London

The Drive-It-Yourself Taxi: A Smooth Ride?

Scott Le Vine — Sat, 05 Jan 2013 10:07:02 -0500

Despite a corporate sponsor that paid handsomely for the naming rights, Londoners stubbornly refer to our bikesharing system as ‘Boris Bikes’, in a nod to our colourful Mayor, Boris Johnson. But what will we call our new drive-it-yourself taxis? My suggestion: ‘Boris Cabs’ – and they are now a reality here, thanks to Daimler’s car2go service, if you happen to live in one of three small and separate sections of town. But why did a one-way carsharing system have to limp into London, when more than a dozen other cities have welcomed these arrangements with open arms? In the US, car2go first appeared in Austin, Texas, and since then has moved into Washington, D.C, Miami, Portland Oregon, San Francisco, San Diego, and Seattle. It operates in Canada and, on the Continent, in Paris and Amsterdam, among other locations. So why no splashy launch across England's Capital, and no images of a smiling Boris cutting a ribbon?

First, roads in London are balkanised. Our regional transport agency (Transport for London) runs the main arteries, and they provide little on-street parking, the mother’s milk of one-way carsharing. That leaves the local streets in the the domain of the 33 boroughs that are each independent municipalities. Car2go is making a brave attempt to get off the ground here by starting with hundreds of cars (the press release reports 500; in practice,170 are in operation two weeks after the launch) in disconnected sections of town, something it has not resorted to anywhere else. Its standard practice is to strike a city-wide deal with whoever’s in charge of on-street parking, and no single agency fits that bill here. What’s the rush? Well, BMW is hot on their heels with its competing DriveNow system, with staff in London well into the advanced stages of planning.

Second, there is genuine uncertainty about the impacts". Will we take drive-it-yourself cabs to work, and avoid the crush on the Tube? It would be a very different experience than traditional carsharing — London is said to be Zipcar’s second-biggest market after NYC — which doesn’t work for the daily commute. In the Zipcar model (soon to be the 'Zipcar by Avis' model?) you take a car on a round-trip basis and pay by the hour, like filling a parking meter. The novelty of this new generation of drive-yourself cabs lies in their flexibility: as with a taxi meter, you pay by the minute for just the time it takes you to get from ‘A’ to ‘B’, then drop the car off and forget about it.

What does this mean for traffic congestion? CO2 emissions? What about the cute blue-and-white Smart Fortwo-model cars now parked in your neighbourhood – will they mean less parking for private car owners? Not bloody likely. The expectation is that, in time, enough private car owners will switch to using the fleet’s cars, meaning that on balance fewer cars will need to be parked. But try explaining this to car2go’s new neighbours who are not familiar with the subtleties and will be the ones dealing with the growing pains as we feel our way forward.

Transport is a long game, so it will be years until we properly understand the impacts of drive-yourself cabs. My research suggests that likely impacts are:

1) A much larger market than traditional carsharing (about four times as many subscribers)
2) A roughly 4% reduction in personal car ownership
3) About a 1% decrease in car driving vehicle miles travelled (including personal cars, traditional carsharing, and drive-yourself cabs)
4) About a 1% decrease in the number of public transport journeys

We can be reasonably certain that some surprising impacts will be revealed during field trials, and if at some future point London’s authorities are not happy with the knock-on effects there’s nothing to stop us from regulating the industry like any other. But for the moment we don’t understand it well enough to do anything other than let the operators experiment and keep tabs on what’s happening.

We just don’t know what the impacts on traffic levels and CO2 will turn out to be, and, frankly, it’s unfair to – as some suggest – hold the industry to a no-net-traffic/CO2 standard. We don’t do that to Black Cabs or [advance-booking-only] minicabs, or indeed to the automotive or urban transport sectors more broadly. A fairer standard, admittedly more complex to administer, would be to assess whether net value is created after accounting for effects on traffic levels, emissions and more. In other words: get the prices right, just like the economics textbooks say.

The question that needs thinking through is what would transport in London look like if drive-yourself taxi systems went viral and we came to depend on them. What happens, for instance, when instead of 500 of these cabs there are 50,000, and the necessary communication links go down? How would the transport system work if on-road congestion became replaced by virtual queuing to get access to a car? And what about times when the system is under stress, like when a hurricane is approaching, for instance. Is it OK to just flip the switch off on the whole fleet? Who would make this decision, and what guidelines would they follow?

If the history of the car in cities has taught us anything, it is that we need to be humble about our ability to forecast the future. So what is the way forward for Boris Cabs in London? Start with a small fleet and short-duration contracts. Be clear on the objectives and flexible on the implementation. Keep our options open. It will be an interesting ride.

Scott Le Vine, AICP is a research associate in transport systems at Imperial College London and a trustee of the shared-mobility NGO Carplus, which serves as the UK’s carsharing trade body. He authored the recent study Car Rental 2.0: Car club [carsharing] innovations and why they matter.

Flickr photo: Car 2 Go in the 1700 block of Q Street, NW, Washington DC on Easter Sunday, 8 April 2012 by Elvert Barnes Photography

Libor: Is The City of London Fixed?

Matthew Stevenson — Tue, 31 Jul 2012 01:38:39 -0400

Having worked inside banking, do I think that banks colluded to post an artificial London interbank offered rate, otherwise known as Libor? For those not in the brotherhood, that acronym is a compendium of average borrowing prices from sixteen large banks, pronounced either as lee-boar or lie-bore. Before turning to conspiracy theories, let’s review the facts of a scandal that began more than four years ago, and are so murky that I, for one — despite twenty-five years in international banking — have a hard time grasping.

In 2008, around the time of the September panic, Barclays and perhaps other large banks began obfuscating the true costs of their interbank borrowing, and submitted rates to the “fix” (in all senses of the word) that were less than their actual cost of funds. Why?

Few creditors wanted to take a chance on leaving their deposits in large European or American banks, especially since so many, such as Lehman, Merrill Lynch, Countrywide, and the UK's Northern Rock were shuttering their branch windows.

Only by paying over the market rates could banks like Barclays fund their bloated balance sheets of subprime assets. (Big banks in 2008 were more like pyramid schemes.) If the market got wind of their true borrowing costs, it would have eroded what little confidence was left in the banking system. Barclays and the British government concocted (shall we say colluded?) to post rates to the Libor “fix” that did not reflect the bank’s actual cost of borrowing funds.

As in Olympic scoring, when setting the Libor the highs and lows are thrown out, leaving the financial world with an approximation of what big banks pay to borrow from each other. When big banks actually trade with each other, however, they have to pay what they agree to with their creditors, not the Libor rates printed in the Wall Street Journal.

In 2008, Barclays was paying over Libor. The British government was helping it to cover its wobbly funding tracks in the interest of showing the financial world that London banks were solid and creditworthy.

Before this shell game, there was the another leg of the current scandal. From about 2005 onward, Barclays and others had been posting artificially high interbank borrowing costs, so that borrowers across the world would be paying higher benchmark rates on their loans and derivative contracts, valued in the trillions of dollars.

The reasons are easy to calculate. Imagine that the world’s big banks can borrow from each other at 2%, but that they secretly agree to establish a Libor benchmark rate of 2.5%. The fifty basis points are pure profit to anyone funding loans at 2%, and then charging a margin on top of 2.5%.

If true, Libor’s three-card Monte could have drained a reported $22 billion from unwitting borrowers. Nevertheless, while cabalistic traders were feathering their plush-carpeted nests, global regulators were also willing accomplices to the large banks in these rigged markets.

After the crash, institutions like the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank were desperate to recapitalize the banking system. The presumed results would be to improve the profitability of the banks, and make them less dependent on state funding.

In fixing Libor, both high and low, Barclays probably thought it was doing the king’s bidding. No wonder its $39-million-a-year Chairman Bob Diamond expected a knighthood rather than a pillory.

If much of this finagling happened between 2005 and 2008, why are bankers now heading to jail for aiding and abetting their senior managements or the regulators? Why now the moral outrage, Senate hearings, presidential soundbites, indictments, hair shirts, resignations, and headlines that the banks have yet again stolen our money?

Although in theory banks are credit institutions, at least according to their charters, in reality they are political interest groups that occasionally grant loans.

