Las Vegas

Biggest Boomer Towns

Joel Kotkin and Wendell Cox — Fri, 12 Aug 2011 11:53:37 -0400

The boomer generation, spawned (literally) in the aftermath of the Second World War, will continue to shape the American landscape well into the 21st Century. They may be getting older, but these folks are still maintaining their power. Those born in the first ten years of the boomer generation — between 1945 and 1955 — number 36 million, and they will continue to influence communities and real estate markets across the country, especially as they contemplate life after kids and retirement.

Much has been written about where “empty nesters” might move as their children move off on their own. One longstanding favorite is the notion that, having jettisoned their children, the boomers will also desert their suburban communities for the bright city lights.

Unfortunately for developers — some of whom have invested heavily in high-end housing for urbanizing “empty nesters” — the actual data do not support this thesis. Indeed, our analysis of migration by this cohort in the past 10 years shows a 10.3% decline among core city dwellers, a loss of some 1.3 million people over the past decade. For this analysis, Forbes, with the help of demographer Wendell Cox, looked at population numbers from the Census for boomers aged 45 to 54 in 2000 and compared them with the numbers for those ages 55 to 64 in 2010.

These population changes include reductions due principally to deaths. Census data do not include mortality information. This cohort lost 3.2% of its population over the 10 years. This would only marginally reduce the changes between 2000 and 2010, while the scale of differences between the metropolitan areas would be identical.

So where are these surviving boomers settling as they enter their likely extended golden years? The results may surprise urban boosters who have confidently expected them to flock downtown.

To be sure, a few of the highly affluent — the ones mentioned in the mainstream media — may purchase homes, or pied-à-terres, in places like Manhattan, Chicago’s Gold Coast or San Francisco. But these areas actually have suffered an exodus of boomers over the past decade. In our ranking of the 51 largest metros in the U.S., the urban cores of San Jose, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Chicago scored near the bottom, suffering double-digit percentage losses of boomers. According to the last Census, New York’s urban core, which the Daily News suggested is packed with aspiring seniors, lost 12% of boomers in their mid-50s to mid-60s — or about 274,000 people.

Over the past three years you could blame this loss on the economy, which has postponed retirements brought home many of the boomers’ young, largely unemployed or underemployed children back to the suburban homestead. Or you can credit it to more active lifestyles among boomers who appear to working later than ever. According to a Careerbuilder.com survey, over 60% of workers over 60 indicated they are postponing retirement.

Yet perhaps something more profound is at work here. An analysis of those who were 55 to 65 in 2000 and 65 to 75 in 2010 reveals an even stronger anti-urban bias, with an over 12% drop in city dwellers. Since these folks are far less likely to have kids at home and more properly retired, this cohort’s behavior suggests that aging boomers are if anything less likely to move to the cities in the next decade.

Indeed, if boomers do move, notes Sandi Rosenbloom, a noted expert on retirement trends and professor of Planning and Civil Engineering at the University of Arizona, they tend to move to less dense and more affordable regions. The top cities for aging boomers largely parallel those that appealed to the “young and restless” in our earlier survey. The top ten on our list are all affordable, generally low-density Sun Belt metros:

Las Vegas, Nev.
Phoenix, Ariz.
Tampa-St. Petersburg, Fla.
Orlando, Fla.
Riverside-San Bernardino, Calif.
Raleigh, N.C.
Austin, Texas
San Antonio, Texas
Jacksonville, Fla.
Charlotte, N.C.-S.C.

But according Sandi Rosenbloom, a noted expert on retirement trends and a professor of planning and civil engineering at the University of Arizona, most boomers are staying put, largely in the suburbs they settled in decades ago. The propensity to move, she points out, starts to drop precipitously as people leave their early 30s. Roughly 1 in 3 people in their 20s move in a given year; by the time they enter their 40s, that figure slides to about 1 in 10. As people age into their 50s and beyond, the percentage drops to roughly 5%, or 1 in 20.

“The boomers are staying put more than anyone thought,” Rosenbloom says. “People of that generation tend to own their own homes and stay there. The idea that they are moving to the city really comes from the wishful thinking school of planning.”

The recession has exacerbated this stay-at-home trend. The number of people moving is at its lowest level since the early 1960s. When boomers do decide to move, Rosenbloom notes, they do so largely for prosaic reasons, such as being closer to children or, more important, grandchildren.

Others succumb to the temptation to cash out expensive housing in metros like New York, Los Angeles, the Bay Area or Boston for less costly residences in Sun Belt locales. Housing in and around these core cities, particularly in attractive neighborhoods, Rosenbloom adds, are simply too expensive for the vast majority of budget-conscious seniors.

Much of this also has to do with the lifestyle preferences of both boomers and seniors, which appear far different than those put forth by urban pundits. People over 55 that Rosenbloom has interviewed usually express a preference to stay or relocate in places that are less crowded and congested. Furthermore, most are reluctant to give up their cars, and many are less able to walk than drive. This may explain why most retirement communities end up on the urban fringe or farther.

This trend — which Rosenbloom has also encountered in the U.K., Australia, Canada and New Zealand — is also reflected by the growing shift to smaller towns and cities among both aging boomers and seniors. The “young and restless” may head to suburbs, particularly in the lower-cost Sun Belt cities, but some older Americans appear headed to even less densely populated regions. Over the past decade over 1 million aging boomers and seniors moved to more smaller cities and rural locations from suburban or urban locations.

What do these trends suggest for the future of our communities and real estate? For one, the big opportunities for selling to aging boomers will remain primarily in the suburbs and some select more rural locations. We also can expect the new senior citizens to move to more affordable places close to their children.

These findings do provide some long-term hope for the housing market, particularly in suburbs. Leading demographers have been busy predicting a massive drop-off in single-family homes as boomers retire and their children leave. Yet our analysis on the Census reveals that most boomers — as well as those older than them — are staying in the suburbs a lot longer than expected. Many will likely to stay in their homes and old neighborhoods well into their 70s or even 80s, leaving either their home either in an ambulance or to an assisted living facility.

Developers and planners anxious to service aging boomers should, instead of building downtown towers, address the needs of this generation precisely where they now live and are likely to stay. This could include adding to new residential options in the suburbs to enlivening local shopping districts while boosting senior services in everything from recreation and public safety to health care. As the rock and roll generation heads toward its dotage, both business and communities need to adjust their strategies based not on fantasies but on the realities so clearly evidenced by the Census.

