much less dense, and far less transit dependent, Dallas-Fort Worth. In Toronto, 21 percent of commuters take transit, compared to two percent in Dallas-Fort Worth. Among Montréal commuters, 20 percent use transit and spend more time commuting than their counterparts in more decentralized Phoenix, where less than two percent take transit. Commute times in transit-focused Vancouver are worse than much larger Los Angeles and indeed longer than nearly American metropolitan area, including Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, and Philadelphia (Table 2).

Given this pattern, transferring car travel to transit likely would increase commute times and make metropolitan areas even less competitive.

Table 2
30- and 40-minute Commute Shares:
Representative Metropolitan Areas
Population Classification	Work Trip Under 30 Minutes	Work Trip 30 to 44 Minutes	Work Trip Under 45 Minutes
5,000,000 and Over
Dallas-Fort Worth	59%	24%	83%
Los Angeles	55%	24%	79%
Toronto	48%	25%	73%
Paris	45%	22%	67%
2,500,000 - 5,000,000
Phoenix	57%	26%	83%
Montréal	47%	27%	74%
1,000,000 - 2,500,000
Edmonton	68%	20%	88%
Indianapolis	66%	22%	88%
Ottawa-Gatineau	65%	21%	86%
Tampa-St. Petersburg	62%	22%	84%
Calgary	54%	29%	83%
Vancouver	55%	21%	76%

Source: Statistics Canada, U.S. American Community Survey, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (France)

The Geography of Transit

Rational Transit and Downtown:Transit’s greatest strength is in providing access to the largest downtown areas. These areas have the greatest job densities (jobs per square kilometre) in their metropolitan areas and are typically well served by frequent, rapid and convenient transit service from throughout the metropolitan area. This combination of high employment density and superior transit service attracts one-half or more of all downtown commuters in Canada’s major metropolitan areas to transit (Figure 2). Transit is meets the needs of people who commute to downtown and is the rational choice for many, if not most. However, downtowns contain only a relatively small share (14 per cent) of metropolitan area jobs (Figure 3).

Rational Personal Mobility Elsewhere: Areas outside downtown lack any such intense concentration of jobs. The area outside downtown, accounting for 6 out of every 7 jobs (Figure 4), maintain much lower employment densities and generally lacks transit service. This is illustrated by the nation's largest employment center, which surrounds Pearson International Airport in Toronto. Its more than 350,000 employees are spread around an area the size of city of Vancouver (or the city of San Francisco) at a density so low that quick and efficient transit is simply impossible.

For the overwhelming share of work trips to outside the downtown area, the car does the job and transit accounts for less than 10 percent of commuters. Thus, the automobile is the rational choice for most people who commute to locations outside downtown. And things are not getting better for transit. According to Statistics Canada, employment has been growing much faster outside of downtown than in the high density core areas suited for transit. The 2011 census indicated a continuing dispersion of population as well.

Transit's Robust Funding Growth and Declining Productivity

Strongly Rising Transit Subsidies: Transit subsidies have been growing strongly. According to Transport Canada data, from 1999 to 2008 subsidies grew 83 percent (adjusted for inflation), which is more than three times the 26 percent ridership growth rate and 3.5 times the rate of general inflation. Transit’s declining productivity could indicate a substantial potential for improved cost effectiveness and service expansion within the generous present funding levels.

Declining Transit Productivity: At the same time, there are concerns about transit productivity. The Conference Board of Canada has documented a 1.2 percent annual decline in productivity for two decades. The same analysis found productivity in other transport sectors to be generally improving. Transit costs have risen well in excess of inflation, service levels and ridership. Rising costs seriously limit transit’s ability to increase its share of travel in metropolitan areas and limits the important role that it is called upon to play in providing door-to-door mobility for the transportation-impaired, such as disabled citizens, the elderly, and students.

Land Use Strategies that Retard Metropolitan Competitiveness

Policies that Could Make Metropolitan Areas Less Competitive: While the prospects for improving transit commute times are discouraging, some current land use strategies further increase traffic congestion and lengthen commute times and make metropolitan areas and make metropolitan areas less competitive . Compact cities (also called smart growth) policies have been adopted across Canada in an effort to reduce automobile use and increase urban densities. The planning expectation is that housing should be placed near rail stations. Yet job locations throughout metropolitan areas remain highly dispersed, and with the rise of working at home, are becoming more so. The potential for transit systems (or walking or cycling) to materially impact commuting is very limited in the least.

International data indicate that higher densities are associated with greater traffic congestion. Further, higher traffic densities are strongly associated with higher levels of air pollution. Improvements in vehicle technology will make reductions in automobile use to reduce greenhouse gas emissions unnecessary, according to U.S. research by McKinsey & Company. Finally, smart growth type policies have been found to retard metropolitan economic growth in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States (Note 2).

Improving Metropolitan Competitiveness

Strategies that reduce commute times can improve metropolitan competitiveness. Expanded telecommuting reduces average commute times by its very nature (though the reported commute times routinely exclude the working at home sector, both in Canada and the US). There are also lessons to be learned from Edmonton and the international metropolitan areas that have been more successful in maintaining shorter commutes: more dispersed employment, lower population densities and a larger share of travel by car (Table 3).

Table 3
Comparison of Canadian and U.S. Major Metropolitan Areas
Average One-way Commute Times and Urban Area Densities

CANADA	Canada Metropolitan Areas		United States: Metropolitan Area Size Classes
	Commute Time	Principal Population Centre Density (per KM2)	Average Commute Time	Average Principal Population Centre Density (per KM2)


5,000,000 and Over
Toronto	33	2,900	28	1,400
2,500,000 - 5,000,000
Montréal	31	2,200	26	1,200
1,000,000 - 2,500,00
Vancouver	30	1,900	23	1,100
Ottawa-Gatineau	27	1,900
Calgary	26	1,600
Edmonton	23	1,100
Principal Population Centre: Largest population centre (Statistics Canada term for urban area) in the metropolitan area.

Focusing on Objectives: To become more competitive, Canada’s metropolitan areas need to improve their average commute times. This requires focusing on strategies that have the highest potential to reduce traffic congestion.

Residents and businesses in metropolitan areas would be best served by goal-oriented and objective policies squarely directed toward getting people to work faster. The focus should be on what makes commutes shorter, regardless of transport mode, rather than on idealistic notions of how a city should look or how people should travel.

Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life”.

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Note: This article is based upon the recently released Frontier Centre for Public Policy report Improving the Competitiveness of Metropolitan Areas by Wendell Cox, who also serves as a senior fellow at the Centre.

Note 1: Data not provided for other metropolitan areas.

Note 2: On a related note, the Bank of Canada (the central bank) and others have indicated a concern about rising house costs relative to incomes. This is to be expected in metropolitan areas adopting green belts, urban growth boundaries and other land rationing policies. Huge housing price increases have occurred in Vancouver, Toronto, Montréal and Calgary (for example), in response to such policies (This is evident from the annual editions of the Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey, sponsored in Canada by the Frontier Centre for Public Policy). The Bank of Canada may be virtually powerless to slow this loss of housing affordability, since its cause (constraining metropolitan land supply) is beyond the reach of the Bank's monetary policies.

Photo: Suburban Montreal (by author)

Special Report: Census 2011: Urban Dispersion in Canada

Wendell Cox — Tue, 14 Feb 2012 08:24:18 -0500

Canada now has fastest-growing population in the G-8 (Note 1), according to the results of the 2011 census, released last week. Canada's growth rate from 2006 to 2011 exceeded that of the United States by nearly one-third and is nearly one half greater than just a decade ago. The population rose from 31.6 million in 2006 to 33.5 million in 2011.

The move west continues. For the first time in history, the provinces west of Ontario (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia) account for more population than the provinces east of Ontario (Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland). Two-thirds of the growth was due to immigration, a development cited in a census editorial by the Toronto Star as a solution to the nation's fertility deficit.

... we need to make more babies. But we are not, to the extent we need to. Canada’s birth rate of 1.67 children per woman is well below the minimum of 2.0 required. Therefore, we need to get more immigrants, which we are.