Among the oldest arguments in American politics are those that center on whether the US should have national or just state banks, and whether the circulating currency should be tethered to some commodity (gold, silver, toasters) or allowed to float unhinged on world money markets, as they now do (Nixon ended the dollar’s convertibility in 1971).

Another divisive political argument has been whether banking and money should be beholden to big city interests (for example, robber baron J.P. Morgan) or to agricultural concerns (Andrew Jackson had them in mind). Morgan got rich on deflation when money was tied to gold; the farmers won with inflation because they could repay their loans with cheaper dollars.

In Europe, the similar divide is between the propertied and working classes. In the Libor scandal, Barclays is synonymous with the remittance men in the House of Lords, living off coupons.

Now on both continents, the political question is whether the financial system should be geared toward stimulus (cheaper money) or austerity (debt reduction; gold standards). In the US. election, Romney speaks for the hard money men while the Obama administration, like French President François Hollande, believes in fiat money with the revolutionary passions of Marat and Robespierre.

Because both political blocs have their constituents and henchmen, Libor bankers are walking the plank for constricting the money supply, and spendthrift politicians are being turned out of office, charged with debasing the paper currency.

Although the fine print of the outrage is obscure, Libor is at the subconscious center of the 2012 election and the future of Europe. No wonder headline writers and prosecutors are rounding up the usual banking suspects.

The soundbite storyboards are perfect for a prime-time, election-season docudrama, starring greedy bankers, virtuous senators, victimized home owners who were bilked out of billions in a scam hatched in City of London pubs and carried out in corner offices.

On the campaign trail the President could be heard to imply that plutocratic, Republican supporters of Mitt Romney are hand-in-black-glove with the rate fixers. The message is clear. The reason the world’s economies are in recession is not incompetent economic policies, but collusion between Wall Street and its UK counterpart, the City of London.

In other words, the banking system has fulfilled its historic political mandate: to give every presidential election “a good, safe menace,” so that nervous voters can cast their ballots to keep the moneychangers away from the temples of democracy, even though they need a billion in soft money to light the altar candles.

Flickr Photo by Garry Knight – The Dragon from the City of London's coat of arms, cast as a statue.

Matthew Stevenson, a contributing editor of Harper's Magazine, is the author of Remembering the Twentieth Century Limited, a collection of historical travel essays. His next book is Whistle-Stopping America.

London's Olympic Whingers

James Heartfield — Tue, 24 Jul 2012 01:38:38 -0400

Busted. "Even in the best of times, whinging, as Britons call the persistent low-grade grousing that is their default response to life’s challenges, is part of the national condition", Sarah Lyall writes in the New York Times, about Londoners’ failure to embrace the Olympic Spirit. If a British newspaper mocked America there would be a flood of patriotic remonstrance right back at us. But when The Guardian asked its readers whether it was true that Britons were whingers, this is how the poll went:

There is a lot to complain about with the Olympics. The police have been heavy-handed, pushing around people who have argued with the Olympic hype. The Olympic Park has been forcibly cleared of its official and unofficial tenants.

Dave Renton, author of Lives; Running, who believes in the Olympics but not in the corporate hype and security that comes with it explains:

Already the park is enclosed by a sky high fence, topped by razor wires and electronic sensors, with CCTV every few metres and security patrols inside the fence, all to protect the Park from intruders. But in addition the towpath was closed to public access 23 days before the Olympics even began. All across London on the edge of Olympic venues there have been similar restrictions imposed. (see his Olympics-and-other sports blog, http://livesrunning.wordpress.com/)

Most shockingly, the army has put surface to air missiles on the roofs of local tower blocks, to the outrage of the residents, who see them as a threat against London’s rioting youths rather than any imagined Al Qaida attack. Pointedly, the one estate that has welcomed the installation is the Bow Quarter, a super-rich gated community in the heart of impoverished East London (the site, ironically, of the re-birth of British trade union struggle in the nineteenth century, the Bryant and May match factory).

There are special Olympic lanes painted on the roads, like those that the old Soviet bureaucracy had for the Zil limousines carrying officials. We are warned that spectators wearing the wrong logo will be barred from the stadium, as will Tibetan flags and any kind of political slogan.

There is much to complain about, but Sarah Lyall is right: scoffing is the British way. Poor Sebastian Coe, goody-two-shoes of the 1980s track, has a hard job selling the Olympics to the British public. This coming Saturday radicals of the counter Olympics network will meet at noon to protest in Mile End Park.

Of course Briton’s have not been big on public celebration since they lost that last toe-hold on world domination, as subalterns to the United States in the Cold War. The Falklands War against Argentina (oh, the shame!) was the last that drew out a jingo crowd. Ever since the Berlin Wall came down, we only come out on the streets to object or mourn. That is why the Millennium celebrations drew such a vicious reaction from the intelligentsia here, and why the most recently celebrated Queen’s Jubilee was such a damp squib. By contrast, hundreds of thousands mourned the death of Princess Diana, and perhaps a million marched against the war in Iraq.

It is not easy to be a British sporting star. Jaded Britons willed Wimbledon tennis finalist Andy Murray to lose with the fervour that in years gone by they would have willed him to win. England's soccer captain, John Terry, is better known for swearing at Anton Ferdinand than for his defending skills (after a failed prosecution for racial abuse, the press, unwilling to accept the jury’s decision, found him guilty anyway). The mood behind team GB in London right now is markedly downbeat. Londoners’ main interest has been whether they could make any money letting out their homes (no, it turns out, the market was flooded).

The mood is not helped by the downbeat promotion. Filmmaker Danny Boyle is in charge of the opening ceremony. He says he will not follow the Beijing triumphalism, but instead threatens a mawkish recreation of the English countryside, complete with sheep and even a mob of countercultural festival hippies. On television, Britons follow not the hype, but a mockumentary satire of the hype, Twenty Twelve.

******

The London that Britain will showcase to the world is at a difficult crossroads. It is the centre of the financial services sector, Britain’s most successful export since deregulation in the 1980s, but currently mired in successive crises, most recently the manipulation of the LIBOR rate by Barclays (with the apparent connivance of not only shamed Chief Exec Bob Diamond, but the Governor of the Bank of England, too). There is little doubt that Britain’s economy is dangerously skewed in favour of its financial sector, which buys influence from out-of-touch and cash-hungry politicians. Sadly, the one occasion when the financial sector might have been reined in, the crash of 2008, led to a massive bailout instead. Advice from financiers that the banks were ‘too big to fail’ was accepted with much the same gullibility as advice from the securocrats that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction could strike London in 15 minutes. In the manner of a naïve maiden aunt, the press and the politicial establishment here were repeatedly surprised that the billions the government gave the bankers went straight into bonuses, instead of being passed on as loans to businesses. Did no one ever tell them that banks are in the business of making money, not giving it away?

The problem with the banks, in any event, is misunderstood. The febrile financial sector is more symptomatic than causal. It has been fuelled for some years by the surplus capital that British and European industry fails to reinvest in its manufacturing base. Europe’s risk-averse business leaders are reluctant to disturb their cozy relations with each other and government by innovating new processes or products. Where their forebears ploughed profits back into the business, our business leaders prefer to put them in the bank, hunting around for some fantasy of high yield investments that do not entail any relationship more demanding than a phone-call. It is not that bankers steal the cash from business so much as that business that is falling over itself to give it up.

High on the list of London’s problems is its house-building industry, which has systematically failed to meet the expanding demand for homes. Characteristic of the institutional prejudice against development here, house-building has been stymied by a planning system that restricts building to brownfield sites, and is strangling London’s growth with a ‘green belt’.

Predictably, the limit on building new houses has forced up prices, and priced poorer Londoners out of central London. According to a study by Tom MacInnes and Peter Kenway for the City Parochial Foundation:

… more than half (54%) London’s low income population live in Outer London. This is an increase compared to the late 1990s, when London’s low-income population was split equally between Inner and Outer London. Reflecting this relatively bigger population, a larger number of children in low-income households live in Outer London (380,000) than Inner London (270,000). (London’s Poverty Profile, 2009, p 29)

The impact of high prices on where people live, the gentrification of the inner city, and the exodus of the poor, has been dramatic. For poorer residents to carry on living in London gets more and more difficult. That is particularly so because the rise in rents mirrors the rise in house prices. For too many families living in London means accepting less and less space. Meanwhile, in Caledonian Road, a local developer bought up local shops to convert into flats, and then realised that the cellars could be made into houses, too.