This piece originally appeared at Forbes.com.

Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

Cities That Prosper, Cool or Not

Bill Fulton — Thu, 09 Dec 2010 17:31:44 -0500

Over the past few years, the raging debate in economic development has been over whether cities should be cool or uncool. Should cities pursue “the creative economy” by going after arts, culture, creative research & development, and innovation? Or should they focus on the bread-and-butter economy: hard infrastructure, traditional industries like manufacturing, and blue-collar jobs?

Usually a raging debate is an indication that the wrong question is being asked, and that’s the case here. The question is not whether cities must be cool or uncool in order to prosper. Clearly, there are some cities in each camp that prosper, and some cities in each camp that do not. The question is deeper: In both cool and uncool cities, what is the underlying nature of the economy? Does the city simply import money from other places, or does it export goods and services to other places? Because it is this distinction – not cool or uncool – that serves as the dividing line between prosperity that is real and prosperity that is illusory.

Not long ago, I was interviewing a retired politician in a fast-growing Southern metropolis. Even though he was a good ol' boy who had never left home, he bore no resentment for the retired Yankees who flooded his town. In fact, he attributed the whole area’s prosperity to them. A retirement community, he said, “is like a high-wage factory. You build 1,000 houses, you have 1,000 households making $90,000 a year. A high-wage factory without the factory.”

I grew up in a factory town, and this got me thinking about a factory's huge and multi-faceted contribution to a region’s economy. But is a retirement community really similar?

In some ways the answer is yes — and that’s a good thing. The most obvious similarity, as my politician friend pointed out, is that the residents live in town, get steady paychecks to spend locally, and become involved in local life. Like factory workers, retirees can support a whole service economy with their local spending.

But there’s more to a factory-town economy than simply Saturday grocery shopping by the workers. Factories are in the export business, while retirement communities are in the import business. An export economy spins off all kinds of economic benefits that you don’t get from an import economy. A big factory requires lots of suppliers, and tends to stimulate the creation of an economic cluster — a group of businesses that feed off each other and, in time, find new customers outside the region.

A retirement community creates a cluster of suppliers, too. But this cluster tends to be composed of local service-sector businesses that create low-wage jobs and aren’t interested in repackaging their services for export outside the region — retailers, contractors, landscapers and pool-maintenance companies.

There’s also a psychological difference. Factory workers are connected to the local economy in a way that retirees are not. If orders fall off, they might get laid off for a while, switch jobs and go to work over at a supplier, sometimes for more money, sometimes for less. But the point is that they have a stake in the regional economy. Factory workers don’t like traffic jams anymore than the rest of us, but they see the value of an expanding economy. They see how growth can be good as well as bad.

Retirees see no such thing. They are tied to the global economic system in which their investments are based, or else to the economic fortunes of, say, a government pension system in another part of the country. They might want tax revenue to flow into public coffers in New York or Ohio to protect their public pensions, or they might want interest rates to go up so that their incomes rise.

But they see no benefit in an expanding local economy. If a bunch of factory workers get laid off, the retirees don’t need to worry, in fact, they might actually benefit because local prices might fall. If business is booming and people are employed and labor rates are going up, they don’t have to worry about that, either. They might even be harmed by it, because their incomes are fixed — not tied to the local economy — and prices will go up.

A retirement community is not the only type of place that operates this way. Tourist towns and bedroom suburbs function pretty much the same way. All are in the business of importing money from somewhere else, rather than exporting goods and services. And the recession has shown, once again, how fragile import-based economies are. A few years ago, Las Vegas was the biggest boomtown in America. Today, it’s become crash city, largely because the two-tier economy tied to tourism — a few wealthy casino owners and managers, a vast number of low-paid hotel service workers — couldn’t sustain the huge increase in home prices that occurred during the housing bubble.

There’s nothing new in this distinction between import and export economies. Jane Jacobs laid out the thesis magnificently, almost 30 years ago, in Cities and the Wealth of Nations. But it’s become more relevant in the last couple of years, as the cool v. uncool cities debate has heated up.

The argument that cool cities are involved in fluff, and therefore aren’t creating real economic growth, is based on the perception that cool cities are in the import business. If you build arts centers and sports stadiums and convention centers and subsidize lofts for artists, you’re not really creating any wealth… or so the argument goes. All you’re really doing is drawing people to your city so you can empty their pockets while they are having a good time; the classic import economy.

That’s true sometimes, but not always. At its best, a creative economy is generating innovations that turn into products that get exported elsewhere, whether those innovations are fashion trends or software applications or biotech breakthroughs. And in many cases, a more plodding blue-collar economy requires fluffy arts stuff to create the quality of life that will attract top people. My grandfather left the Cornell faculty to run the research lab of a rope manufacturing company in my hometown in upstate New York, but I’m pretty sure one of the attractions was a symphony orchestra that my grandmother, a concert pianist, could perform with now and then.

Similarly, just because a city is a lunch-bucket town doesn’t mean it’s sending goods and services out into the world and truly creating a lot of wealth. Here again, Las Vegas is a great example. Despite the glitz, Vegas is basically a blue-collar town. It’s job-rich, and workers traditionally didn’t need a lot of education or a high skill level to succeed, they just needed drive. Yet, by and large, the jobs created in Vegas aren’t very good. They’re relatively low-wage service jobs, and they come and go depending on the economy. Vegas' business leaders are accumulating wealth quickly, and maybe eventually it will become an export economy. But for now, like the retirement community in the South that I mentioned, it depends entirely on importing money.

It’s time to stop talking about whether towns should be cool or uncool. What really matters is what they are producing. If all they’re producing is some kind of experience that induces people to come to town and spend money, it doesn’t matter how cool the town is; it’s probably not sustainable economically. If, on the other hand, the city is creating and exporting something the world needs – whether that product is cool or uncool – it’s a good bet that both the city and its people will do pretty well for a long time.

Photo by Stuck in Customs/Trey Ratcliff. Prosperity, or just an illusion? Building 43 at Google.

William Fulton is a principal at Design, Community & Environment (dceplanning.com) and mayor of Ventura, California. This article is adapted from his new book, Romancing the Smokestack: How Cities and States Pursue Prosperity.

The Housing Bubble: The Economists Should Have Known

Wendell Cox — Wed, 25 Aug 2010 22:54:23 -0400

Paul Krugman got it right. But it should not have taken a Nobel Laureate to note that the emperor's nakedness with respect to the connection between the housing bubble and more restrictive land use regulation.