The Major Metropolitan Areas

Canada's six major metropolitan areas (over 1,000,000 population) grew even half again as quickly as the nation --- 9.3% over five years. Within these metropolitan areas, the pattern of urban dispersion continued, with 83% of the population increase in the largest metropolitan areas (Toronto, Montréal and Vancouver) occurring outside the central municipalities. For the first time, the population in the suburbs of "905" (so-called for its area code), exceeded the population of the amalgamated municipality of Toronto. Similarly, for the first time, the island of Montréal (this includes the ville de Montréal and other municipalities) had a smaller population than the rest of the metropolitan area. According to the The Gazette:

Most of the people who leave the 514-area (the island -ed) for the 450 (off the island -ed) do so reluctantly. They are often young people with children (or who hope to have children). They enjoy the city's stimulation and its proximity to workplaces, shopping and entertainment. But they leave because there's not enough suitable housing in their price range. The taxes are also high and services spotty. Not the greatest place to to raise a family.

Dispersion continued in Ottawa- Gatineau, Calgary and Edmonton, though not as obvious because most suburban areas are inside these proportionately larger central municipalities. Even so, 56% of the growth in the six major metropolitan areas was outside the central municipalities (Table 1).

Table 1
Metropolitan Area Population Trend:
Central Municipalities & Peripheral Municipalities

	Population (000)			Change (000)
	Central Muncipality	Surrounding Muncipalities	Metropolitan Area	Central Muncipality	Surrounding Muncipalities	Metropolitan Area
Toronto	2,615	2,968	5,583	112	358	470
Montreal	1,650	2,175	3,824	29	160	189
Vancouver	604	1,710	2,313	25	171	197
Ottawa-Gatineau	883	353	1,236	71	31	103
Calgary	1,079	136	1,215	90	28	118
Edmonton	812	348	1,160	82	43	125
Total	7,643	7,689	15,332	410	791	1,201


	Change in Population			Share of Growth
	Central Muncipality	Surrounding Muncipalities	Metropolitan Area	Central Muncipality	Surrounding Muncipalities	Metropolitan Area
Toronto	4.5%	13.7%	9.2%	23.8%	76.2%	100.0%
Montreal	1.8%	7.9%	5.2%	15.3%	84.7%	100.0%
Vancouver	4.4%	11.1%	9.3%	12.9%	87.1%	100.0%
Ottawa-Gatineau	8.8%	9.8%	9.1%	69.4%	30.6%	100.0%
Calgary	9.2%	25.5%	10.8%	76.7%	23.3%	100.0%
Edmonton	11.2%	14.1%	12.1%	65.5%	34.5%	100.0%
Average	6.6%	13.7%	9.3%	43.9%	56.1%	100.0%

Urban Core Analysis

Recent amalgamations and aggressive annexation policies make more difficult an analysis of the growth between urban cores and more suburban areas. Only one of the six central municipalities retains boundaries that reflect the core urbanization that preceded the explosive automobile-oriented suburban expansion (Table 2). The same situation exists in US metropolitan areas, where only 19 of the 51 largest metropolitan areas have central municipalities with boundaries that have remained relatively constant over the past 60 years (see Suburbanized Core Cities).

Table 2
Metropolitan Area Population Trend:
Urban Core & Outside

	Change in Population			Change (000)
	Urban Core	Outside	Metropolitan Area	Urban Core	Outside	Metropolitan Area
Toronto	703	4,880	5,583	45	425	470
Montreal	930	2,894	3,824	9	180	189
Vancouver	604	1,710	2,313	25	171	197
Ottawa-Gatineau	218	1,019	1,236	7	96	103
Calgary	128	1,087	1,215	4	114	118
Edmonton	123	1,037	1,160	2	123	125
Total	2,705	12,626	15,332	92	1,109	1,201

	Change in Population			Share of Growth
	Urban Core	Outside	Metropolitan Area	Urban Core	Outside	Metropolitan Area
Toronto	6.8%	9.5%	9.2%	9.5%	90.5%	100.0%
Montreal	0.9%	6.6%	5.2%	4.6%	95.4%	100.0%
Vancouver	4.4%	11.1%	9.3%	12.9%	87.1%	100.0%
Ottawa-Gatineau	3.2%	10.4%	9.1%	6.6%	93.4%	100.0%
Calgary	3.0%	11.8%	10.8%	3.1%	96.9%	100.0%
Edmonton	2.0%	13.4%	12.1%	1.9%	98.1%	100.0%
Average	3.4%	10.5%	9.3%	6.5%	93.5%	100.0%

Urban core based upon federal electoral districts (see text)

The core versus suburban trends are better illustrated by examining areas more representative of the historic cores. This following analysis uses federal electoral districts that roughly conform to the urban cores as they existed in the early 1950s, at the beginning of the automobile oriented expansion. Federal electoral districts generally had a population of approximately 100,000 in 2006.

Toronto: The Toronto metropolitan area grew 9.5%, adding 470,000 new residents.

The central municipality of Toronto contains considerable post World War II suburban development, as a result of a late 1990s municipal amalgamation imposed by the provincial government. Federal electoral districts (Note 2) that roughly match to the former municipality of Toronto's early 1950s boundaries grew 45,000, from a population of 658,000 in 2006 to 703,000 in 2011. This 6.8% increase represents some of the strongest growth in 80 years, though the population of the former municipality tended to hover between 600,000 to 700,000. The core growth between 2006 and 2011 was concentrated in the Trinity-Spadina and Toronto Centre electoral districts, where the population rose 38,000 (16%). These two districts have grown strongly as a result of Toronto's high rise condominium boom. The balance of the urban core grew only 2%.

Areas outside the core added 425,000 population, nearly 10 times the increase of the core. The percentage increase was also stronger, at 9.5%. Approximately 85% of this region’s growth was outside the municipality of Toronto, which The National Post characterized as explosive.

Montréal: Montréal was the slowest growing major metropolitan area, at 5.9%, adding 189,000 new residents.

Like Toronto, expansion of Montréal's municipality boundaries include considerable amounts of post-war development. Yet the core of the ville de Montréal has become considerably less dense. In 1951, the ville de Montréal had a population of 1,022,000 people in 131 square kilometers. By1996 (before an amalgamation), the population had dropped to 1,017,000 in 186 square kilometers. This represents a 30% loss in density. Between 2006 and 2011, nine federal electoral districts (Note 3) in the urban core experienced 0.9% population growth from 922,000 in 2006 to 930,000 2011. No significant densification was evident in these districts.

The areas outside the core added 180,000 people, 95% of the population growth. Nearly 90% of this growth was outside the ville de Montréal.

Vancouver: The Vancouver metropolitan area grew 9.3% between 2006 and 2011 and, despite all the popular literature about the city’s “smart growth” policies, most growth was dispersed. "The population of the City of Vancouver, the urban core, is flat-lining or even declining notes the Globe and Mail. In contrast, "Surrey, Coquitlam and ... Port Moody are growing fast --- shifting Metro Vancouver's centre of gravity east." The Vancouver Sun reported that suburban Surrey would surpass the population of the municipality of Vancouver in the next decade (Note 4).

The municipality of Vancouver has retained virtually its early 1950s boundaries. The municipality grew 4.4% from 2006 to 2011, adding 25,000 residents. One -half the growth was in the densifying Vancouver-Centre electoral district, which includes downtown and English Bay. The rest of the core municipality grew at only one-fourth the rate of downtown. Despite the downtown gains, the suburbs accounted for 87% of the metropolitan area growth. Seven new suburban residents were added for every new resident in the municipality of Vancouver.

Ottawa-Gatineau: The Ottawa-Gatineau metropolitan area straddles the Ontario-Québec border, with the national capital in Ottawa. Ottawa-Gatineau added 9.1% to its population between 2006 and 2011, rising to 1,236,000.

A 1990s amalgamation brought much of the former suburban area into the central municipality. Two federal electoral districts (Note 5) that are representative of the urban core grew 3.2%, from 211,000 to 217,000. Areas outside this core grew 10.4%, from a population of 923,000 to 1,019,000. Non-core area growth accounted for 94% of the metropolitan area's population growth.

Calgary: The Calgary metropolitan area grew 12.6%, to a population of 1,215,000 (Note 6). Calgary is one of the world's most successful post World War II metropolitan areas. Like Edmonton, Phoenix and San Jose, Calgary has virtually no pre-automobile core. However, uncharacteristic for a new metropolitan area, Calgary has developed one of the strongest central business districts – largely due to the oil industry – in North America, and Emporis ranks Calgary's skyline as 57th in the world, just ahead of Seattle.

The core federal electoral district (Calgary-Centre), the most dense in the Calgary metropolitan area, experienced growth of 3.0% from 2006 to 2011. This district is comparatively large in land area, but has a population density one-third that of Vancouver-Centre. All of the electoral districts surrounding Calgary-Centre have much lower densities.