With some cheek, London's former Mayor, Ken Livingstone, architect of the London plan that put the dampeners on development is now protesting that ‘rents have soared beyond people's ability to pay’. But it was Livingstone’s policy, with its mantra of building up, not out, on brownfield, not greenfield land, that created the scarcity of homes that is forcing up prices and rents. All of Livingstone’s solutions are about redistributing the limited housing stock available, without understanding that the real problem is in the realm of production.

The Olympics, of course, are supposed to have a lsting and positive effect on the London’s housing. But that will not happen unless there is a cultural shift in favour of development that is not engulfed in precautionary regulations and political indecision.

So let’s hope that Londoners do cheer up before the games start, and enjoy the sight of people giving their all. It ought to be a good antidote to the dog-in-the-manger attitude that is wrecking the prospects of recovery. Londoners have to choose between Olympic spirit, or Olympic whinging.

Photo by BBC World Service: Homeless Hostel, East London

James Heartfield’s latest book The Aborigines' Protection Society: Humanitarian Imperialism in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Canada, South Africa, and the Congo, 1836-1909 is published by Columbia University Press, and Hurst Books in the UK.

The Evolving Urban Form: London

Wendell Cox — Mon, 23 Jul 2012 01:29:55 -0400

The 2011 census results show that London (the Greater London Authority, which is Inner and Outer London) experienced its greatest percentage population growth in more than 100 years (1891 to 1901). London added nearly 1,000,000 new residents since 2001. That growth, however, is not an indication that "people are moving back to the city." On the contrary, National Statistics data indicates that London lost 740,000 domestic migrants between 2001 and 2011. The continuing core net domestic migration losses have been replicated in other major European metropolitan core areas, such as Milan, Vienna, Stockholm and Helsinki.

Instead as typical in major European core municipalities, the vast majority of the growth in London has come from net international migration. London added 690,000 residents between 2001 and 2010. This pattern has become more prevalent since European Union enlargement, when Eastern Europeans began moving in much larger numbers to the United Kingdom and other richer areas of the old EU-15.
London first became the world's largest urban area in the first quarter of the 19th century, displacing Beijing. At that time, London was approaching 1.4 million residents, living in an urban area of approximately 15 square miles. Today, Inner London, the Outer London suburbs and two rings of exurbs spread 10,500 square miles (27,000 square miles), with a population of 20.3 million. Beijing, meanwhile, has grown so fast that it may once again surpass London in the next decade. However, other metropolitan regions are much larger, such as Tokyo and Jakarta.

Meanwhile, the urban area (the continuous built up area), circumscribed for more than one-half century by the Greenbelt, appears to have a population of 9.5 million, which would place it 27th in population in the world.

Over the past century, London has experienced substantial ups and downs in its population and still remains below its 1939 population, even with the large gain over the past decade. Over the same period, Inner London lost millions of its residents and only recently has begun to gain some back, largely due to net international migration gains. Outer London gained in the first half of the 20th century, plateaued and then also gained strongly in the last decade. The exurban areas virtually monopolized growth for most of the post-World War II period (Table) until recently.

London Region: Population 1891-2011

Year	London Region	London (Greater London Authority)	Inner London (Historical Core)	Outer London (Suburbs)	Exurbs (Outside Greenbelt)	1st Exurban Ring (Historical Counties Adjacent to Green Belt)	2nd Exurban Ring
1891	7,752,000	5,574,000	4,432,000	1,142,000	2,178,000	595,000	1,583,000
1901	8,931,000	6,507,000	4,898,000	1,609,000	2,424,000	691,000	1,733,000
1911	11,526,000	7,162,000	5,002,000	2,160,000	4,366,000	2,365,000	2,001,000
1921	12,071,000	7,386,000	4,978,000	2,408,000	4,684,000	2,553,000	2,131,000
1931	13,229,000	8,111,000	4,898,000	3,213,000	5,119,000	2,805,000	2,314,000
1939		8,617,000	4,441,000	4,176,000
1951	14,832,000	8,193,000	3,680,000	4,513,000	6,635,000	3,891,000	2,744,000
1961	15,911,000	7,997,094	3,492,881	4,504,213	7,918,000	4,720,000	3,198,000
1971	17,028,000	7,453,000	3,031,000	4,422,000	9,659,000	5,894,000	3,765,000
1981	16,644,000	6,713,000	2,498,000	4,215,000	10,035,000	6,127,000	3,908,000
1991	17,139,000	6,393,000	2,343,000	4,050,000	10,746,000	6,497,000	4,249,000
2001	18,313,000	7,172,000	2,766,000	4,406,000	11,141,000	6,773,000	4,368,000
2011	20,256,700	8,164,000	3,222,000	4,942,000	12,092,700	7,318,700	4,774,000

Sources
Census except 1939
Greater London Authority, 1939

The London Region

The London region is composed of the Greater London Authority (GLA), which includes Inner London, the historical core municipality, covering approximately the same geographical area as the old London County Council from the 1890s to the 1960s and Outer London, the great suburban expanse consisting of detached and semi-detached housing.

GLA is surrounded by the Greenbelt, established to contain the expansion of the urban area after World War II, and, at least at first, to decentralize London's unhealthy and overcrowded conditions. Beyond the Greenbelt are the East of England and the Southeast, which are composed of a first exurban ring of historical county areas, adjacent to the Greenbelt, and a second ring of historical county areas in the East and Southeast, beyond the first ring. Virtually all new urban expansion in the London region was forced into the exurbs by the Greenbelt. As a result, all of the London region's growth (6 million) since World War II has been outside the Greenbelt (Figure 1).

Inner London

Inner London has been a population growth miracle over the past two decades. The 2011 population was 3.2 million, up more than 450,000 from 2001 and nearly 900,000 since 1991. However, the 1991 figure of 2.3 million was more than one-half below the 5,000,000 peak reached in 1911. Even though historical core city losses are typical (where geography is held constant), Inner London's loss was huge, at more double those sustained in Chicago (since 1950) and Paris (since 1921). The core of Inner London was developed as a walking city and expanded substantially with the coming of transit. At approximately 26,000 residents per square mile (10,000 per square kilometer), Inner London is less than one-half the density of the ville de Paris and far less dense not only than Manhattan but even less dense than the New York City boroughs of Brooklyn and the Bronx.

Yet despite the recent increases, inner London's 2011 population is lower than counted in the 1861 census (yes, 1861) Even with the population increase Inner London lost 390,000 domestic migrants (Figure 2) to other parts of Great Britain between 2001 and 2010 (the detailed 2011 data is not yet available at this level).

Tower Hamlets, one of London's 32 boroughs, is an example of this population roller-coaster. Tower Hamlets is located just to the east of the Tower Bridge in Inner London on the north bank of the Thames. It is home to substantial new development spurred by the rapid growth of the financial services industry both in the "square mile" ("city of London) and Canary Wharf. Tower Hamlets grew to 254,000 in 2011, a nearly 80 percent increase from the 142,000 registered in 1981, less than its 1801 population (Note: London Boroughs). But like Inner London, Tower Hamlets used to be much more populous, reaching a record for a London borough at 597,000 residents in 1901. It then lost more than 75 percent of its population over the next 80 years.

Outer London

Outer London, which was combined into the Greater London Council in 1965 (and the Greater London Authority in 2000) also grew strongly, from 4.4 million to 4.9 million and is now at its peak population. Outer London's population density is 10,000 per square mile (4,000 per square kilometer), approximately the same as the District of Columbia. Like Inner London, Outer London also lost domestic migrants, with a net 310,000 residents leaving for other parts of the United Kingdom (Figure 2).

The Greenbelt

Since World War II, the London urban area (principally composed of Inner and Outer London) has been surrounded by the Greenbelt on which development is not permitted. The Greenbelt ranges from 10 to 20 miles wide (25 to 50 kilometers) and covers more than three times the size of the Greater London Authority. The Greenbelt has been cited, along with related policies, with substantially raising house prices and contributing to London's longer commutes than Paris, where there is no greenbelt.