A just published piece by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, however, shows that much of the economics fraternity still does not "get it." In Reasonable People Did Disagree: Optimism and Pessimism About the U.S. Housing Market Before the Crash, Kristopher S. Gerardi, Christopher L. Foote and Paul S. Willen conclude that it was reasonable for economists to have missed the bubble.

Misconstruing Las Vegas and Phoenix: They fault Krugman for making the bubble/land regulation connection by noting that the "places in the United States where the housing market most resembled a bubble were Phoenix and Las Vegas," noting that both urban areas have "an abundance of surrounding land on which to accommodate new construction" (Note 1).

An abundance of land is of little use when it cannot be built upon. This is illustrated by Portland, Oregon, which is surrounded by such an "abundance of land." Yet over a decade planning authorities have been content to preside over a 60 percent increase in house prices relative to incomes, while severely limiting the land that could have been used to maintain housing affordability. The impact is clearly illustrated by the 90 percent drop in unimproved land value that occurs virtually across the street at Portland's urban growth boundary.

Building is largely impossible on the "abundance of land" surrounding Las Vegas and Phoenix. Las Vegas and Phoenix have virtual urban growth boundaries, formed by encircling federal and state lands. These are fairly tight boundaries, especially in view of the huge growth these areas have experienced. There are programs to auction off some of this land to developers and the price escalation during the bubble in the two metropolitan areas shows how a scarcity of land from government ownership produces the same higher prices as an urban growth boundary

Like Paul Krugman, banker Doug French got it right. In a late 2002 article for the Nevada Policy Research Institute, French noted the huge increases auction prices, characterized the federal government as hording its land and suggested that median house prices could reach $280,000 by the end of the decade. Actually, they reached $320,000 well before that (and then collapsed).

In Las Vegas, house prices escalated approximately 85% relative to incomes between 2002 and 2006. Coincidentally, over the same period, federal government land auctions prices for urban fringe land rose from a modest $50,000 per acre in 2001-2, to $229,000 in 2003-4 and $284,000 at the peak of the housing bubble (2005-6). Similarly, Phoenix house prices rose nearly as much as Las Vegas, while the rate of increase per acre in Phoenix land auctions rose nearly as much as in Las Vegas.

In both cases, prices per acre rose at approximately the same annual rate as in Beijing, which some consider to have the world's largest housing bubble. According to Joseph Gyourko of Wharton, along with Jing Wu and Yongheng Deng Beijing prices rose 800 percent from 2003 to 2008 (Figure). This is true even thought we are not experiencing the epochal shift to big urban areas now going on in China.

The Issue is Land Supply: The escalation of new house prices during the bubble occurred virtually all in non-construction costs such as the costs of land and any additional regulatory costs. It is not sufficient to look at a large supply of new housing (as the Boston Fed researchers do) and conclude that regulation has not taken its toll. The principal damage done by more restrictive land regulation comes from limiting the supply of land, which drives its price up and thereby the price of houses. In some places where there was substantial building, restrictive land use regulations also skewed the market strongly in favor of sellers. This dampening of supply in the face of demand drove land prices up hugely, even before the speculators descended to drive the prices even higher. Florida and interior California metropolitan areas (such as Sacramento and Riverside-San Bernardino) are examples of this.

Missing Obvious Signs: There are at least two reasons why much of the economics profession missed the bubble.

(1) Unlike Paul Krugman, many economists failed to look below the national data. As Krugman showed, there were huge variations in house price trends between the nation's metropolitan areas. National averages mean little unless there is little variation. Yet most of the economists couldn't be bothered to look below the national averages.

(2) Most economists failed to note the huge structural imbalances that had occurred in the distorted housing markets relative to historic norms. Since World War II, the Median Multiple, the median house price divided by the median household income, has been 3.0 or less in most US metropolitan markets. Between 1950 and 2000, the Median Multiple reached as high as 6.1 in a single metropolitan area among today's 50 largest, in a single year (San Jose in 1990, see Note 2). In 2001, however, two metropolitan areas reached that level, a figure that rose to 9 in 2006 and 2007. The Median Multiple reached unprecedented and stratospheric levels in of 10 or more in Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego and San Jose- all of which have very restrictive land use and have had relatively little building. This historical anomaly should have been a very large red flag.

In contrast, the Median Multiple remained at or below 3.0 in a number of high growth markets, such as Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston and other markets throughout the bubble.. Even with strong housing growth, prices remained affordable where there was less restrictive land use regulation.

Seeing the Signs: Krugman, for his part, takes a well deserved victory lap in a New York Times blog entitled "Wrong to be Right," deferring to Yves Smith at nakedcapitalism.com who had this to say about the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston research:

It is truly astonishing to watch how determined the economics orthodoxy is to defend its inexcusable, economy-wrecking performance in the run up to the financial crisis. Most people who preside over disasters, say from a boating accident or the failure of a venture, spend considerable amounts of time in review of what happened and self-recrimination. Yet policy-making economists have not only seemed constitutionally unable to recognize that their programs resulted in widespread damage, but to add insult to injury, they insist that they really didn’t do anything wrong.

Maybe we should have known better: beware economists bearing the moment’s conventional wisdom.

------

Note 1: The authors cite work by Albert Saiz of Wharton to suggest an association between geographical constraints and house price increases in metropolitan areas. The Saiz constraint, however, looks at a potential development area 50 kilometers from the metropolitan center (7,850 square kilometers). This seems to be a far too large area to have a material price impact in most metropolitan areas. For example, in Portland, the strongly enforced urban growth boundary (which would have a similar theoretical impact on prices) was associated with virtually no increase in house prices until the developable land inside the boundary fell to less than 100 square kilometers (early 1990s). A far more remote geographical barrier, such as the foothills of Mount Hood, can have no meaningful impact in this environment.

Note 2: William Fischel of Dartmouth has shown how the implementation of land use controls in California metropolitan areas coincided with the rise of house prices beyond historic national levels. As late as 1970, house prices in California were little different than in the rest of the nation.

Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life”

Photograph: $575,000 house in Los Angeles (2006), Photograph by author

“James Drain” Hits Cleveland

Aaron M. Renn — Wed, 14 Jul 2010 23:31:16 -0400

The ten story of mural of LeBron James is coming down in Cleveland. This one hurts. James wasn't just the latest embodiment of Cleveland's hopes, he was a local kid who, unlike so many, had stayed home in Northeast Ohio. His joining of the Cleveland exodus at a time of severe economic distress prompted Cavaliers owner Dan Gilbert to pen a now infamous open letter to fans:

As you now know, our former hero, who grew up in the very region that he deserted this evening, is no longer a Cleveland Cavalier.....The good news is that the ownership team and the rest of the hard-working, loyal, and driven staff over here at your hometown Cavaliers have not betrayed you nor NEVER will betray you....This shocking act of disloyalty from our home grown "chosen one" sends the exact opposite lesson of what we would want our children to learn. And "who" we would want them to grow-up to become....

Forty years of frustration boiled over in that letter. Gilbert is from Detroit, but perhaps that's why he too shares these feelings so viscerally.

Cleveland's “Big Thing Theory”

In a sense though, Cleveland's disappointment was inevitable. LeBron James was never going to turn around the city. No one person or one thing can. Unfortunately, Cleveland has continually pinned its hopes on a never-ending cycle of “next big things” to reverse decline. This will never work. As local economic development guru Ed Morrison put it, “Overwhelmingly, the strategy is now driven by individual projects....This leads to the 'Big Thing Theory' of economic development: Prosperity results from building one more big thing.”

These have all failed, now even “King James”. The trend lines haven't changed, even where the individual projects have done well. But often even that hasn't happened. For example, the Flats, a once-thriving entertainment district in an old warehouse district, now resembles, as one local comedian put it, a “Scooby Doo ghost town.”

Combating “James Drain”

James' departure also fits the narrative of generalized anxiety around “brain drain” and cities losing their best and brightest of each generation. As lots of people really have left Cleveland, this is understandable. But the real story is much more complex. A look at IRS tax return data shows that in reality Cleveland doesn't have especially high out-migration. Its metro out-migration rate* in 2008 was 28.02. Miami's was 40.34 and for even the boomtown of Atlanta it was 38.95. Not only is Cleveland not losing an especially high number of people, you can actually argue it is losing too few. A big part of the problem in Cleveland's economy is that too many people are stuck there.

Conversely, a real migration problem is that too few people are moving in. As local attorney Richard Herman noted, “New York City and Chicago, like most major cities, see significant out-migration of their existing residents each year. What is atypical is that Cleveland does not enjoy the energy of new people moving in.” The Cleveland metro in-migration rate was only 22.19. Miami's was 30.36 and Atlanta's a robust 51.91.

Cities need new blood. Cleveland isn't getting it. Its circulatory system is shut down. Cleveland needs more natives to leave and more newcomers to arrive. Both sides win. Those Cleveland departees will move on to be part of the new energy other cities so desperately need. James is going to get to live the high life he wants in South Beach, but somebody else will be fired up to get the opportunity to play in Cleveland.

Selling Cleveland

But that begs the question, what's going to get more people to move to Cleveland? The fact is, James wasn't getting the job done, and never would. Nor will amenities like the Cleveland Orchestra or the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame Museum.

The mistake Cleveland and other Rust Belt cities make is that they are too worried about the likes of LeBron James moving to Miami. For people with the means and the desire to choose a place like South Beach, Cleveland simply can't compete. And let's not forget, James snubbed Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles too.

Rather than trying to take on the Chicagos, Miamis, and New Yorks of this world at their strongest points, Cleveland would be far better served ceding that market and fighting where it can best compete. Believe it or not, not everyone wants to live in a huge global city. There are plenty of people who might choose to live in Cleveland, if the city focused on the basic blocking and tackling of city services, quality of life, and business climate instead of splashy grands projets. As Anthony Bourdain said this week:

I think that troubled cities often tragically misinterpret what's coolest about themselves. They scramble for cure-alls, something that will "attract business", always one convention center, one pedestrian mall or restaurant district away from revival. They miss their biggest, best and probably most marketable asset: their unique and slightly off-center character....Cleveland is one of my favorite cities. I don't arrive there with a smile on my face every time because of the Cleveland Philharmonic.

In short, Cleveland needs less South Beach, less Chicago Loop, and more American Splendor. Ultimately, my bet is Cleveland will end up missing Harvey Pekar a lot more than it will any multi-millionaire sports star.

Shooting the Messenger

Who is going to get that message out about Cleveland? After that sendoff, it sure won't be LeBron James. That's a shame. As Jim Russell has richly illustrated, people make migration – and investment – decisions based on knowledge, not just information. Nobody picks a city to live in by entering reams to statistics into a sixteen tab spreadsheet. They're more likely to move to be near family, friends, or places they know. That knowledge comes from first hand experience – and trusted recommendations.

Until the switch flips on Cleveland's brand, it needs to be out earning that trust of prospective residents. The people who've left aren't Judases, they're your field sales force – or at least they should be. James could have been a missionary “Witness” for Cleveland in a foreign land. Instead, Cleveland blew an enormous opportunity, and left itself with little more than soured memories and a partially demolished mural as an ephemeral reminder of yet another failed Next Big Thing.

* Tax return exemptions migrating per 1000 overall tax return exemptions in the base year.

Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs based in the Midwest. His writings appear at The Urbanophile.

Photo by alexabboud

The Myth of the Back-to-the-City Migration

Joel Kotkin — Tue, 06 Jul 2010 13:38:17 -0400

Pundits, planners and urban visionaries—citing everything from changing demographics, soaring energy prices, the rise of the so-called "creative class," and the need to battle global warming—have been predicting for years that America's love affair with the suburbs will soon be over. Their voices have grown louder since the onset of the housing crisis. Suburban neighborhoods, as the Atlantic magazine put it in March 2008, would morph into "the new slums" as people trek back to dense urban spaces.

But the great migration back to the city hasn't occurred. Over the past decade the percentage of Americans living in suburbs and single-family homes has increased. Meanwhile, demographer Wendell Cox's analysis of census figures show that a much-celebrated rise in the percentage of multifamily housing peaked at 40% of all new housing permits in 2008, and it has since fallen to below 20% of the total, slightly lower than in 2000.

Housing prices in and around the nation's urban cores is clear evidence that the back-to-the-city movement is wishful thinking. Despite cheerleading from individuals such as University of Toronto Professor Richard Florida, and Carole Coletta, president of CEOs for Cities and the Urban Land Institute, this movement has crashed in ways that match—and in some cases exceed—the losses suffered in suburban and even exurban locations. Condos in particular are a bellwether: Downtown areas, stuffed with new condos, have suffered some of the worst housing busts in the nation.