Most of the growth occurred the northern and western portion of the municipality of Calgary and beyond. Overall, the population growth rate outside the core electoral district was 11.8%. Non-core areas of the Calgary metropolitan area accounted for 97% of the growth.

Edmonton: Like Calgary, Edmonton is a post-World War II metropolitan area. The Edmonton metropolitan area added 12.1%, to its population, growing to 1,160,000. The core Edmonton-Centre electoral district, the most dense in the metropolitan area, grew only 2.0%, from 121,000 to 123,000. This district has less than one-quarter the density of Vancouver-Centre. Areas outside the core grew 13.4% from 914,000 to 1,037,000. The non-core areas accounted for 98% of the area's growth. Some of the greatest growth was in the western half of the municipality of Edmonton.

Suburban Gains Dwarf Core Densification

Toronto and Vancouver are experiencing significant increases in downtown populations. But the base is so small that these gains are dwarfed by the scale of suburban population increases. At the same time, central municipality areas outside downtown have lagged. Thus, the 2011 census shows that across Canada, urban dispersion continues, results similar to recent results from the United States as well as a number of major metropolitan areas in the both the developed and the developing world. More than 93% of growth was outside the urban cores.

Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life”

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Note 1: The G-9 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Note 2: Toronto Centre, Toronto-Danforth, Trinity-Spadina, Parkdale-High Park, Davenport and St. Paul’s.

Note 3: Westmount-Ville Marie, Mount Royal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce - Lachine, Outremont, Papineau, Ahutsic, Jeanne-Le Ber, Laurier-Sainte-Marie and Rosemont-La Petite-Patrie

Note 4: If Surrey exceeds Vancouver in population, it is to be wondered if Canada's third largest metropolitan area will be called Surrey instead of Vancouver. A similar displacement of the historic core municipality occurred in the United States when the population of Norfolk was exceeded by suburban Virginia Beach, with the first name of the metropolitan area changing accordingly.

Note 5: Ottawa-Centre and Ottawa Vanier

Note 6: This 12.6% figure differs from the 10.8% in Tables 1 & 2, which is calculated using actual data reported by Statistics Canada. Statistics Canada indicates that the data "excludes census data for one or more incompletely enumerated Indian reserves or Indian settlements."

Photo: Condominium buildings and the CN Tower, Downtown Toronto (by author)

The Decline and Fall of the French Language?

Gary Girod — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 01:38:16 -0400

It's been indisputable for some time that English is becoming the ‘universal language’. As the number of living languages has steadily decreased, the use of English has expanded on every continent. And though English has not — despite predictions — crushed all other languages (German, Russian, and Spanish, to cite the prime examples, all remain strong), one language does seem to be undergoing the predicted cataclysmic collapse. English may not yet have won the globe, but French has definitely lost it.

The reasons for the decline of French are many, including geography. Francophone regions are spread out: think of France, Vietnam, Quebec, and Guadeloupe, to start. Many of these regions are without direct connections to other French-speaking countries. The result is that many of the people choose to abandon French for more useful languages within the region. In contrast, German, Russian and Spanish speakers are based in numerous adjacent countries, each supporting the others.

French has been most visibly hurt in the last few decades in Africa. In North Africa, French has had to compete with Arabic, a language which Arabs are now clinging to as proudly as the French have traditionally clung to French. South of the Sahara, countries which formerly had large French-speaking populations are making the switch to English due to its relevance in Southern Africa, as well as internationally.

In Algeria, after the Algerian War, French was mostly expunged. Its decline has continued, including the recent closure of French schools, as Arabic and English become the standard.

More dramatically, in Zaire, in 1997, fueled by anti-French sentiment, the French language was replaced with native languages. And in nearby Rwanda the president has pushed for the abandonment of French in favor of English. It is questionable whether any Africans will be speaking French in a few decades.

English, meanwhile, is becoming the most important Western language in Africa, replacing both French and Portuguese. An English derivative is the majority language of Sierra Leone, and remains an important language in South Africa, of course, as well as Nigeria, and various other smaller countries.

Former French-speaking colonies beyond Africa have been hostile to the French language. French has been collapsing even faster in Asia than it is in Africa, due to the isolation of French-speaking populations. In Vietnam, students have protested having to learn French, stressing the need to learn English instead. And in the Middle East, the Lebanese have been shucking off French in favor of English.

French has also seen a drastic decline in North America. In the U.S., between 1990 and 1995, college applicants for French class declined by twenty-four percent. In Canada, the number of French students enrolling in English classes is rising rapidly, while the overall percentage of French speakers across Canada is falling.

Across Europe, French has gradually declined from being the lingua franca to falling behind German and English. English is spoken by 41% of Europeans, while only 19% speak French. English is now the language of business in Europe, a fact which even French ambassador for international investment Clara Gaymard was forced to admit. And French has fallen so far behind in Eastern Europe, in particular, that it is the third-most studied language, behind English and Spanish.

While once the language of culture, French has been pushed off the global stage. Perhaps the most symbolic example of this was in 2008 when Sebastian Tiller, the French representative at the Eurovision contest, planned to sing 'Divine' almost exclusively in English. That the French singer did not choose to represent the jealously guarded language of his country internationally came as a shock to many. This cultural decline was mirrored when New York's Metropolitan Opera decided to reject the libretto of the musical star Rufus Wainwright (who was raised in Canada), because he chose not to translate his opera into English.

The calamitous decline in French seems irreversible, even to the French. In 2008, the budget of La Francophonie, the governing body of the French language, was six million euros; in contrast, the British Council announced it would spend 150 million euros in efforts to advance English.

In any Darwinian model, a characteristic can become prominent, or it can be driven out of existence. Use of the French language has been globally dispersed, and French culture is without historical significance in many of its colonies. These are not the characteristics that increase a language's chances of survival.

Photo by funtik.cat (Dasha Bondareva).

Gary Girod graduated Cum Laude from Chapman University in Spring, 2011 with a dual major in European History and French. His work includes creating historical collections for Chapman's Leatherby Libraries. He is also analyzing unpublished primary materials which will be turned into a narrative-driven history of one business magnate's life during the Industrial Revolution, for Paragon Publishing.

Can the Winnipeg Model Save Detroit?

Steve Lafleur — Sun, 15 May 2011 23:05:18 -0400

Detroit, not only in the US but across the globe, has become the poster child for urban decay. The city lost 25% of its population between 2000-2010, and over half its population since 1950. Over 90,000 houses stand empty, and many neighborhoods have been completely abandoned.

The burden of maintaining infrastructure and law enforcement in a city with an eroding tax base and sparse population has lead to attempts to “shrink” the city. This means bulldozing several areas of the city, and relocating existing residents. Current Mayor Dave Bing realizes this, and has pledged to knock down a staggering 10,000 structures during his first term. In the past such slum clearances lead to vigorous opposition from urbanists like Jane Jacobs, who argued that top down approaches to urban redevelopment would cause a great deal of pain, for little to no benefit. Yet despite the fact that Jacobs is widely admired by planners, the plan to shrink the city has met with little opposition in Detroit. Frankly, unless Detroit sees a major population surge, shrinking the city may sadly be necessary.

Last week, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg appeared on NBC’s Meet the Press, and at one point mused about using immigration policy to repopulate the city. Bloomberg didn’t offer a substantive policy proposal, but the premise makes perfect sense. Most of Detroit’s problems stem from the fact that fewer and fewer people are working and paying taxes in the city. There is more infrastructure than people need or the city can afford.

Ultimately the issue then is getting people to live in Detroit. But the biggest problem, even with a mild resurgence in the auto sector, is that Americans, and even most Michiganders, don’t want to live in Detroit, even with jobs.

But for many immigrants, Detroit would seem like a major upgrade over their current living situation. This is not as far-fetched a notion as some may believe. Here’s a proposal for Detroit based on an unlikely Canadian immigration success story: Winnipeg.

Learning from Winnipeg

When Americans think of Winnipeg, they think of white guys wearing earmuffs in July, speaking with the kind of Canadian accents typically ridiculed on American sitcoms. When Canadians from outside of Manitoba think of Winnipeg, they think of a former industrial city that is hardly a draw to the much sought after “creative class” even though the city has the nation’s lowest housing cost. What no one from outside the city associates with Winnipeg is immigration.

Winnipeg’s immigration success is not well known outside of the province, but it is hard to dispute the facts. Smart immigration policies have helped Winnipeg stabilize its population and reverse the city’s decline.