Exurban London

Despite their more modest growth in the last decade, the exurbs have been effective in attracting net domestic migration. From 2001 to 2011, three was a net inflow of domestic migrants of 320,000 (Figure 2). Much of this appears to be people leaving London. During the last year, more than 50,000 residents of London moved to the exurbs. Net international migration to the exurbs had been fairly small earlier in the decade, but increased substantially in the later years. By 2009-2010, two thirds of the London region's net international migration was to the exurbs, and only one-third to London.

First Exurban Ring

The first exurban ring includes the historical counties that border on the outside of the Greenbelt. These areas added approximately 550,000 residents between 2001 and 2011 and reached a new population peak, at 7.3 million.

Second Exurban Ring

The second exurban ring includes the counties of the East of England and the Southeast that are outside the first ring. These areas added more than 400,000 new residents, and reached a new peak population of 4.8 million.

London and England

In contrast to the 1991-2001 decade, the 2001-2011 decade indicated a significant slowdown in the share of England's population growth in the London region. In the previous decade, all of England's growth occurred in the greater London region. In the last decade, 50 percent of England's growth took place around the capital. Overall, the core of London (Inner London) population has steadily fallen relative to the rest of England England's while the suburbs and exurbs have grown to include one-third of England's residents (Figure 3). So as Japan is moving to Tokyo, England is still moving to London, but not nearly so fast.

Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

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Note: London Boroughs: The 32 boroughs of London were defined after the creation of the Greater London Council in 1965 (which was abolished in 1986). The Greater London Authority provides data to show the historical population figures for the boroughs, going back to the initial census (1801). The new Greater London Authority was established in 2000, with less power than the previous Greater London Council. The 32 boroughs continue to operate, providing local public services.

Photograph: London Suburbs (Outer London) by author

London Olympics 2012: Let the Games End

Matthew Stevenson — Sat, 21 Jul 2012 08:57:12 -0400

Why does anyone persist with the Greek mythology that the Olympics are an engine of economic development, sportsmanship, or peace on earth? London is spending $15 billion on the hope that it can sell enough tickets to synchronized swimming, and earn enough from television ads, to cover the costs of the 30,000 rent-a-cops and military personnel being deployed in the spirit of Olympic harmony.

Even though the Games break few economic records, except those for non-performing sovereign debts, governments around the world scramble madly every four years for the right to act as host, as if influence peddling were an Olympic sport.

The original cost estimate, sold to the British public to convince them to get behind the bid for the 2012 Games, was about $4 billion. Those budget forecasts imagined that, after the event, Olympic sites would be recycled for use as schools, homes for the aged, and handicapped parking, even though earlier Olympic cities have found little use for their table tennis stadiums and aquatic centers.

In 2005, London beat out Paris (narrowly), New York, Madrid, and Moscow for the right, if not the privilege, to spend billions of dollars (that no one has) on a temporary Olympic village, a badminton complex, and swimming pools suitable for the American relayers to lap swimmers from places like Albania and Costa Rica.

Those who advocate Olympian edifice dreams include smiling politicians who can dole out sweetheart construction contracts; national sports associations, whose budgets are commensurate with gold-medal production; the International Olympic Committee, which in the past has been something of a Dream Team for backhand payments; and the television networks, which use the Games to fill the dog days of August and to develop various story-lines around medal-gobbling athletes (see Michael Phelps) or mildly voyeuristic content (women’s beach volleyball comes to mind).

Everyone wins at the Olympics: stadium contractors, strutting central governments, and athletes who place high enough to be crowned with the laurels of corporate sponsorship. Well, everyone except the bondholders, who are left with little more than folded tents when the circus leaves town after three weeks of breathless commentary about women’s weightlifting.

By chance, I have been to many of the cities that have hosted recent summer Games — Barcelona, Moscow, Beijing, Athens, and Seoul. In nearly each locale the thought crossed my mind that city residents have little more to show for their indebted billions than a few light-rail lines, perhaps an airport facelift, and impractical buildings that can be converted only into minimum-security prisons.

Beijing still has its iconic Bird’s Nest and Water Cube, although neither stadium is used now for anything more than tourist photography and an aqua park.

My son Charles and I spent a week driving around Greece after the 2004 Games. As best as we could tell, all Athens got for its now-bad loans were signs pointing the way to the Olympic Sailing Center (we even found these billboards miles from the sea), and a light-rail connection to Piraeus. Weeds covered the infield of the softball stadium.

Barcelona, the 1992 host, ended up with some new apartment buildings — since the Olympics were played in downtown areas — a few marinas, and of course light-rail. Many cities, however, have successfully put up apartment blocks without staging a field hockey tournament.

Nor did Moscow get the political bounce it had angled for when it hosted the 1980 summer Olympics. In protest over the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and many allies refused to send teams, giving the Games the feel of a Warsaw Pact scout jamboree. The paint peeled off the Olympic village faster than some of the times in the marathon. (In London, the US has decided against boycotting its own invasion of Afghanistan.)

In theory, politics have nothing to do with the Games, although by organizing teams according to countries, the Olympic Committee has ensured that the spectacle is best understood as the continuation of war by other means, including archery and (in 1900) live pigeon shooting.

When the modern Olympics were revived in 1896, individual athletes paid their own way to Athens to compete as amateurs. Now, nearly all nations field the equivalent of the East German swim team, a squad bred in laboratory test tubes to demonstrate a triumph of the will.

The reason terrorists have the Games on their hit lists (Munich in 1972 was the worst example) is because the governments that they revile enter the stadiums with such wild displays of flag waving, as though the opening ceremony were a bullfight. At the London Games, security contracts are worth more than gold medals. For example, the British army is deploying surface-to-air missiles near the Olympic Stadium (apparently javelins no longer do the trick), and the FBI, in theory an exclusively domestic US Agency, is sending over about 500 agents, even though it was the Secret Service that won the regional escort trials in Cartagena.

Does the corporate business of the Olympics negate the achievements of the athletes? Am I so cold-hearted that I cannot admire Joan Benoit Samuelson coming home in 1984 with the gold or Fosbury’s flop? Not at all. I enjoy watching Moldova lose at water polo as much as the next American. At the same time, there is something cartoonish about NBA All-stars dunking over a Latvian small forward.

Were the decision mine, I would let the Olympics go the way of Nuremberg rallies. The Games strike me as ruinous to city finances and bad for sport. Should not the goal of the Olympic movement be to encourage more players and fewer spectators? Instead, the Games are a celebration of reclining consumerism. At least the athletes get to go through 100,000 condoms in 17 days.

Nor does any sporting event that requires the protection of thousands of soldiers, surface-to-air missiles, and 24/7 cable coverage strike me as the spiritual heir of the Games first contested in a Greek sanctuary.

Several school vacations ago, I took my younger daughter to Olympia, located in the western Peloponnese. We were tracking down the ancient wonders of the world, and Olympia once had a huge gold statue of Zeus, until “promoters” stripped it for parts and carted off the gold to Aleppo on donkeys.

We strolled around the original Olympic stadium, which even today could be built for about $200,000. The “seats” are slopes of grassy lawn, and the field of dreams is covered with dirt. The rest of the Olympic village is a few pine trees and some worn temples, but it’s magical.

Even during times of conflict, from 700 BC to 400 AD athletes came to Olympia from the contours of the Greek world, and left for home, if successful, only with olive branches in their hair. Along with paying honor to Zeus, the ancient Olympics celebrated athletic achievement, not prime-time nationalism or Coca-Cola. To show modesty, athletes were naked for their competitions. The Games ended only when Christianity moved to wipe out what it viewed as a pagan ritual.

At the end of three weeks of the London Games, even if the British army has had to shoot off a few of its surface-to-air missiles, TV commentators will pronounce the Games an immortal success, a triumph of Spartan proportions, and an epic not seen since Jason came back with the golden fleece.

Then, in three years, if not sooner, London will get the $15 billion invoice for its fun summer, and all it will have to show for it will be a few used diving boards and, with luck, some new light-rail. In the words of George Best, the great Northern Irish footballer: “I spent a lot of money on booze, birds and fast cars. The rest I just squandered.”

Flickr photo by Jesse Scott / twowaystairs - Wenlock, the 2012 Olympic mascot.