Take Miami, once a poster child for urban revitalization. According to National Association of Realtors data, the median condominium price in the Miami metropolitan area has dropped 75% from its 2007 peak, far worse than 50% decline suffered in the market for single family homes.

Then there's Los Angeles. Over the last year, according to the real estate website Zillow.com, single-family home prices in the Los Angeles region have rebounded by a modest 10%. But the downtown condo market has lost over 18% of its value. Many ambitious new projects, like Eli Broad's grandiose Grand Avenue Development, remain on long-term hold.

The story in downtown Las Vegas is massive overbuilding and vacancies. The Review Journal recently reported a nearly 21-year supply of unsold condominium units. MGM City Center developer Larry Murren stated this spring that he wished he had built half as many units. Mr. Murren cites a seminar on mixed-use development—a commonplace event in many cities over the past few years—as sparking his overenthusiasm. He's not the only developer who has admitted being misled.

Behind the condo bust is a simple error: people's stated preferences. Virtually every survey of opinion, including a 2004 poll co-sponsored by Smart Growth America, a group dedicated to promoting urban density, found that roughly 13% of Americans prefer to live in an urban environment while 33% prefer suburbs, and another 18% like exurbs. These patterns have been fairly consistent over the last several decades.

Demographic trends, including an oft-predicted tsunami of Baby Boom "empty nesters" to urban cores, have been misread. True, some wealthy individuals have moved to downtown lofts. But roughly three quarters of retirees in the first bloc of retiring baby boomers are sticking pretty close to the suburbs, where the vast majority now reside. Those that do migrate, notes University of Arizona Urban Planning Professor Sandi Rosenbloom, tend to head further out into the suburban periphery. "Everybody in this business wants to talk about the odd person who moves downtown, but it's basically a 'man bites dog story,'" she says. "Most retire in place."

Historically, immigrants have helped prop up urban markets. But since 1980 the percentage who settle in urban areas has dropped to 34% from 41%. Some 52% are now living in suburbs, up from 44% 30 years ago. This has turned places such as Bergen County, N.J., Fort Bend County, Texas, and the San Gabriel Valley east of Los Angeles into the ultimate exemplars of multicultural America.

What about the "millennials"—the generation born after 1983? Research by analysts Morley Winograd and Mike Hais, authors of the ground-breaking "Millennial Makeover," indicates this group is even more suburban-centric than their boomer parents. Urban areas do exercise great allure to well-educated younger people, particularly in their 20s and early 30s. But what about when they marry and have families, as four in five intend? A recent survey of millennials by Frank Magid and Associates, a major survey research firm, found that although roughly 18% consider the city "an ideal place to live," some 43% envision the suburbs as their preferred long-term destination.

Urban centers will continue to represent an important, if comparatively small, part of the rapidly evolving American landscape. With as many as 100 million more Americans by 2050, they could enjoy a growth of somewhere between 10 million and 20 million more people. And in the short run, the collapse of the high-end condo market could provide opportunity for young and unmarried people to move into luxurious urban housing at bargain rates.

But lower prices, or a shift to rentals, could prove financially devastating for urban developers and their investors, who now may be slow to re-enter the market. And for many cities, the bust could represent a punishing fiscal blow, given the subsidies lavished on many projects during the era of urbanist frenzy.

The condo bust should provide a cautionary tale for developers, planners and the urban political class, particularly those political "progressives" who favor using regulatory and fiscal tools to promote urban densification. It is simply delusional to try forcing a market beyond proven demand.

Rather than ignore consumer choice, cities and suburbs need to focus on basic tasks like creating jobs, improving schools, developing cultural amenities and promoting public safety. It is these more mundane steps—not utopian theory or regulatory diktats—that ultimately make successful communities.

This article originally appeared in the Wall Street Journal.

Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in Febuary, 2010.

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Despite Transit's 2008 Peak, Longer Term Market Trend is Down: A 25 Year Report on Transit Ridership

Wendell Cox — Fri, 25 Jun 2010 01:35:03 -0400

In 2008, US transit posted its highest ridership since 1950, a development widely noted and celebrated in the media. Ridership had been increasing for about a decade, however, 2008 coincided with the highest gasoline prices in history, which gave transit a boost.

Less reported was the fact that despite higher ridership, transit's market share (of transit and motor vehicles) has fallen since the 1950s. In 1955, transit's market share was over 10%. By 2005, transit’s share had dropped to 1.5%, but recovered only to 1.6% in 2008. Transit's all time peak ridership was in 1945, driven up by World War II and gas rationing. It is thus not surprising that national transit ridership (boardings) declined 3.8% in 2009 as gasoline prices moderated.

Market Share by Major Urban Area

Demographia has released urban area roadway and transit market share estimates for 2008, based upon Federal Transit Administration and Federal Highway Administration data. The table below compares 2008 with 1983 market share data for 56 urban areas with a corresponding metropolitan area population of more than 900,000 (complete data).