Between 1971-1996, the city of Winnipeg grew by just under 16%, or roughly 0.6% per year. Like many North American cities, all of the growth was taking place in the suburbs. In fact, the population of Downtown Winnipeg shrunk by 23.25% during that period. Though the rate of decline is nowhere near that of Detroit, the causes and effects are similar. Manufacturing declined; people moved to the suburbs, aided by highway expansions and low cost automobiles; residents moved to more entrepreneurial cities, such as Calgary; ensuing job and population decline lead to a decline in safety. The most notable difference is that racial tensions in Detroit exacerbated suburban flight. But the similarities are sufficient to use Winnipeg as a model.

Using immigration to reverse population decline in Manitoba

In 1998, the Province of Manitoba introduced the Provincial Nominee Program, which gave the province the ability to recruit immigrants over and above federal immigration quotas. Since Manitoba was not seen as the most attractive place for new immigrants to settle, only 1.8% of immigrants to Canada settled in the province between 1996-2000 (Note 1). Since the introduction of the nominee program, immigration to the province has increased by 250%. The increase in the City of Winnipeg has been staggering. In the years 1996-2000, the city saw 15,809 new immigrants. In just one year, 2007-2008, the city attracted 16,585 immigrants. Equally as important, 78% of Manitoba immigrants stay in the province, which is a significant improvement over the 1980s, when they had a retention rate of less than 50%. Increased immigration ended Manitoba’s population stagnation, and the province now enjoys consistently positive net migration.

Economic outcomes of Manitoba immigrants

A survey of immigrants who migrated to Manitoba through the provincial nominee program shows promising results. Three quarters of participants surveyed have never experienced involuntary unemployment. Of those surveyed, 85% were employed, and 7% were in school. While the average annual household income of $49,066 for participants is lower than the provincial average of $60,242, they are generally making enough money to live reasonably well, contributing to the provincial and municipal tax bases.

Reasons for the program’s success

Of course, mass immigration often creates challenges for recipient regions. Aside from the need for immigrants to find jobs, they also often require language training, and educational upgrading to meet certification levels for their professions. However, the success of the program shows that participants were by and large able to overcome these difficulties. Some of this can likely be attributed to the fact that immigrants of similar backgrounds tended to cluster together, some integrating into communities with existing settlers of similar backgrounds. The primary examples of these two patterns are the concentration of Filipino immigrants in Winnipeg, and the large number of Mennonites from Germany, Mexico, and South America who integrated into existing Mennonite communities. This can be important, since it allows for them to develop, or take advantage of informal support networks. Living in a community with speakers of the same language makes it easier for immigrants whose first language is not English to integrate into the community, and can help with finding employment.

Benefits of targeted immigration to Detroit

Immigration is often a source of innovation and entrepreneurship. Recent studies have shown that immigrant entrepreneurs in America have created more jobs for existing Americans than for other immigrants. More people moving to Detroit would also mean more customers for the service industry in the city. And by paying property taxes, they would help to keep the city government afloat. Perhaps the most important benefit would be that more people generally would make the city safer. Criminals, after all, hate witnesses.

Hopeful signs from recent immigration to Detroit

Recently, Detroit has experienced an influx of Latino and Muslim immigration. Despite the stigma attached to these groups by many Americans, anecdotal evidence suggests that these newcomers have been a boon to the city. According to the Immigration Policy Center, Arab American employment now contributes $7.7 billion to the Detroit metro economy, and provides $544 million in tax revenue to the state. They now support over 140,000 jobs in the city. Latino immigrants are being credited with helping to revitalize Southwest Detroit, which saw $200 million of investments between 1993-2008, and the area’s population grew by nearly 7% between 1990-2000 even as most of the city declined. The City is now home to nearly 50,000 Latinos, up from under 20,000 in 1990.

And for those who claim immigrants take American jobs, the evidence suggests the opposite. Despite the fact that immigrants have lower average wages than non-immigrants, they manage to have a disproportionate economic impact in many cities, Detroit being one of the best examples. According to the Fiscal Policy Institute, immigrants contribute 1.3 times as much to the economy per capita as non-immigrants in Detroit. This means, among other things, they disproportionately create jobs and contribute to the tax base.

Policy recommendations

Creating a targeted immigration program would require co-operation between municipal, state and federal governments. The policies recommended here are one set of options among many.

The federal government should create an ”urban revitalization” visa category to allow for municipalities with severe demographic declines to accept immigrants without counting them towards immigration quotas.
The state of Michigan, or other similarly challenged states, should create a specific program modeled on Manitoba’s provincial nominee program.
Immigrants should be required to prove that they have the financial means to support themselves for a specified amount of time in the absence of income. This would ensure that they didn’t burden the existing welfare system.
Participants in the program could be required to undertake language training at their own expense, or to prove a basic competence in English.
The City of Detroit should move more aggressively towards allocating abandoned buildings to provide housing or places for businesses of immigrants, or anyone else who wants to occupy them for that matter. Filling buildings means more property taxes.
The City should concentrate on settling new immigrants of similar ethno-linguistic backgrounds into specific underpopulated areas. Rather than simply allowing a certain number of immigrants into the city, they could create zones with high vacancy levels, and allow immigrants who apply to the program to move into these zones initially. The aim should be to populate one neighborhood every two years to fill current vacancies.
Instead of punitive measures to force immigrants to stay in Detroit, the city should provide incentives to stay. This could include requiring immigrants under this program to sign long term leases with large deposits, or to purchase property. This is preferable to attempting to monitor the movement of immigrants.
The city and state should attempt to partner with businesses, who may be interested in opening operations in the city due to the influx of immigrant labor. This could help to give further incentives for new immigrants to stay, and create jobs for existing unemployed residents.

Many of these recommendations require more micromanagement than I’d personally prefer, but address political and economic realities. Simply allowing anyone and everyone to immigrate to Detroit or anywhere else in America is a political non-starter. Also, the dire budgetary situation facing the City of Detroit and the state of Michigan means that neither can afford to allow new immigrants to become economic liabilities. After all, the justification for this program is to replace the tax base and reduce crime, not to create a new underclass. Though there would certainly be some hiccups, evidence in Winnipeg and Manitoba could help to revitalize both Detroit and much of the state of Michigan. Failure to undertake an aggressive revitalization strategy will make an aggressive shrinking strategy inevitable. Given the two choices, revitalization seems vastly preferable.

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Note 1: Unless otherwise noted, data on the Manitoba Provincial Nominees Program is based on http://www2.immigratemanitoba.com/asset_library/en/resources/pdf/pnp-manitoba-provincial-nominee-program-tom-carter-report-2009.pdf

Steve Lafleur is a public policy analyst and political consultant based out of Calgary, Alberta. For more detail, see his blog.

Photo by Arlo Bates

The Poverty Of Ambition: Why The West Is Losing To China And India - The New World Order

Joel Kotkin — Thu, 30 Dec 2010 17:42:37 -0500

The last 10 years have been the worst for Western civilization since the 1930s. At the onset of the new millennium North America, Europe and Oceania stood at the cutting edge of the future, with new technologies and a lion’s share of the world’s GDP. At its end, most of these economies limped, while economic power – and all the influence it can buy politically – had shifted to China, India and other developing countries.

This past decade China’s economic growth rate, at 10% per annum, grew to five times that U.S.; the gap was even more disparate between China and the slower-growing E.U., Yet periods of slow economic growth occur throughout history — recall the 1970s — and economies recover. The bigger problem facing Western countries, then, is a metaphysical one — a malady that the British writer Austin Williams has dubbed “the poverty of ambition.”

This lack of ambition plagues virtually every Western country. The ability to act has become shackled by a profound pessimism that according to a recent Gallup survey contrasts with the optimism found not only in rising states like China, India and Brazil, but also deeply impoverished places like Bangladesh.

Attitudes have consequences. The rising stars of the non-Western world — from the United Arab Emirates to Singapore and China — are building cities with startling new architecture and bold infrastructure. Their entrepreneurs are expanding their operations across the planet.

Of course, you can chortle at the outrageous overbuilding in places like Dubai, but the Western world might do better to appreciate the scope of their ambition. Indeed, for years New York’s Empire State building, erected during the Depression, was derided as ”the empty state building.” Today it’s visionary developers like Iraqi-born Istabraq Janabi who are planning unlikely new structures even in troubled places like Ramadi, Iraq.