Gentrification? Brixton's Angell Town Story

Erin Chantry — Fri, 29 Jun 2012 01:38:07 -0400

In the US, urban planners talk about the 'redevelopment' of a neighborhood. In the UK, 'regeneration' is heard more often. What is the difference, from both the planner and the resident perspective? Are they both synonyms for 'gentrification'? Angell Town , a UK 'estate' in Brixton — it would be called a 'public housing project' by Americans — provides a good example of how these questions are answered in practice.

In theory, meanwhile, the answers are… yes, and no. They overlap quite a bit, but the terms are not the same. In its simplest form, to redevelop is to develop again, which implies doing it over completely. Regeneration most directly means “rebirth or renewal”, implying that the entity remains throughout the process.

The American Planning Association (APA) defines redevelopment as “public actions that are undertaken to stimulate activity when the private market is not providing sufficient capital and economic activity to achieve the desired level of improvement…. such as direct public investment, capital improvements, enhanced public services, technical assistance, promotion, tax benefits, and other stimuli including planning initiatives such as rezoning."

The Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) defines regeneration as “a holistic process which aims to reverse the economic, social and physical decline of places where market forces alone will not suffice… balancing community, business, environmental and individual needs… as well as changes to the physical environment.”

So — redevelopment focuses on monetary investment and physical changes. Regeneration focuses on the existing community and the “social decline” of a place, as well as economic and physical factors. Even further, it aims to “holistically,” address “individual needs.” Of course many redevelopment projects address the community, but because the APA distinctly says that “the private sector may initiate redevelopment projects without any active public involvement beyond the government’s traditional regulatory role,” I would argue that it involves less social investment than regeneration.

Perhaps the distinct difference between the responsibility to act directly on behalf of existing residents versus the responsibility to investors stems from a large English planning system that is more politicized (and therefore receives more federal funding.)

While in America, gentrification might be seen as an inevitable side effect of redevelopment, in England it is seen as a sometimes inevitable and therefore tragic side effect of regeneration.

To illustrate this point, look at a true regeneration project: Angell Town, Brixton, London

Problem (courtesy of Rudi):

• Lack of public space for social interaction – derelict communal areas were unused.
• The garages provided were dark and un-surveyed, and therefore, never used.
• The estate was perceived as crime ridden, as the multiplicity of bridges and walkways provided ideal escape routes for criminals, often from outside the estate itself.
• Litter accumulation resulted from removing the bridges (which gave access to the waste removal pick-up points), in an attempt to reduce crime
• The estate came to epitomize neglect and decline
• The estate became stigmatized a sink estate.

Solution – A summary of simple urban design changes:

• The first main part of the scheme involved re-orientating the existing deck-access housing into a more “normal” street format, based on terraced dwellings which related to the street through individual entrances.
• Each dwelling was given an individual, recognized identity — surveillance on the street was improved, as windows now faced directly out
• Terraced housing replaced the monotonous, unsafe corridors of entrances.
• The pedways, which were perceived as unsafe, were removed so that the houses could be extended to face on to the street.
• New central grassed areas were defined as focal points for the houses. These areas were separated from the new vehicular perimeter roads by railings, enabling children to play, away from the danger of traffic and dogs.
• The unused garages on the ground floors were replaced with shops and community facilities, such as a bar, cafe, workshops, and even a recording studio in one area, to provide the previously, much lacked social amenities. This design measure also helped transform dark and bleak spots into animated facades of street level activity.

Instead of only seeing Angell Town's problems, the urban designer, planners, and architects looked at them as opportunities to build on the strong community that had lived there for decades. The project improvements didn’t eradicate every trace of the place that had become their home, but committed a large investment to renovate the buildings they could, and design the new ones to compliment the existing ones so well that you had to look hard to tell the difference between the two.

Members of the community could still see where they came from. In other words, it still felt like home. Most importantly they could look again a little harder and see their bright futures. This might sound like I’m laying it on a little thick, but the success of this regeneration stunned so many, both nationwide and on the European continent, that it provoked intense project documentation. Residents who were interviewed realized what planners so often don’t: they looked to their physical environment to define their identity. With the existing bones of the original Angell Town Estate still in existence, they easily identified the physical improvements to be improvements in themselves.

This outstanding result came from an intense and time-consuming community consultation process, a term that is distinctly different than public involvement. The lead urban designer was so involved with the community that he actually lived there on the weekends in a flat. While this is rare in any country, it certainly is to be commended.

Perhaps the most powerful items in Angell Town now are the benches that, poetically, are made from the rubble of demolished parts of the old buildings, caged, with stone seats on top. People can actually sit on the physical representation of what was destroying their community. This was recited by residents often as what made the biggest difference to them. Don’t ever underestimate the power of poeticism!

I would love you to share you comments on this story. I'll also suggest: Consider the many similar public housing projects in America that have been completely razed and rebuilt to look like another place. How does it make people feel to have their homes be deemed so worthless that they are torn down and completely replaced, often with architectural rubbish?

So, what will it be — redevelopment or regeneration?

Photo: UK Government Web Archive: Angell Town – "Many residents also have private outdoor space." Building for Life is run by CABE and the Home Builders Federation with Design for Homes.© Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE)

A different version of this post appeared on Erin Chantry's blog, At the Helm of the Public Realm. Chantry is an Urban Designer in the Urban Design and Community Planning Service Team with Tindale-Oliver & Associates

London’s Social Cleansing

James Heartfield — Mon, 14 May 2012 01:24:54 -0400

Unscrupulous landlords are forcing poorer tenants out of their London homes, freeing them up to rent out to visitors to the Olympics this summer, according to the housing charity Shelter. At the same time, the government’s cap on rent subsidies (Housing Benefits) for those out of work or on low incomes threaten to force less well-off tenants out of the capital. Newham Mayor Sir Robin Wales says that they will have to move people as far afield as Stoke-on-Trent if they are to meet their obligations to house the homeless. Fears of ‘social cleansing’ featured in the Mayoral election where Tory incumbent Boris Johnson made sure to distance himself from his own government’s policy to beat off the challenge from veteran left-winger Ken Livingstone.

Inner London, outer London (Newham in red); London, Stoke-on-Trent

Critics of London’s ‘Social Cleansing’ have fixed on the changes to the law regarding housing benefits and the Olympics, but failed to notice that working class Londoners have been being forced out of the nation’s capital for some time now – thanks to the ceaseless rise in house prices. On the London Programme in 2003, I said that without opening up more land to building in the green belt, house prices would spiral out of control, pricing ordinary Londoners out of the capital. Mayor Ken Livingstone slapped me down saying that he would never sanction building on the green belt.

Today Eva Wiseman, a commissioning editor on the upmarket broadsheet, the Observer, says that she cannot afford to rent in London’s once poorest borough, Tower Hamlets, let alone buy a house. She cites Shelter’s estimate that you would need an income of £67,669 to rent there (average income is £26,244).1

It is not hard to understand why prices are so steep. Housebuilding in the UK has failed to keep pace with demand. New housing starts are slightly up after the crash, but overall they are woefully short of actual need. The reason is that Britain has among the most stringent laws on building – the ‘planning laws’ – which stop building on the ever-growing ‘green belts’ that surround our cities.

Given that the working class are the Labour Party’s natural constituency, you might have thought that its years in government (1997-2010) would have seen more homes built for working people. But Labour turned its back on the working classes a long time ago, while keeping its neurotic interest in regulating the economy. The outcome was a re-vamped planning system that put the brakes on home building. This time this was done in the name of the environment, not to protect the Tory Shires from ‘bungaloid sprawl’, as it was originally intended. Housebuilding fell below the bare minimum of 250,000 you would need just to replace the increasingly dilapidated stock.

When David Cameron’s Conservative-Liberal coalition came to power in 2010, his Communities Minister Eric Pickles and Housing Minister Grant Shapps had promised a large scale liberalisation of the planning laws – and even blamed their predecessors for doing more damage than the Luftwaffe to Britain’s housing stock. But the fine print on Shapps’ new planning law proved as prohibitive as what went before. Even those champions of the Green Belt at the Guardian were moved to editorialise that ‘these convoluted and qualified planning laws will become another aid to the big-money lawyers’. 2

The Conservative government’s commitment to liberalisation is like its Labour predecessor’s commitment to the working class, theoretical. Home building remains stalled, and prices have not seriously fallen despite the shortage of credit). Governments of all stripes are most committed to orderly regulation of change, and dread the unsupervised activity of their citizens – a prejudice which has only led to chaos.