Urban Areas: Roadway & Transit Market Share: 2008
Ranked by 2008 Transit Market Share
With 25 Year (1983) Comparison
		2008		1983		Roadway Share % Change
Rank	Urban Area	Roadway Share	Transit Share:	Roadway Share	Transit Share:	Roadway Share % Change
1	New York	89.0%	11.0%	87.7%	12.3%	1.5%
2	San Francisco	95.0%	5.0%	93.7%	6.3%	1.4%
3	Washington	95.5%	4.5%	96.1%	3.9%	-0.6%
4	Chicago	96.1%	3.9%	94.2%	5.8%	2.0%
5	Honolulu	96.2%	3.8%	93.2%	6.8%	3.2%
6	Boston	96.7%	3.3%	97.5%	2.5%	-0.8%
7	Seattle	97.2%	2.8%	97.6%	2.4%	-0.4%
8	Philadelphia	97.3%	2.7%	96.0%	4.0%	1.4%
9	Portland	97.7%	2.3%	97.6%	2.4%	0.1%
10	Salt Lake City	97.8%	2.2%	99.1%	0.9%	-1.3%
11	Los Angeles	98.1%	1.9%	98.1%	1.9%	0.0%
12	Denver	98.2%	1.8%	98.5%	1.5%	-0.3%
13	Baltimore	98.3%	1.7%	97.7%	2.3%	0.6%
14	Pittsburgh	98.6%	1.4%	97.3%	2.7%	1.3%
15	Miami-West Palm Beach	98.7%	1.3%	98.8%	1.2%	-0.1%
16	Atlanta	98.8%	1.2%	98.0%	2.0%	0.8%
16	Cleveland	98.8%	1.2%	98.0%	2.0%	0.8%
16	Las Vegas	98.8%	1.2%	99.6%	0.4%	-0.8%
16	Minneapolis-St. Paul	98.8%	1.2%	98.8%	1.2%	0.0%
16	San Diego	98.8%	1.2%	99.3%	0.7%	-0.5%
21	San Jose	99.0%	1.0%	99.0%	1.0%	0.0%
22	Austin	99.1%	0.9%	99.7%	0.3%	-0.6%
22	Houston	99.1%	0.9%	99.0%	1.0%	0.1%
22	Milwaukee	99.1%	0.9%	98.3%	1.7%	0.8%
22	Sacramento	99.1%	0.9%	99.0%	1.0%	0.1%
22	San Antonio	99.1%	0.9%	98.7%	1.3%	0.4%
27	St. Louis	99.2%	0.8%	99.0%	1.0%	0.2%
28	Buffalo	99.3%	0.7%	98.5%	1.5%	0.8%
28	Providence	99.3%	0.7%	98.9%	1.1%	0.4%
30	Charlotte	99.4%	0.6%	99.3%	0.7%	0.1%
30	Cincinnati	99.4%	0.6%	98.7%	1.3%	0.7%
30	Dallas-Fort Worth	99.4%	0.6%	99.4%	0.6%	0.0%
30	Hartford	99.4%	0.6%	98.7%	1.3%	0.7%
30	Orlando	99.4%	0.6%	99.7%	0.3%	-0.3%
30	Phoenix	99.4%	0.6%	99.4%	0.6%	0.0%
30	Rochester	99.4%	0.6%	98.9%	1.1%	0.5%
30	Tucson	99.4%	0.6%	98.9%	1.1%	0.5%
38	Detroit	99.5%	0.5%	98.8%	1.2%	0.7%
38	Fresno	99.5%	0.5%	99.3%	0.7%	0.2%
38	New Orleans	99.5%	0.5%	97.4%	2.6%	2.2%
38	Norfolk-Virginia Beach	99.5%	0.5%	99.2%	0.8%	0.3%
38	Riverside-San Bernardino	99.5%	0.5%	99.6%	0.4%	-0.1%
43	Columbus	99.6%	0.4%	98.6%	1.4%	1.0%
43	Louisville	99.6%	0.4%	98.9%	1.1%	0.7%
43	Memphis	99.6%	0.4%	99.4%	0.6%	0.2%
43	Tampa-St. Petersburg	99.6%	0.4%	99.5%	0.5%	0.1%
47	Bridgeport	99.7%	0.3%	99.8%	0.2%	-0.1%
47	Jacksonville	99.7%	0.3%	99.4%	0.6%	0.3%
47	Kansas City	99.7%	0.3%	99.4%	0.6%	0.3%
47	Nashville	99.7%	0.3%	99.4%	0.6%	0.3%
47	Raleigh	99.7%	0.3%	99.9%	0.1%	-0.2%
47	Richmond	99.7%	0.3%	99.1%	0.9%	0.6%
53	Indianapolis	99.8%	0.2%	99.3%	0.7%	0.5%
54	Birmingham	99.9%	0.1%	99.5%	0.5%	0.4%
54	Oklahoma City	99.9%	0.1%	99.9%	0.1%	0.0%
54	Tulsa	99.9%	0.1%	99.6%	0.4%	0.3%

Unweighted Average		98.7%	1.3%	98.3%	1.7%	0.4%

All Urban Areas Combined		98.4%	1.6%	97.5%	2.5%	0.9%

Based upon passenger miles
Core urban areas in metropolitan areas with more than 900,000 population in 2009.
Derived from Federal Transit Administration and Federal Highway Administration data
Los Angeles and Mission Viejo urban areas combined
San Francisco, Concord and Livermore urban areas combined
Historic transit market share data at http://www.publicpurpose.com/ut-usptshare45.pdf
Maryland commuter rail (MARC) assigned to Washington, DC

In 1983, transit systems started receiving support from federal taxes on gasoline. This was also the first year that the National Transit Database reported on the same annual basis as it does today. One justification for using funds from road users was the hope of attracting people from cars to transit. The national data above and the urban area below show that the overwhelming share of new travel has, nonetheless, continued to be captured by motor vehicles rather than transit. Among the 56 urban areas, 13 experienced gains in transit market share from 1983 to the peak year of 2008, while 37 posted losses and six had no change. Transit was able to capture only 0.9% of new urban travel between 1983 and 2008, while roadways captured 99.1%. (Note 1).

The Top 10: Still a New York Story

#1: New York: The nation's predominant urban area remains New York, with an 11.0% transit market share. In 2008, 41% of the national transit ridership (passenger miles) was in New York, with much of it either in or focused upon New York City. The New York City Transit Authority, and a host of local public and private systems, principally serve New York City destinations and account for a remarkable 38% of the nation's transit ridership. Even so, transit's market share dropped from 12.3% in 1983. As a result, the roadway market share in New York increased 1.5% between 1983 and 2008, the fourth largest gain in the nation. Transit attracted 8.7% of the new demand between 1983 and 2008, while roadways attracted 91.3%.

#2: San Francisco: San Francisco had the nation's second highest transit market share in 2008, at 5.0%. This is a decline from 6.3% in 1983. Nonetheless, San Francisco moved up from 6th place in 1983. This produced a 1.4% increase in the roadway market share between 1983 and 2008, the fifth largest gain in the nation. Transit accounted for 2.2% of the new demand, while roadways attracted 97.8%.

#3: Washington: Washington placed third in transit market share in 2008, at 4.5%. This represents a gain from 3.9% in 1983 and an improvement from 6th place. Washington was the only urban area among the top five to experience an increase in transit market share. Much of Washington's transit increase was on its expanding Metrorail system and the MARC commuter rail system (most of the ridership on this Maryland based system commutes to Washington. Overall, transit in Washington has attracted 5.1% of new travel over the past 25 years, while roadways attracted 94.9% of new demand.