The difference in ambition can be seen clearly at airports, which now serve as the entry halls of the global economy. A traveler to John F. Kennedy Airport, Heathrow, Charles De Gualle LAX or Dulles passes through decayed remnants of fading late 20th century buildings and technology. In contrast, airports in Dubai, Hong Kong and Singapore offer clean, ultra-modern facilities with often impressive design.

The West’s retreat from space exploration further underscores its metaphysical poverty. Today, Europe and the U.S., the world’s historic leader in the field, are cutting back on plans to explore the cosmos, which has included a manned operation to the moon. President Obama wants NASA to focus more on issues regarding climate change instead. In contrast, the rising countries of Asia, notably China and India, have begun plans for manned flights to the moon and beyond.

This divergence is not about resources; it is about the growing conviction in the West that moving forward is an illusion or, as the British academic John Gray’s puts it, “progress is a myth.” Victorian empire-makers and intellectuals, like their republican American successors, believed perhaps naively in the potential of humanity, economic and technological progress. Today our intellectual and political classes have gone to the other extreme.

The West’s politics are in the grips of two profoundly retrograde mentalities. One, a small-minded conservatism, harks back to the “golden” age of the 1950s when Western power faced only a flawed Soviet challenge. The idealistic but flawed commitment to imposing democracy by force of the Bush years has faded; it has been replaced by an obsession with taming a bloated public sector. While this focus may be justified, it is fundamentally more reactive than proscriptive.

The Left, which once portrayed itself as the bastion of scientific rationalism, increasingly embraces neo-druidism, a secular form of nature worship. This tendency’s roots can be traced back to the “Limits to Growth” ideology of the early 1970s which projected, mostly mistakenly, that the planet was about to run out of everything from food to oil. Concerns over climate change have transformed this dismal sentiment into a theology, with carbon emissions treated as a form of original sin.

The anti-progress nature of the new Left is unmistakable. Rather than seek ways to control climate change, suggests The Guardian’s George Monbiot, environmentalism is engaged in “a battle to redefine humanity.” Monbiot believes the era of economic growth needs to come to an inevitable denouement; that “the age of heroism” will be followed by the decline of the “expanders” and the rise of the “restrainers.”

Europe, particularly the U.K., suffers acutely from metaphysical angst. Once touted as the new great power by its leaders and their American claque, the E.U. is quickly dissolving along cultural and historical lines; this is especially evident in the division between the resilient countries of the north (something like the Hansa trading states of the late Middle Ages) and the weaker countries along the periphery. For the most part, Europe no longer seems capable of doing much more than finding ways to control an unaffordable welfare state without tearing about its social net. The once cherished notion of a multi-racial “new” Europe largely has dissolved as immigration has devolved from a source of demographic and cultural salvation to a widely perceived threat to the E.U.’s economic and social health as well as security.

Such defeatism usually has less success in the United States. But America’s “progressive” left increasingly resembles its European cousins. Obama’s science advisor, John Holdren, has been a long-time advocate of the idea of “de-development,” the purposeful slowing of growth in advanced countries in order to protect the environment. The critical infrastructure needed to accommodate upward of another 100 million Americans — new dams in the west, intelligent development of our vast natural gas reserves and building new cities, airports and ports – are not at the center of either party’s platforms. These could be financed largely with private sources, given the right incentives.

Fortunately the West’s decline is not at inevitable. China, India, Vietnam, Brazil, South Africa all deserve their day in the sun, but this does not mean that Americans or Europeans should cower in the shadows. Western countries still possess much of the world’s cutting-edge technology and leading companies; the combined GDP for the E.U., North America and Oceania stands at over $33 trillion, almost five times that of India and China together.

More important still, the political and cultural institutions of the West — with their liberal values — represent the best hope for a stable world of self-governing peoples. Does anyone in the West, particularly the progressives in the media and academia, really want a world run by Chinese despotism?

The current financial crisis should serve as both a warning and a spur for a new focus on economic expansion. But this can only occur if the West can restore its belief in its future. This does not necessitate a return to the colonial attitudes of the past, but rather a keener appreciation of our unique human, physical and political advantages.

Only the United States – by far the richest, largest and most populous Western nation — can lead such a revival. For one thing, the U.S. remains the world’s leading immigrant magnet and most diverse large country, all of which makes it the natural center of an evolving global society. Although immigrants pose some serious issues, University of Chicago scholar Tito Sananji notes that the U.S., along with Canada and Australia, seems to be doing a better job educating their newcomers than the continental European states.

The U.S., Canada and Australia also possess resources, most critically food, that could benefit from growing demand in developing countries. Both North America and some European nations — notably the new Hansa of the Netherlands, Germany and Scandinavia – remain world leaders in scores of industrial endeavors, as well as technology- and culture-based industries.

Together these Western countries can do much more to shape the global future than is commonly understood. But to do so this century they will need how to recover the animal spirits that drove their remarkable rise in the last.

Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

Photo by Wally Gobetz

Toronto: Three Cities in More than One Way

Steve Lafleur — Thu, 30 Dec 2010 09:38:48 -0500

The issue of income disparity in Toronto has once again been brought into the public eye by a December 15th report by University of Toronto Professor David Hulchanski. The report, “The Three Cities Within Toronto,” points to a growing disparity in incomes between Downtown Toronto, the inner suburbs, and the outer suburbs of the city. The report demonstrates that between 1970 and 2005 the residents of the once prosperous outer suburbs have been losing ground compared to the now wealthy downtown core. The results for the inner suburbs have been mixed.

In 1970, 66% of city neighbourhoods were considered middle income. Only 15% were considered high or very high, and 19% were low or very low. In 2005, only 29% of neighbourhoods were considered middle income. The number of high or very high income neighbourhoods rose to 19%, while low and very low income neighbourhoods made up a staggering 54% of neighbourhoods.

The news isn’t all bad. After all, the downtown core is now one of the most desirable places to live in North America, and many of the formerly low income neighbourhoods have gentrified, or are in the process of doing so. However, many of the city’s traditional suburbs have been decimated. The former cities of Etobicoke and Scarborough used to be middle class. Not so much anymore.

In real dollar terms, even the majority of the very low income areas have become wealthier. The trouble with poverty statistics is that they focus on relative poverty, rather than absolute poverty. This means that if Etobicoke’s average income doubled tomorrow, the downtown core would all of a sudden be considered poor. This is a major limitation. Toronto isn’t exactly turning into a Canadian Detroit.

The report rightly points to the need for greater mobility in the outer suburbs. Given that the most lucrative jobs are typically downtown, many young professionals and recent graduates living outside of the core need to be able to get downtown cheaply and quickly in order to build their careers. Where the report goes wrong is that it recommends stricter land use regulations, stronger rent controls, and the revival of the flawed Transit City plan that Mayor Ford vigorously campaigned against in the recent election.

It is easy for academics to blame a lack of social welfare spending, or suburbanization for the problem. The real problem is the loss of local policy making power resulting from amalgamation. For the most part, the areas losing ground the fastest are the formerly middle class suburbs amalgamated into the city. In contrast the “exurbs” just outside of city boundaries have thrived. This is no coincidence. The real takeaway from this study is that the suburbs have different needs than the central core. By attempting to accommodate the needs of both, the megacity has benefitted neither. Short of de-amalgamation, the only hope for the city is to substantially decentralize policy making. No amount of spending can make up for the loss of local autonomy.

Policies have different effects in different types of cities. Take the treatment of automobiles. It might make sense to discourage automobile usage in downtown Toronto, but the benefits of doing so in Vaughan or Pickering would be questionable at best. Similarly, mandating that every commercial establishment have a public washroom probably makes sense as a public health measure in downtown, where public urination is an issue, but not so much in suburban Markham, or Richmond Hill.

Making sensible regulations for a small, relatively homogenous area isn’t all that difficult. Applying these regulations to a large, demographically diverse area can help some areas and hurt others. It’s not that regulations need to be a zero sum game. People in Etobicoke wouldn’t be affected if, say, maximum parking allotments were tightened in the downtown core. They would be affected if they were tightened throughout the entire megacity. Similarly, increasing maximum parking allotments might hurt the core and help the suburbs. The current one size fits all approach sometimes benefits the core and sometimes benefits the suburbs, but ever both.