The short supply/rising price dilemma is particularly intense in London. A metropolis of nine million creates a fierce competition for prime sites. Even putting aside the super-rich boroughs, like Kensington and Chelsea, where average prices are £1.3 million (roughly $2 million US), the overall London average is £406,000 ($770,000 US) .

Besides being the most logical place for real estate speculation from around the world, London also has been in the grip of the planning system. It was in London that the Labour mayor took on architect Richard Rogers as an advisor, and committed the capital to a programme of building only on brownfield (already developed) land, ‘building up, not out’. The result is not much building at all, except to pack more four and five storey blocks into what few pockets of green space can be grabbed. His successor Boris Johnson has avoided challenging the Livingstone system, preferring a quiet life to any hint of controversy.

Rather than face the problem of the absolute shortfall in new homes, most critics have fixated on peripheral issues, such as the number of empty homes (which, despite the attention they receive, are, because of high prices, at an all-time low). Easy credit, too, has been blamed for high prices, which is true, but the shortage of credit has not led to a great fall in prices, because the underlying problem was the absolute shortage of homes. Others have argued that the British are too wedded to the idea that they should own their own homes, and could rent, like the Germans, failing to understand that the availability of homes to rent depends on their being built, and rents tend to move in the same direction as prices, as The Observer’s Eva Wiseman has discovered. London’s Mayors have dedicated much attention to schemes to build ‘affordable homes’ – sometimes reserved for occupations like teachers and firefighters – though these are too few in number to have much impact on prices overall.

Over time, this means working people are being priced out of central London. Tim Butler, Chris Hamnett and Mark Ramsden’s analysis of London’s employment in the 2001 census shows that outer London and the South East is more working class than inner London. Inner London had more large employers, professionals and managers than outer London and the South East. Outer London had more routine, semi-routine and technical or lower supervisory workers. Inner London did have more unemployed than outer London, and outer London had more self-employed than inner London. This employment profile was new, following changes that took place after fifteen years of economic growth, say Butler and his colleagues, though many have noted the sharper contrasts between wealthy enclaves and impoverished housing estates dogged by underemployment. 3

These social changes show inner London’s parallel embourgeoisment and deepening social poverty. Of course, those who live in the outer suburbs scoff at the protests from well-heeled social commentators about the prices in inner London as ‘Zone Six snobbery’. Still the changes go some way to explaining why Ken Livingstone was unable to sustain the traditional City Hall machine he built consolidating constituencies among inner London’s poor immigrant and residual working class communities while Tory Boris Johnson won over the more working and middle class outer suburbs.

In his last term Livingstone concentrated on winning over London’s bloated financial service sector more than he did on popular support – but the City of London switched its allegiances to the Tory Johnson, who champions it as an engine of growth. Neither candidate has understood that the skew towards the overheated financial service sector creates a weakness in the London economy, with manufacturing having moved out to the surrounding South East and a growing lack of upwardly mobile jobs for all but the most skilled or privileged.

The housing benefit cap clearly is a problem for welfare-dependent families who are caught in the poverty trap and cannot earn enough to pay the rent. But the problem of the less well-off being priced out of London began long before the changes in housing benefit rules, or London’s winning the Olympic bid. The city the world will visit this summer increasingly resembles not the social democracy imagined after the Second World War, but increasingly a social bifurcated place increasingly resembling that of Victorian times.

James Heartfield is the author of Let’s Build: Why we need five million new homes, a director of Audacity.org, and a member of the 250 New Towns Club.

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A Mile High Tower for London

One imaginative solution to London’s housing problem was proposed by Ian Abley and Jonathan Schwinge of the 250 New Towns Club. Abley and his colleagues have been pressing for new building in Britain’s green spaces to meet housing need.

Taking on the challenge of building up as well as out, Ian unveiled a plan for a tower one mile high for London at the Building Centre, which could house 90,000 people.

‘Locked out of the Property Market’, Observer, 6 May 2012

27 March 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/mar/27/planning-builders-charter-lawyers-delight-editorial, and see ‘Coalition of the Unwilling’, New Geography, 1 July 2011, http://www.newgeography.com/content/001966-coalition-unwilling

Inward and Upward: Marking Out Social Class Change in London, 1981–2001, Urban Studies 45(1) 67–88, January 2008, 72

London photo by Bigstockphoto.com.

Britain Fears a Developer’s Charter

James Stevens and Ian Abley — Wed, 25 Jan 2012 01:38:42 -0500

The UK Government’s Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) announced that there were only 127,780 new housing completions last year in Britain. British house building activity is down to levels of after the First World War, when reliable industrial records began, and still falling. In 1921 the British population was nearly back up to 43 million following the slaughter of the First World War. In 2011 the population of England, Wales, and Scotland is approaching 61 million people. By 2031 the British population is expected to be closer to 70 million. With such existing unmet and growing demand for new housing the DCLG, the Government department that runs the Planning System should be busy finding ways to allow developers to build.

Many feared that the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), prepared by the DCLG for an expected release in January 2012 would be a developer’s charter. We wish it was a developer’s charter! The NPPF continues planning policies, supported by all Parliamentary political parties, which continue to frustrate volume housebuilding. Developers have to prove that their proposals for house building are not merely about building useful homes at a profit, but are “sustainable development” when measured against disputable social and environmental criteria. No developer is free to build on their own land without first having to obtain planning approval from an array of third party interests all insisting on their interpretation of the moral idealism of sustainability.

This makes the NPPF an anti-development charter for all those who oppose house building and population growth. Anyone can claim that more house building and more households are unsustainable in their area, in the effort to stop a project which they don’t approve of.

The NPPF will do nothing to challenge the power of contemporary anti-development campaigners, who are well known. Anne Power, Lord Richard Rogers and other members of New Labour’s Urban Task Force (UTF) have correctly identified themselves as allied to the “Hands off Our Land” campaign run by The Daily Telegraph, the Conservative supporting newspaper. The UTF favors a continuing commitment to ‘… reclaiming brownfield sites and re-densifying cities.’ To build only on previously developed land is the green ideal of the UTF and the “Hands off Our Land” campaign.

We all know where these policies lead. Not to a golden age of regeneration for all, but to lucrative property investment for those with access to sufficient capital and the right connections to steer themselves through the planning system to obtain approvals. The volume of Greenfield land developed declined dramatically under New Labour. The present Conservative led Coalition Government continues the practice of obstructing development on Greenfield land.

Between 2000 and 2006 the total area of land built on for new housing fell by 23%, with a 42% fall in the annual amount of Greenfield land used. In 2010 76% of all housing was built on previously developed Brownfield land, a slight decrease from the 80% in 2009. Only 2% of housing was built on the Green Belts around major cities and towns. The Green Belt in England covers 13% of the land, or twice the area already developed for housing. Small wonder that the price of the shrinking supply of land with a prospect of being approved for sustainable development remains inflated.

House building was only increased from the low point of 2001 by increasing the density of development in the cities. Average densities rose from 25 dwellings per hectare (dph) in 2000, to 43 dph by 2010. In London the average density for new housing is much higher, at 115 dph in 2010.

Densification policies considered sustainable have meant that the majority of the working British public can no longer buy a new house with a garden, in ways that previous generations may have taken for granted. Instead the plan has been to squeeze more new households into less space. UTF supporters and the DCLG imagined they were regenerating cities and saving the planet for all of society. Like traditional Conservatives they mean to keep developers and the population off Britain’s ample supply of otherwise redundant farmland.

The Daily Telegraph’s campaign, best articulated by the conservative anti-growth philosopher Roger Scruton, is clearly the flip side of the UTF’s densification argument. He is happy as long as the population is kept away from the countryside he loves. ‘Thank God for obstacles to economic growth,’ says Scruton.

Scruton speaks for the comfortable who already enjoy plenty of space. The Daily Telegraph’s campaign is ultimately concerned that existing housing markets are protected, sustained through the division between Town and Country, and moralised as a concern for environment and heritage. New Labour supporters are more likely to read The Guardian, but its more middle-class readership finds nothing to object to in The Daily Telegraph’s campaign, in order to restrict the “sprawl” of suburbia and halt the imagined damage this will do to the environment and urban communities. The Guardian’s readership formed the bed-rock of New Labour’s support, and back Next Labour. The working class may have deserted Labour, but is depoliticized and passive. The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph – still supposed by many to be at opposite ends of the old-fashioned and defunct ideological spectrum of Left and Right – prove closer than either cares to think.