#4: Chicago: Chicago ranked fourth in transit market share, at 3.9%. In 1983, Chicago had ranked 3rd, with a market share of 5.8. The roadway market share in Chicago increased 2.0% from 1983 to 2008, the third largest road travel gain in the nation. Transit attracted 1.3% of new demand over the period in Chicago, while roadways attracted 98.7%.

#5: Honolulu: Honolulu ranked fifth in transit market share, at 3.8%. This is a significant drop from 1983, when Honolulu ranked 2nd in the nation, with a transit market share of 6.8%. Honolulu's roadway market share gain was the largest in the nation between 1983 and 2005, at 3.8%. Transit ridership also dropped in Honolulu from 1983 to 2008, so that roadways accounted for all new travel.

#6: Boston: Boston ranked sixth in transit market share in 2008, at 3.3%. This is a gain from 2.5% in 1983, when Boston ranked 9th. Much of Boston's increase is attributable to its commuter rail expansion. Transit captured 4.1% of new demand, while roadways attracted 95.9%.

#7: Seattle: Seattle's principally all bus transit system ranked 7th in 2008 with a market share of 2.8%. This is an increase from 2.4% in 1983, when Seattle ranked 10th. Transit captured 3.1% of new travel over the past 25 years, while roadways accounted for 96.9%.

#8: Philadelphia: Philadelphia slipped from the 5th largest transit market share in 1983 (4.0%) to 8th in 2008, at 2.7%. Philadelphia's transit system, one of the most comprehensive in the nation, captured just 1.4% of new travel over the last quarter century, while roadways captured 98.6%.

#9: Portland: Portland ranked 9th in transit market share in 2008, at 2.3%. This is a decline from 2.4% in 1983 and occurred despite opening the most extensive new light rail system in the nation over the period. Transit attracted 2.2% of new travel over the period, while roadways attracted 97.8%.

#10: Salt Lake City: Salt Lake City, at 10th, is a new entrant to the top 10 transit market share urban areas, with a share of 2.2%. In 1983, Salt Lake City ranked 34th, with a transit market share of 0.9%. Even with this increase, however, roadways captured the bulk of new travel, at 96.2%, while transit attracted 3.8%, due to transit's small 1983 base.

Other Urban Areas: There were also notable developments among the urban areas that did not place in the top 10 in 2008 transit market share.

Las Vegas: Las Vegas improved its ranking more than any other urban area, moving from 49th in 1983 to 16th in 2008 (in a tie with Atlanta, San Diego, Cleveland and Minneapolis-St. Paul). In 1983, Las Vegas had a transit market share of 0.4%, which improved to 1.2% in 2008. This was an especially notable achievement, because Las Vegas experienced substantial population growth over the period. During the period, Las Vegas established a 100% competitively contracted transit system, the only such transit system in the nation and has seen ridership expand by more than 10 times. Nonetheless, as in other gaining urban areas, such as Salt Lake City and Washington, the transit ridership base was so small that roadways captured nearly all the new demand, at 98.6% (transit obtained 1.4%).

Atlanta: Atlanta both (1) was the fastest growing larger urban area in the developed world between 1983 and 2008 and (2) built the second most new rail capacity in the nation, in its expansion of the MARTA Metro (trailing only Washington's Metro). Yet, Atlanta's transit market share fell from 2.0% to 1.2% between 1983 and 2008, with transit attracting only 0.9% of new travel.

New Rail Urban Areas: Transit market shares generally failed to increase in urban areas opening new light rail or metro systems over the period (excludes urban areas with new rail systems that were not open at the beginning of fiscal year 2008).

Six urban areas with new rail systems experienced market share declines, including Portland, Baltimore, Houston, Sacramento, St. Louis and Buffalo.
Four urban areas with new rail systems had static transit market shares, including Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, San Jose and Dallas-Fort Worth.
Three urban areas with new rail systems experienced transit market share increases. The largest increase was in Salt Lake City (and the largest of any urban area). Denver and Miami-West Palm Beach also experienced increases.

Where from Here? It might have been expected that transit would have attracted far higher ridership numbers when gasoline prices achieved such heights. Yet, nationally, transit market share increase was only from 1.5% to 1.6%, even as roadway demand was declining modestly.

Transit's principal marketing problem lies in its problem serving destinations outside downtown. Downtowns typically account for only 10% of urban area employment. Some trips in an urban cannot even be made on transit. For example, Portland's extensive transit system connects only about two-thirds of the jobs and residences within the (Tri-Met) service area (Note 2). Further Tri-Met's award deserving internet trip planner shows that some trips to outside downtown destinations can require more than two hours, even when light rail is used.

Note 1: This data relates only to passenger transportation. Urban roadways, unlike transit, also carry a substantial amount of local and intercity freight, which is not reflected in this data.

Note 2: According to Metro's 2004 Regional Transportation Plan, 78% of the residences and 86% of the jobs in the Tri-Met service area were within walking distance (1/4 mile) of a transit stop. This means that approximately 67% of residences and jobs are within 1/4 mile of a transit stop (0.78 * 0.86). Metro's plans envision this figure dropping to 59% by 2020 (this data does not include Clark County in Washington, part of which is in the urban area).

Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris. He was born in Los Angeles and was appointed to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission by Mayor Tom Bradley. He is the author of "War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

Las Vegas: The World’s Convening City?

Robert E. Lang — Mon, 26 Apr 2010 01:00:54 -0400

Conventional wisdom, and in many cases wishful thinking, among many urbanists holds that America’s sunbelt cities are done. Yet in reality, as they rise from the current deep recession, their re-ascendance will shock some, but will testify to the remarkable resiliency of this emerging urban form.

Origins: Bright Light City

The epicenter of the sunbelt rebound will be Las Vegas. The desert city has taken a unique road to a world city status. Most places get there by being financial, trade or manufacturing hubs, or can have a concentration of all three in the case of the biggest and most connected world cities. In contrast Las Vegas has achieved world city status via one key sector: entertainment.

Just about no one saw Las Vegas coming as a world city. Even in the late 20th century few would predict that the region could ever get to 1 million residents, let alone reach two million. In 1970 Jerome Pickard, a demographer working at the ULI—the Urban Land Institute in Washington, DC, projected U.S. metropolitan area populations to the year 2000. These estimates were nearly perfect, but for one major exception—he missed Las Vegas.