Perhaps more important than city wide regulations is the centralization of taxing power. Since the merger, the city now sets tax rates across the entire megacity. This also allows the city to control the ratio of residential to non-residential taxes. The city of Toronto has the highest ratio of non-residential to residential taxes in Ontario. This means that businesses carry a higher share of the tax load in the city than anywhere else in the province. The combination of tax and regulatory policies in the city have lead the Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses to rank Toronto as the second least business friendly city in Canada. On a scale of 1-100, Toronto came in at 33, slightly ahead of Vancouver’s 31. Meanwhile, the rest of the (Greater Toronto Area) GTA is near the top, at 61. Neighbouring Oshawa took the top spot in Ontario with 69.

GTA Area Cities by CFIB Entrepreneurial Cities Policy Score

Rank (Ontario)	City	Score	Driving Distance to Yonge and Bloor
1	Oshawa	69	0:45
6	GTA (Excluding Toronto)	61
	Mississauga	61	0:27
	Brampton	61	0:41
	Richmond Hill	61	0:32
	Markham	61	0:32
	Vaughan	61	0:32
16	Hamilton	55	0:58
19	Guelph	54	1:15
24	Barrie	52	1:16
27	Brantford	51	1:20
30	Kitchener	48	1:23
33	Toronto	33
	Etobicoke	33	0:20
	Scarborough	33	0:21

Now the share of non-residential to residential taxes in Toronto may actually make sense downtown. The core is home to the third biggest financial sector in North America. These jobs are heavily concentrated in the downtown core.

Downtown Toronto isn’t competing with low tax Vaughan or Barrie for these jobs. They are competing with high tax cities like New York and Chicago. This means that employment in the core is not as easily chased off by taxes and regulations than in the suburbs. But in industries like wholesale and manufacturing, which are far more important outside of the core, employment can easily relocate to Barrie, Mississauga, Oshawa, and so forth. Indeed, jobs have been leaving the city since before the recession hit.

Since 2004 Downtown and North York have prospered but the rest of the city has lost jobs. This should make the results of the Professor Hulchanski’s report unsurprising. The financial sector isn’t enough to keep the entire city employed or lift wages in the city-controlled suburban rings. As a a result despite the thriving financial sector, Toronto was dead last in the GTA in terms of median incomes.

To turn this around, the city must decentralize decision making power so the suburban communities can come up with their own economic development strategies. No matter how much the city improves transit to the outer suburbs, they will not be able to significantly increase median incomes without creating more jobs. The financial sector will continue to grow, but many of jobs created in this sector require specialized training, and thus go to people from outside of the city. This doesn’t do much for former manufacturing workers in Scarborough and Etobicoke. Growth of the financial sector combined with the dispearance of blue collar jobs together guarantee continuing income disparities in the city.

Below is previously published data from Professor Hulchanski that highlights how badly blue collar sections of the city have been hit.

Fundamentally, a strong focus on financial and other so-called “creative class” jobs will do little for these areas. The above map was created by Richard Florida’s Martin Prosperity Institute. It shows that most creative class jobs are clustered around the subway, but this doesn’t mean that expanding rail transit will expand creative class employment. Building a light rail line through a neighbourhood doesn’t suddenly transform the residents into artists and physicians. It may attract more artists and physicians, but this could actually hurt local residents by driving up rent and property values without creating jobs for them. Below is a map of educational attainment by ward. The darker the colour, the higher the number of residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher.

The real problem is that a focus on elite jobs creates exactly the kind of bifurcation that progressive complain about. Given that city wide business policies are tailored towards creative class type occupations, it is unlikely that price sensitive manufacturers will find any reason to locate within city boundaries, rather than setting up shop in Mississauga or Barrie.

Indeed, for all the temptation by urbanists to point to Toronto’s suburban ring as an example of the decline of suburbia, the peripheral suburban areas outside of city limits have been booming. Here is a map of growth in the GTA between 2001-2006. While Toronto grew modestly, suburban cities Milton, Brampton, Vaughan, Richmond Hill, Markham, Ajax, and Whitby all grew by at least 20%. Even Oshawa, which was hit hard by the decline of the auto sector, has managed to survive, and indeed maintained a higher median income than Toronto during this period. Regional rival Mississauga eclipsed Toronto’s growth rate, and emerging regional player Barrie grew by over 20%.

In short, despite its strong financial core, Toronto is losing its standing as the go-to destination in the GTA. And it could get worse. Mississauga is working hard to lure financial services and advanced manufacturing jobs from Toronto. Several other cities, such as Guelph and Waterloo are actually competing for the very creative types that Toronto’s policies are tailored to attract. Other cities, such as Barrie are working hard to cannibalize what is left of Toronto’s manufacturing and distribution sectors. Were it not for amalgamation, Etobicoke or Scarborough could just as easily have undertaken a similar strategy to attract blue collar jobs.

The Three Cities report identifies serious regional disparities in Toronto. Unfortunately, it doesn’t provide much insight into how to fix the problem. Expanding transit options will only go so far towards this. Building more light rail may raise median incomes by attracting wealthier people to these neighbourhoods. Ironically, this will only widen the income gap. The real challenge is finding out how to create opportunities for blue collar jobs in suburban Toronto. Unfortunately, amalgamation has imposed one size fits all policies that may work downtown, but utterly fail in the suburbs and continue to drive people to the periphery outside the city limits. Ironically, the very policies that seek to halt “sprawl” may well end up exacerbating it.

Toronto Skyline photo by Smaku

Steve Lafleur is a public policy analyst and political consultant based out of Calgary, Alberta. For more detail, see his blog.

Toward a Continental Growth Strategy

Joel Kotkin — Sun, 19 Dec 2010 20:38:40 -0500

North America remains easily the most favored continent both by demography and resources. The political party that harnesses this reality will own the political future.

America cannot afford a prolonged period of slow economic growth. But neither Democrats nor Republicans are prepared to offer a robust growth agenda. Regardless of what happened in the November midterm elections, the party that can outline an economic expansion strategy suitable to this enormous continental nation will own the political future.

Economic expansion that barely exceeds the current 2 percent or less is woefully insufficient for the United States. Such meager growth could perhaps work in countries with very low birthrates and limited immigration, such as in much of Europe and Japan, but not in the demographically vibrant United States.

In the years between 2000 and 2050, Europe’s workforce will decline by 25 percent; Japan’s by 44 percent; China’s by 10 percent. In contrast, America’s workforce is expected to expand by more than 40 percent, adding millions of new entrants from an increasingly diverse population.

Given the growth in workforce, it is impossible to see how the country succeeds without rapid expansion not only of employment but also a broad-based wealth creation. Despite conservative attempts to dress up the numbers, the vast bulk of all the gains in wealth since 2000 have been achieved by the relatively small number of Americans with incomes significantly above the poverty level. Meantime many middle-tier educated and skilled workers have lost ground while the rate of upward mobility has stagnated.

The collapse of the housing bubble has eliminated the one way that middle class families took advantage of economic growth during the Bush years. Under Obama, virtually all the gains have been to the stock market (up 30 percent) and corporate profits (42 percent). Meanwhile, weekly earnings, jobs, and home sales price all stagnated or declined. But the biggest price may be paid by young people; even those with degrees have lagged behind in wage growth as they crowd into a labor market potentially far tougher than the one their boomer parents faced.

All this suggests an emerging “aspiration gap” that could define our politics for much of the next few decades. Today, belief in the achievability of the “American dream,” according to a recent survey by Strategy One, has dropped to the low 40s. Americans may still overwhelmingly believe in the ideal of upward mobility but, as individuals, now only a minority feel they can achieve it themselves.

The “aspiration gap” fundamentally does not advantage either party at the moment. Democrats are set for large losses in the 2010 election. But party identification and approval for the GOP remain low, particularly among the rising minority and millennial constituencies. Even in suburbia, amid rapidly rising middle class angst, the Republicans, according to a recent Hofstra University poll, have lost more support than the Democrats since 2008. Independents have been the big winner and constitute the largest faction of suburbanites—more than 36 percent, compared to just 30 percent two years ago.

Our Failing Parties: The Democrats

Let’s start with the Obamacized Democratic Party. Up through the 1990s, the Democrats still maintained strong links to small businesses, private sector unions, and the old Midwest industrial economy. This gave them reasons to favor growth-inducing policies that could close the “aspiration gap.”

But today the party has become captured largely by the coastally oriented alliance of public employees, their charges, greens, and the professiorate—what Fred Siegel calls an alliance of the “overeducated and the undereducated.” For the most part, these constituencies are largely detached from the private sector, and thus only tangentially interested in economic growth. Even high unemployment, unsurprisingly, was not the primary concern for an administration dominated by longtime public servants and tenured professors—people who rarely lose their jobs.