Labour Members of Parliament have traditionally feared the “flight to the suburbs” lest they lose voters and the associated tax revenue. The planning system has proved very effective in maintaining the political geography of Britain. Labour politicians negotiate their political dependency on urban containment with a Red-Green stance in urban areas, without threatening the Blue-Green interests of those who want to keep development out of the countryside. All depend on the denial of development rights that date from the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, and which the NPPF reinforces.

Meanwhile working class families are squeezed into what little Twentieth Century suburbia is still affordable, competing unsuccessfully with the more affluent for ownership of this increasingly scarce and valued commodity. What new housing is built is at higher density, usually on the least attractive sites. That is land previously occupied by factories, old infrastructure, and utilities, or by council housing estates re-developed at higher densities. Yet even these unpopular sites enter the inflated British housing market, sustained through a chronic lack of house building.

The working class is caught in a political crusher made manifest through the planning system. The Red-Greens, who may imagine themselves on a new Left, gentrify towns and cities with “sustainable redevelopment”, and the Blue-Greens, who persist with being on the Right, protect their landscape for their exclusive enjoyment. Meanwhile the majority of home owners have come to depend on the inflated and unaffordable housing market. New Labour needed this house price inflation to allow the owner occupying majority to supplement inadequate wages by withdrawing equity from their homes. So does the Coalition. Deliberate or not, The Daily Telegraph’s commitment to building fewer new homes will stabilise what we have called the Housing Trilemma.

Our current predicament may be thought of as a Trilemma, in which house price inflation supports burdensome mortgage lending and private debt, while households in the owner occupied sector accept low quality housing conditions. High rents shadow private sector housing costs, and private rental housing quality is often of the lowest quality. Many in Britain, including the majority of the home owning middle class, are dependent on the Housing Trilemma remaining stable.

The planning system serves well in protecting the interests of existing home owners. Behind the NPPF’s moral idealism of sustainability, the immediate instrumental objective is to restrict new housing supply to avoid destabilising housing markets. Appearing as a moral mission to save the planet from developers, the NPPF and the denial of development rights sustains the Housing Trilemma. Debt is secured, but housing remains unaffordable, quality low, and house building activity is at an all time industrial low. This is not a conspiracy. It is a predicament.

When Britain’s elites talk about wanting to revive economic growth, they don’t mean a massive surge in new house building or an expansion of infrastructure. What they have in mind is a revival of financial services in The City, subject to uncertainties in the fragmenting Euro Zone, and the maintenance of high housing prices in the hope of more inflation to come. Meanwhile the countryside is kept pristine for the few who can afford access to it as a weekend retreat for the wealthy, including the pro-urban intelligentsia, in all their Red-Green-Blue moral plumage.

The Coalition could have challenged the Housing Trilemma. Instead they have reinforced it.

The result is predictable. Planning applications are falling in number and ambition. Only 25,000 new homes were approved in the second quarter of 2011 compared to 32,000 in the second quarter of 2010. This will be read by The Daily Telegraph campaign members as “proof” that there is no demand for development, inverting the causality. Money is being made out of an environmentally sanctioned scarcity rather than through increased productivity and innovation in a sector like house building and the wider construction industry. Britain’s already backward construction industry is further retarded, and it is becoming commonplace for social elites, and not only crazed nationalists, to blame immigration for housing shortages.

Britain’s economy needs growth, but is unlikely to get it from the house building sector. Britain too needs a dose of political reality while the pro-urban intelligentsia preen their green morality.

The Coalition cannot afford to confront the political problem of the Housing Trilemma if it is to sustain its fragile political base. Increasingly, only the elderly bother to vote and this equity rich group will be mostly satisfied with modest house price inflation as a hedge against general inflation, while savings in banks attract little return. Meanwhile an influential propertied elite still enjoys sustained house price inflation at the top of the market. They are anxious that environmental and heritage designations operate to enhance the exclusivity and enjoyment of their investments. The unelected charities, agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations that were aligned against the draft of the NPPF in July 2011 represent these elite interests. They may now back the redrafted 2012 NPPF with all its demands for sustainability. Their “Hands off Our Land” campaign has worked for them.

The NPPF means that house builders face a future in which building on Greenfield land is effectively considered an eco-crime. Only those who can develop Town Centre sites, perhaps as rental housing, or as luxury homes for the equity rich will thrive. Basically Britain is no longer building homes with gardens for sale to young working families on modest incomes.

If you are in a young working family, or hope to start one, the question is: What are you going to do about the housing predicament you and your friends face?

We have to face a stark reality. Sadly, there is no contemporary habit of young working families organising to demand housing collectively. Meanwhile the 2011 to 2012 production figures look set to be lower again, and the developmental uncertainties about to be articulated in a redraft of the NPPF in pursuit of sustainable development will further the decline in production.

Anticipating this feature of Britain’s ratcheting austerity does not make for a Happy New Year. Much depends on what the people of Britain, and particularly the young, do to demand that family houses are built at modest prices in places they want to live together. At present Britain fears a developer’s charter, even though the National Planning Policy Framework is nothing of the sort. Parliament might yet instead be in fear of people demanding cheap land on which to build a better place to live.

James Stevens is Strategic Planner at the Home Builders Federation, www.hbf.co.uk. Email him at james.stevens@hbf.co.uk. The views expressed are his own and not those of Home Builders Federation. Ian Abley is a site architect and runs the pro-development website audacity, www.audacity.org. Email him at abley@audacity.org. Together they organise the 250 New Towns Club, www.audacity.org/250-New-Towns-index.htm.

It's Not the 1980s in Britain Anymore

James Heartfield — Sun, 04 Dec 2011 11:05:04 -0500

Britain’s public sector workers came out on a one day strike last week over government plans to raid their pension funds. Government ministers did the rounds of television studios denouncing the strikers as mindless militants. Both sides are echoing the class struggles of the Thatcher-era, but the truth is that it’s not the 1980s.

My children were off school, and like many children, glad of it. Schools are among the more solid parts of the public sector action today, and in London were struck out, though in the country the teachers’ unions have not achieved the 90 per cent shut down they were aiming for. Unlike the last great wave of union opposition to Conservative spending cuts, back in the 1980s, the teachers’ unions were supported by the National Association of Head Teachers.

At the college where I teach, the lecturers in my department were solidly behind the strike, and boldly leafleted and informed students of their decisions in lectures and circulars. Administrative staff, by contrast, crossed the picket lines.

Overall the strike is well-supported, but not quite the quantum leap of opposition to the Conservative-Liberal coalition that seemed to be in the air. Those joining the marches were 30,000 in London, and a few thousand in the other major cities, which is many more people than the deracinated petit bourgeois mobilised by the #Occupy camps, but does not compare to the bigger union mobilisations of the 1980s.

Union activists have tried to paint the coalition (which they call the ‘Con-Dem’ government) as Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government of the 1980s reborn. As they see it, some ‘anti-Thatcher’ spirit would give the rank and file more fire in their bellies.

Prime Minister Cameron and his ministers have been trying to spark up a Thatcherite spirit, too. It is their only blueprint for handling the challenge of the public sector union revolt. They have been going around the studios denouncing mindless trade union militants in the same way that Thatcher’s ministers Cecil Parkinson and Norman Fowler did back then. But they have not done it very convincingly. Most of all they have failed to get the public to blame the state sector for the budget deficit, as Mrs Thatcher by and large did. The public is just not in the mood to turn on any group of workers with that much anger. It is people in power that are distrusted, newspaper editors and politicians. The specific plan to cut pensions and raise the pension age is not accepted, but widely seen as the chancellor robbing from people’s rightfully earned savings. Chancellor Osborne has failed to persuade many people that they need to take his harsh medicine.

It is perhaps typical of the strident Mrs Thatcher that her ghost is haunting the country even though she is still with us, if a little frail. It is a generational thing – anyone over forty either hated or loved Thatcher and by and large it is the ones who hated her who went on to be opinion formers, whether in TV studios, newspapers or teaching in colleges and schools. The under thirties take their idea of the Thatcher era from those teachers, or from the novels of Jonathan Coe, or most recently from the Meryl Streep film. There is a touch of nostalgia for an age that was a bit more black and white, where the choices were starker.