Las Vegas at the time seemed like, to make a bad pun, a one trick town. Its main industry, gambling (or “gaming” in local parlance), was pretty much unique to Nevada. Sure, the city already had landmark hotels and the famous “Strip” was by then iconic enough to influence American architectural theory, but the idea of an overgrown honky-tonk town as a true world city seemed a stretch.

A generation later, what changed? To start, gambling began to spread throughout the U.S. and indeed the world. First, Atlantic City, NJ, allowed gaming in the late 1970s and soon the floodgates opened. Soon people could gamble on riverboats in the Mississippi and off the Gulf Coast. Then a Supreme Court ruling allowed Native Americans to build and operate casinos—and they did just about everywhere.

Every time gaming expanded, analysts predicted the demise of Las Vegas. Yet history has shown that the widespread diffusion of gambling only induced a bigger appetite. In this socio-cultural-legal-lifestyle transition, Las Vegas became the epicenter of gaming. Many people who gambled in a nearby Indian reservation were really just warming up for Las Vegas.

The gaming industry in Las Vegas also matured in two key ways, offering a host of complimentary activities to go along with gambling. The first was the Las Vegas tie into Hollywood and live entertainment. By the 1980s, Las Vegas became one of the world’s largest venues for entertainment, surpassing even Broadway in New York. The city then began to add function after function related to tourism—food, shopping, and perhaps most importantly of all: conventions.

Las Vegas’s rise also was directly tied to infrastructure. Completed in the 1930s, Hoover dam provided Las Vegas with ample power and water. The other major improvement was a new highway to Los Angeles, which led to Vegas’s discovery by Hollywood figures.

At the same time, a series of complimentary economic drivers transformed the city over several decades. The casino and entertainment complex constructed in Las Vegas by 1970 soon engendered a proliferation of airline connections and convention business. The city had enough business to warrant non-stop links to just about every other major city in the U.S. The scale of tourism worked to keep landing fees among the lowest of any major American city. In 2008, McCarran Airport ranked 15th in the world for passenger traffic, with 44,074,707 passengers passing through the terminal, and 6th in airplane “movements,” which includes take offs and landings.

The other advantage Las Vegas possesses is lots of hotel rooms. In fact, nine of the top ten largest hotels in the world can be found on the Las Vegas Strip (which technically lies outside the city proper in unincorporated Clark County, NV). The presence of so many hotel rooms facilitated the emergence of the nation’s largest convention business.

The city is also a leading center of producer services specific to gaming. Las Vegas is to gaming what Houston is to energy, the command and control center in a booming global business. Like Houston, whose initial energy business growth came from nearby oil wells, Las Vegas’s initial advantage derived from being home to the first large-scale gaming industry. Many overlook the fact that the U.S. is a service exporting powerhouse, with almost a half trillion dollars in overseas sales last year. In fact the U.S. captures over 14 percent of total world service trade, which performed much better in the current recession than did goods trade. Las Vegas is now grabbing a bigger share of these exports.

As gaming spread, Las Vegas firms that specialize in building and managing mega-resort and entertainment complexes often built, designed, or consulted on new gambling centers from Atlantic City in New Jersey to Macau in China (which recently passed Las Vegas in total gambling revenue). In the current recession, as gaming revenue plummeted in Las Vegas, properties in much of the rest of the world kept performing, especially China. This geographic diversification strengthened the bottom line for such Las Vegas-based companies as MGM-Mirage and Wynn and sustained the local firms that export gaming services.

To consolidate its gaming and entertainment gains, Southern Nevada must still diversify its industrial mix to reach a multi-dimensional world city status as say Los Angeles. Fortunately Las Vegas has the capacity to further leverage its core industry. At the same time some other key sectors look promising, especially data storage and transmission, and alternative energy technology such as solar and geothermal.

Finally, Las Vegas is working to improve its transportation links to nearby Southern California and the Sun Corridor complex of Phoenix and Tucson. These regions are increasingly integrated with one another. Las Vegas’s inclusion in the larger Southwestern U.S megaregion should further connect it to the global economy and lift its status as a world city in full.

The Convening City

Ultimately, the Las Vegas case for world city status lies in its role as the globe’s leading convening space. There are more face-to-face exchanges in Las Vegas during a major convention than key financial exchanges in New York or London. Las Vegas, on any given week, may comprise the world’s most expert cluster in a particular industry.

The convening role that Las Vegas plays in the world economy comprises perhaps the biggest opportunity for additional diversification, especially given the way business is evolving in sectors such as business services. These gatherings provide a means of overcoming coordination and incentive problems in uncertain environments. It becomes an environment to create a critical “buzz” around a company, product or industry.

Most Las Vegas conventions are really about deal making. Conventions also are used for industry education, vendor networking, competitor insights, networking with prospects, hosting an exhibit, and seeing customers. Another dimension to building trust in Las Vegas lies in the fact that it is very much an adult place. It is a wide open, non-moralizing, libertarian place where grownups get to have fun. Las Vegas is a place where you can, and maybe even should, mix business with pleasure.

To move forward, Las Vegas needs to tweak its branding in a way that signals its dual personalities as a play hard and work hard city. This shift is already under way. The Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority now use the tagline “Only Vegas” and an omnibus identity for the city. Their website has two links: one aimed at business community: VegasMeansBusiness.com with the tagline: “Close the deal and make new opportunities.” and one for tourists: VisitLasVegas.com which uses the tagline: “What happens in Vegas, Stays in Vegas.”

So far Las Vegas has not leveraged its role as convening place to create something on par with the New York Stock Exchange or the Chicago Board of Trade. However, the convention business can be used as the basis of what may become a permanent trade show.

A harbinger of this future potential for Las Vegas can be seen in its new giant furniture mart, the World Market Center. This grew out of the city’s role in hosting the largest furniture/home wear convention every year. Las Vegas has developed a year round trade show capacity in furnishing with big annual events. This city is now poised to be a leading design center. Architectural and industrial design firms will follow. In this way, Las Vegas could emerge as the Milan of the U.S., where design leads to industrial spin offs.

Las Vegas can expand this model to host permanent trade shows in a multiple fields from home entertainment and biotechnology to alternative energy. Rather than become a new ghost town, as some urbanists imagine, the city in fact has a bright future, one that will continue to befuddle its many critics while enriching the opportunities of its citizens.

Robert E. Lang, Ph.D. is one of America’s most respect urban analysts. He is director of both Brooking Mountain West and the Lincy Institute and is a professor of Sociology at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

Photo: by Roadsidepictures