This indifference stems not so much from a traditional socialist agenda, as imagined by some conservatives, but by the nature of the party’s constituencies. It is more a dictatorship of the professoriate than that of the proletariat.

Further obscuring the growth agenda is the fact that some key advisors consider growth itself inherently evil. Take for instance the president’s science advisor John Holdren. A protégé of the Malthusian Paul Ehrlich, Holdren long has favored the planned “de-development” of Western economies in order to reduce consumption.

The “de-development” agenda has been bolstered by the growth of the climate change industry. Proposals for “cap and trade” rules or Environmental Protection Agency regulations on greenhouse gases represent profound threats to basic industries like manufacturing, housing, and agriculture. In contrast, they have proven boffo for university research grant-seekers and Silicon Valley venture capitalists, who increasingly focus on “clean” technologies subsidized by government grants and edicts favoring their technologies.

The climate change agenda also distorts the administration’s approach to infrastructure. Instead of focusing on transportation bottlenecks effecting companies and commuters on a daily basis, the administration has favored massive boondoggles such as high-speed rail or sometimes poorly conceived light-rail systems. These are often too expensive compared to alternatives, and not well-suited to the needs of most American communities or companies.

Our Failing Parties: The Republicans

Today, with as many as 25 million Americans unemployed or underemployed, the Democratic Party still seems to be missing a coherent program to put them back to work. Sadly, much the same can be said of the Republicans, who benefit from populist outrage about the stimulus, but also lack an answer to the deepening aspirational gap.

The fundamental problem is obvious at the level of the Tea Party, the grassroots driving force behind today’s GOP. Tea partiers know what they are against—higher taxes and government spending—but have not developed much in the way of approaches to spur growth.

This is epitomized by the career of the movement’s patron saint, Sarah Palin. Celebrated by many in the “lower 48,” Palin is widely seen among Alaska’s predominately Republican business community as indifferent to economic growth. As governor, they maintain, she proved more interested in redistribution to the middle class—through larger checks from the state’s energy fund—than in investing in things like new infrastructure.

“She epitomizes the whole idea of we get a piece and no sense of planning for the future, about thinking about what we need to do,” notes Jim Egan executive director of Commonwealth North, a local think tank.

Long-term growth, in Alaska and elsewhere, Egan suggests, needs government to play a critical supporting role. The fact that the Obama administration missed its opportunity to focus on basic infrastructure in its bungled, politically driven stimulus does not mean that investing in the future is an inherently bad idea.

The Republican embrace of austerity represents good policy when it comes to reducing wasteful spending, notably on public employee pensions. But knee-jerk resistance to any government spending could prove detrimental in an increasingly competitive world.

Needed: A Continental Strategy

To promote economic growth, the country needs to develop a new national consensus around which I call “a continental strategy.” This would focus on taking advantage of the unique demographic and resource assets of this country as well as its North American neighbors, Mexico and Canada.

Today the United States faces formidable competitors, notably from China, India, and Brazil. These are proud, vast countries with considerable resources and an expanding middle class population. At least in the short run, they suffer neither the ruinous demography of Japan nor the elaborate welfare burdens of Western Europe.

Already these countries are investing in their basic infrastructure so that they can tie their vast landmass together and profit from it.

Hard as it is to imagine amid the wreckage of the stimulus, American history is replete with examples of how government can actually do good things. The public support for canals, railway lines, the New Deal engineering and construction projects, the Interstate Highway, and space programs all greatly benefited the country’s economy. They underpinned first American leadership in the industrial age, and then in the information economy. In recent decades, public investment in basic infrastructure construction and maintenance has declined, even in the face of considerable population growth.

“One looks back at that map ‘Landscape by Moses,’” writes the sociologist Nathan Glazer, about the legacy of New York City’s “master builder” Robert Moses, “and if one asks what has been added in the 50 years since Moses lost power, one has to say astonishingly: almost nothing.”

Restoring our priority towards binding together and improving our continental infrastructure remains critical to achieving greater economic growth. Rather than a policy of retrenchment, it would represent a return to an approach that sparked our original ascendency and could gain broad bipartisan support.

Even today, what makes a continental strategy so compelling lies with this often overlooked reality: North America remains easily the most favored continent both by demography and resources. It possesses the world’s second-largest oil reserves and massive, still largely untapped natural gas supplies.

North America also constitutes by far the world’s richest agricultural area, with the most arable land. This is a huge advantage as global food demands grow over the next few decades. Critically, the continent also boasts more than four times as much water per capita as either Asia or Europe.

Most important still, North America retains a unique demographic vitality among all advanced countries. It continues to lure upwardly mobile people from around the world: roughly half of the world’s educated migrants come to America, and a considerable number also head for Canada.

Ultimately a continental strategy meets the needs of large segments of the country—ranging from immigrants and their children to millennials—who will dominate our emerging job market. These same groups in the coming decades will also shape our political future.

The party that offers these new voters the greatest opportunities for work, raising a family, and buying a house will be the one that dominates the political future. As generational chroniclers Mike Hais and Morley Winograd, both committed Democrats, have pointed out, millennials are essentially nonideological; they will be attracted to those policies that work, both for society and for their young families.

Although this year’s political results may please conservative ideologues, they should recognize that this represents only the defeat of poorly executed Obamian statism. The future belongs to whichever party emerges as the true party of growth.

This article originally appeared at The American.

Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

Photo by IronRodArt - Royce Bair

Love and the City

Larry Beasley — Sat, 27 Nov 2010 13:11:16 -0500

It has been said that the modern city is soulless, that it is heartless, and that it is brutal. The modern city represents in its scale and complexity one of the most extraordinary of human inventions, but there is also no doubt that everywhere in the world it is also one of our biggest failures.

The dysfunction of a city in the past was an inconvenience. The dysfunction of a city in the future will be a profound disaster for that city and, ironically, a profound opportunity for another city, of a smarter city. It will be an opportunity for a city that has found out how to position itself better in the world of cities, but more importantly in the eyes and hearts of its citizens.

All over the world, there is a growing recognition that this brutality must stop; we have to imagine a different kind of city which addresses human needs and that puts the soul back into the city. This is essential to the survival of the city. Put another way, there is a growing understanding that it is actually “love” that will be the prime force in the future economy of successful 21st century cities.

Who would have thought in the last generation that “love” might become a meaningful topic in a discussion about urban economies, much less a prime force of those economies?

One important reason for creating a love-based city grows from the struggle today among cities for hegemony. We read all the time about “alpha-cities” and “delta-cities”: the “alphas” enjoy the fruits of labour and the “deltas” just do the labour – they just exist. And why is this?

Well, it’s because the dynamics of urban growth and competition have fundamentally changed in the last quarter century. The world has become footloose, with people and capital moving at will: business can be done anywhere. Other aspects of life are more important than one’s livelihood and where people choose to settle is not tied down the way it used to be. We can do and be almost anything anywhere.

The result is a new kind of economic base for our cities, augmenting the traditional economic activities holding our cities together. This is the ideas and service economy and it opens up the imperative to create a city of beauty and quality liveability and style. This is an economy driven by people, their direct needs, their preferences and their day-to-day experiences.

This ideas and service economy quickly becomes an economy involving almost everyone. If you live in a core city, have you ever tried to get a gardener or a plumber? But, even beyond that, you have to think about all of the professions and vocations that can now demand an enjoyable as well as functioning city.

We’re not just talking about the service sector or the ‘creatives’, we’re talking about almost everybody. We have to focus the discussion on a city that is liveable for a broad array of its population.

I worry that in all our creative thinking about sustainable technologies and sustainable urban forms, there may be some strong denial going on about people and their inclinations, denial that will block the way towards sustainability.

Take the fashion that insists on the primacy of density and mixed use and diversity and sustainable transportation. Sadly, most consumers in the English speaking world, except in a very few of our older gracious places, have shown very little interest in being a part of that kind of city. In my country, two-thirds of Canadians live in auto-dominated suburbs that boast none of these qualities – and that proportion is even higher in America.

Let’s be blunt: most people hate density because most of it has been so bad; they think of mixed use as probably hitting them negatively and transit is not even in most people’s vocabulary. The ideal of most people is some sort of rural “garden of Eden” that they want to escape to from the city – even if that ends up being an illusory goal.