Today’s class struggle is by no means as clear. As much as the unions talk up the coalition as a return to Thatcherism there is nothing like the determination to lead an offensive against trade union power in Cameron’s cabinet, which, remember, is a coalition with some sceptical Liberal Democratic partners. What is more, the party he leads got elected on the express promise that it had left the ‘nasty party’ image of the Thatcherite 1980s behind. This was the nice Tory party.

Cameron’s one distinctive policy, the Big Society, if it were to work, would surely be carried along by the kind of people who are on strike today – who struck me as people with a social conscience, and an interest in their communities. It cannot be comfortable for him that this is the very constituency that he most offends.

Mrs Thatcher was not so bothered about the Social Workers and Community Activists, generally painting them as a big nuisance. What she was good at was rallying the establishment – the newspaper editors, City financiers, industry managers, senior police chiefs and judges were a formidable establishment ready to face down any rebellious mood among the scruff trade unionists or rioting youth. Mr Cameron, though, does not have any such united establishment on his side. They have all been attacking each other for some time now. Right now, Lord Leveson is enquiring into the scurrilous phone tapping done by Rupert Murdoch’s News International. It is a ghoulish picture of the newspaper magnate that emerges, and not the kind of thing that is likely to persuade him to get behind the Cameron government in the way he was behind Mrs Thatcher’s.

The left, too, is in a weaker state than it looks. There is a kind of trajectory to events, from the student demonstrations of a year ago, through the summer riots and this autumn’s version of #Occupy Wall Street – a tent city in the gardens of St Paul’s cathedral. The rhythm of these protests – and protest is legitimated emotionally by the events in the Middle East, however different those protests are – give the impression of a rising crescendo. But that is deceptive. The anti-capitalist mood is not deeply rooted. Last week they had an opportunity to make their organisation a bit stronger. But without a concerted assault from the government, the opposition is also a little tentative.

Overall the country is much more exercised by the throwaway line from TV presenter Jeremy Clarkson, that the strikers ought to be shot – for which he has been roundly condemned – than it has been by the strikes.

On the night Cameron went around the television studios saying that the strikes proved to be a bit of a damp squib. It is a smart spin to put on things. It conveys that he is not rattled, and that it is all a bit of a fuss about nothing. But it is not true enough for him to get away with it. The unions did not land a big punch, but they had a respectable day. Worse still for Cameron is that it sounds like his own strategy is a bit of a damp squib so far.

James Heartfield’s latest book The Aborigines' Protection Society: Humanitarian Imperialism in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Canada, South Africa, and the Congo, 1836-1909 is published by Columbia University Press, and Hurst Books in the UK.

Photo by Flickr user Ben Sutherland

Mass Transit: Could Raising Fares Increase Ridership?

Steve Lafleur — Thu, 24 Nov 2011 12:05:48 -0500

Conventional wisdom dictates that keeping transit fares as low as possible will promote high ridership levels. That isn't entirely incorrect. Holding all else constant, raising fares would have a negative impact on ridership. But allowing the market to set transit fares, when coupled with a number of key reforms could actually increase transit ridership, even if prices increase. In order to implement these reforms, we would need to purge from our minds the idea that public transit is a welfare service that ought to be virtually free in order to accommodate the poor. Concern about poverty should drive welfare policy, not transit policy. Persistent efforts to keep public transit fares as low as possible are a big part of the reason that public transit ridership in North America has hit record lows. To increase ridership, transit agencies have to convince people who can afford to drive that transit is a better option. Convenience, and not lower prices, is the key.

There are three basic reasons that private automobiles have virtually crowded out transit. First, private automobiles are inherently more convenient for a large segment of the population. Transit routes are naturally limited to well-traveled corridors, which are often slower because of wait and stop times. On the other hand, you can get into your car and immediately take the most efficient route to your destination.

The second factor is free roads. While people do pay for roads, they don't pay for using specific roads at specific times. Gas taxes go into general revenues, and road construction and repair isn't directly connected to usage. As a result, a large percentage of roads are subsidized by travelers who use a small percentage of highly traveled routes. Similarly, drivers don't pay more during peak times than non-peak times. They instead pay with their time, by waiting in traffic.

The third factor is that the market dictates private automobile sales. This is important because automobile companies and dealerships have an incentive to keep prices competitive while selling a high quality product. It also ensures that there are a multitude of different types of automobiles, and differing finance schemes and secondary markets tailored to a range of needs. The private sector is great at marketing things to people; government isn't.

While public transit can never be as flexible as private automobiles, some of the automobile's advantages can be reduced. Road tolls and congestion pricing ought to be implemented where practical. Ironically, offsetting these new fees by reducing the gas tax would actually also be beneficial for transit services. After all, the only reason many impractical roads are built is that they are financed out of general revenue. If roads were primarily financed by those who used them, more funding would go to highly traveled urban roads, and less would go toward subsidizing sprawl.

Here's the controversial aspect of the solution: Transit should operate on a for profit basis and its prices should closely reflect market forces — even if it means that transit fares increase.

Mass transit has one major advantage: where there is sufficient demand, transit is inherently cheaper than private automobile usage because the costs are spread over many people, making the per person cost lower. That's why most people fly with commercial airlines instead of chartering private jets, for example. But keeping the price too low reduces the ability of transit service to provide more routes. And this is important. While there is a segment of the population who are stuck with public transit no matter how inconvenient it is, most people won't ditch their cars unless they can get to their destinations relatively quickly. And it may not be economical for a transit system to get them to many of those places for $2.25.

A flat price structure subsidizes inefficient routes with efficient ones. But what if transit services charged the full cost for less efficient routes? While charging more for less popular routes may seem like it would reduce ridership, it wouldn't. If people knew that there were many additional routes going to out-of-the-way locations that they don't ordinarily frequent, they would still positively factor it into their calculation of whether or not they need a car. After all, paying $5 to get to an out of the way destination occasionally is still cheaper than getting a cab, and can often be cheaper than the cost of driving. Transit systems have higher ridership in major centres than in small centres, even when the fares are high. Transit is not only cheaper than driving in dense cities, it's also equally or more convenient.

But just allowing prices to fluctuate isn't enough. For a price system to function properly there needs to be an incentive to keep prices as low as possible. Public monopolies don't have this incentive. Furthermore, there needs to be competition to ensure high levels of service. The reason that air travel service is so high quality and cheap is because it is private, not public.

The thought of privately delivered public transit will no doubt turn some people off, especially public sector employees. And simply removing government from the transit business isn't necessarily the best solution. Instead, municipal transit services should be turned into transit commissions that coordinate and contract for transit from competing companies. Transit companies would bid on routes, and pay the city a fixed cost for the right to service each route based on a competitive auction.

For less cost efficient routes, a city could even offer a small subsidy per rider, should no transit company enter a bid. Whichever company would be willing to service that route at the lowest subsidy level would win. This would maintain downward pressure on costs. But it would be important that the transit commission use this as a last resort. Otherwise it could undermine the competitive market process by creating the incentive for companies not to bid on many marginal routes until a subsidy was offered.

Collecting variable rates for trains is simple, but it would be more difficult for buses. One method would be to have buses classified as local, express, or commuter, for instance. Each would charge a different rate. An automated payment system could be installed where riders swiped their cards on the way in and out, as they do on the Washington DC Metro, to calculate the rate.

Changing the operating and pricing structure wouldn't alter the way that people use transit services. Transit vehicles would still work on a coordinated schedule, and collect fees from riders as they always have. What would change is that the competing companies would have an incentive to keep operating costs lower, and to provide more routes. They also would have to meet performance guidelines monitored by the city, or face fines. What would change is the philosophy of transit companies. They would be out to make a profit.

This may seem like a radical departure, but consider that London, England, contracts out its bus service. If one of the world's busiest cities can co-ordinate a public-private partnership of this magnitude, there is no reason smaller cities couldn't do the same. The key is to create the right incentives and institutions. The current model of treating transit as a welfare service has failed. It is time to make transit the first choice for commuters, not the last.

Steve Lafleur is a Policy Analyst with the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.

Image from BigStockPhoto.com: A metro bus in Madison, Wisconsin.