I sympathize. The cities we have been building since the War have very seldom offered anything very appealing at almost any density. Who can really fall in love with brutal concrete canyons or anonymous strip malls or wind-swept roads?

If cities want to offer an alternative, they must change and bring back the human touch – we have to bring placemaking to the very heart of the civic agenda. We have to stop trading away the urban qualities we care about for the urgencies of the moment of modern life.

We must start to build places that truly appeal to people – yes, places that are sustainable, but also places that are so good that people will choose them. These cities have to have all the human services and they have to have beauty and they have to be gentle. Only then will they become attractive to a wide range of people.

I call this “Experiential Planning” – learning about and then carefully making the city deliver the experiences people tell us they want in their lives for their families and children.

Experiential planning looks beyond land-use and transportation patterns to things like character and comfort and health and convenience and the visceral response of the senses and caprice: things that simply make people happy. Happiness is the applied side of love.

People want all of the efficiencies and choices but they also want more. They want to feel the unique, special spirit of a place as a real thing, not a marketing gimmick. They want their habitat to have a “buzz” that makes them feel good. They want their day-to-day living environment to foster social engagement and neighbourliness not isolation. That is what the contemporary city has often been missing.

For as long as anyone can remember, modern cities, with very few exceptions, have been shaped by economic activity and politics and the shifting of social groups: the city exploited as a commodity. But that doesn’t have to be the case. We can actually design our cities as an explicit act of creation – grand civic design with the whole city as a canvas. And every city has to find its own way: they should not accept cookie-cutter replications of what’s being done everywhere else.

To start, every city needs to perform a ritual burning of these outdated and single-purpose rules. Now I am not talking about de-regulation. The city of the future will have to have strong regulations because the possibilities out there for development are just too diverse and the private interests in development too strong. There must be a clear expression of the public interest and public needs to match that of the private sector.

Also, I want to be clear that this is not a “top-down” agenda. Experiential planning requires an aggressive and diverse engagement of the public at every step along the way to articulate the public perspective and to insure public buy-in and ownership. The general public needs to discuss and debate an overall civic vision and all aspects of urban design.

In this experiential-based city there will be an alignment of profitability and community building. We will also see people coming back to live in the core city and to suburbs transformed through natural choice and preference. There will be an alignment of consumer selection and sustainable practice. This will include all kinds of people but especially families with children.

But none of this will happen by accident. We have to make it happen and bring along individual values through a careful process of reconciliation.

Tomorrow’s city must meet the environmental test and the economic test but it must also meet the experiential test; and that is the test of love; that is the test of soul. It must be beautiful and joyful and sociable and humane and offer a complete rich community life – with all the subtleties of human occupation. That is the real power of an urban love affair.

Larry Beasley is the retired Director of Planning for the City of Vancouver in Canada. He is now the “Distinguished Practice Professor of Planning” at the University of British Columbia and the founding principal of Beasley and Associates, an international planning consultancy. He chairs the ‘National Advisory Committee on Planning, Design and Realty’ of Ottawa’s National Capital Commission; he is the Chief Advisor on Urban Design for the City of Dallas, Texas; he is on the International Economic Development Advisory Board of Rotterdam in The Netherlands; and he is the Special Advisor on City Planning to the Government of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates.

Photo by ecstaticist

Toronto Election Highlights Failure of Amalgamation

Steve Lafleur — Thu, 25 Nov 2010 16:38:51 -0500

In my pre-election piece on the Toronto election, I discussed the city’s lingering malaise. It developed slowly but its roots can be traced to the 1998 amalgamation that swallowed up five suburban municipalities. This led to a six folds expansion of city boundaries and a tripling the population base. This amalgamation was initiated by the province of Ontario as a cost saving measure and faced major local opposition. Citizens and politicians were concerned that the benefits of the alleged efficiency saving would be outweighed by the negative impact of losing local decision making powers. The recent Toronto municipal election bore out this concern.

In the October 25th election, Torontonians were presented with two dramatically different visions. The first vision was presented by former Liberal Ontario cabinet minister George Smitherman. A self-described progressive, Smitherman appealed mainly to voters in the downtown core of Old Toronto. He stood for issues such as improved bicycle lanes, renewal of the downtown waterfront, and improving social housing conditions. The second version was presented by maverick councilor Rob Ford, who represented a ward in the former City of Etobicoke. Ford’s message was simple: it’s time to stop the “gravy train” at City Hall. While he had elaborate platforms on many issues, cutting waste at City Hall was his ubiquitous message.

Despite Toronto’s social democratic image, Rob Ford won a crushing victory. Ford earned 47% of the vote, while Smitherman ended up with 35%. Far left candidate Joe Pantalone (known primarily for attempting to stop businesses from opening in his own ward) managed to capture 12% of the vote.

Aside from the shock that a partisan conservative won in Toronto, there are two other significant developments. Both front runners were significantly more fiscally conservative than the current administration. Ford and Smitherman represented constituencies desperately seeking change. Smitherman’s base was frustrated with the inability of the city to provide the services that they want efficiently. Ford’s base was angry that the city is providing many of these services in the first place.

Not surprisingly the results broke down along specific geographic lines. Ford won an outright majority of votes in every single ward outside of Old Toronto. Within the old boundaries, Smitherman won 13 of the 16 wards. The three Old Toronto wards Ford won are all on the fringes of the Old City.

In 1997, the newly amalgamated city went to the polls for the first time. Conservative former North York Mayor Mel Lastman narrowly defeated social democratic former Old Toronto Mayor Barbara Hall. Since then, downtown oriented social democrats have controlled the city ever since.

Clearly this result shows that the concerns expressed by the opponents of amalgamation were largely valid. Amalgamation failed to create cost savings, and has created a dysfunctional megacity. Rather than having six municipalities where voters are focusing on solving local problems, we have one gigantic city with the core and the suburbs fighting for their share of the public purse. This leads to the schizophrenic policy decisions we see today.

Before amalgamation, there were six different versions of Toronto life that one could choose from. If you didn’t like living in high tax Toronto, you could live in Etobicoke. If Etobicoke’s bylaws and business taxes were hurting your business, you could move to North York. Now all people in the Toronto area can do is vote the bums out on election day, or get out of the area altogether. This isn’t a viable long-term solution.

The problems are systemic, and cannot be solved so long as the megacity exists. This extends beyond the fact of the impossibility of satisfying the core and the suburbs at the same time. The megacity allows public sector unions to literally hold 2.5 million people hostage whenever they feel like it. A notorious strike last summer lead to a month without garbage collection in the entire city. The 24,000 strikers also shut down parks and recreation services, daycare, provision of municipal licenses, health inspections, animal services, and forced a 25% reduction in ambulance services. In 2008, the transit union called a last minute strike at midnight on a Friday night, grinding the city to a halt. These are just two examples of how powerful Toronto public sector unions have become. The only reason strikes aren’t more frequent is that the city typically gives them whatever they want in order to avoid chaotic strikes. De-amalgamation would not only allow more local control over policy, but would help fray the noose that the unions have tied around the city’s neck.

Downtown progressives gripe over how Rob Ford is going to destroy their city, but they should take a minute to think about what some of their policies have been doing to suburbanites for years. They have imposed high taxes, and burdensome regulations on the amalgamated cities, as well as a myriad of new bylaws. Some of these policies make sense in Old Toronto. For instance, dissuading automobile usage in the congested core makes sense. Doing so in the suburbs does not. It might make sense to regulate trees on private property in a crowded downtown neighborhood. Not so much in a new subdivision. One-size-fits-all policies don’t work across a city as large and diverse as Metropolitan Toronto.

Now that the suburbs have wrought their revenge on the old city, progressives need to recognize that de-amalgamation is not just a fantasy of libertarians and angry suburbanites. It is a prerequisite to restoring sound public policy reflecting the preferences of individual communities. Railing against Rob Ford won’t fix the problem. Rob Ford is what the suburbs want. As long as the megacity lives, Toronto will elect a Rob Ford type every now and then.

The only way to stop this pattern of alternating, divergent visions is by de-amalgamation. Critics will use metaphors such as ‘unscrambling an egg’ to illustrate the difficulties of de-amalgamation. No one should believe that de-amalgamation would be easy. But there will never be a better time than now to take the necessary step of de-amalgamation. A few years of chaotic governance would be worth the long run benefit of restoring local control.

Downtown Toronto photo by Astro Guy

Steve Lafleur is a public policy analyst and political consultant based out of Calgary, Alberta. For more detail, see his blog.