Sacramento

California's Poor Long-term Prognosis

Joel Kotkin — Mon, 07 Jan 2013 00:38:20 -0500

California's current economic recovery may be uneven at best, but things certainly look better now than the pits-of-hell period in 2008. A cautiously optimistic New York Times piece proclaimed "signs of resurgence," and there was even heady talk in Sacramento of eventually sighting that rarest of birds, a state budget surplus.

Yet such outbreaks of optimism should not blind us to the bigger issue: the long-term secular decline of the state's economy. Whether you believe that the new higher taxes may now slow our growth, as my colleagues at Chapman University now believe, or right the fiscal ship, as is widely hoped in the blue California press, it's more important to look more at the long-term trends, and assess where we stand compared with our domestic competitors.

California, despite its enormous natural and human resources, is losing ground in most basic areas. Its unemployment rate, a still-horrendous 10 percent, stands as the nation's third-highest. This is not a new development or the product of a run of bad luck. The state's unemployment rate has been consistently above the national average for almost all of the past 20 years. Most interior counties, including the Inland Empire and the Central Valley, now suffer unemployment rates well into the double digits, with some approaching 15 percent.

Overall, the state is still down a half-million jobs during the recession. California's losses since its employment peak have been considerably above the national average, some 3 percent, far worse than the 2.3 percent erosion seen nationwide. Despite the modest recent uptick, the California Budget Project projects the state would need to add twice as many jobs per month to fully recover from the recession by the summer of 2015.

Other long-term trends confirm the state's secular decline in competitiveness. Take per capita income – a decent indicator of relative progress. In 1945, journalist John Gunther, writing his famous "Inside USA," gushingly described California "the most spectacular and most diversified American state ... so ripe, golden." At the time, the state boasted the third-highest per capita income in the nation. As late as 1980, the state still ranked fourth. Today, despite Silicon Valley's money machine, California has fallen to 12th and appears headed for further decline.

Despite hopes in Sacramento and in the media, high-tech alone can not bail out the state. The much hoped-for windfall around the time of the Facebook IPO has failed to produce the expected fiscal bonanza for the state treasury. Silicon Valley famously gets nearly half the country's venture capital, but its impact on the rest of the state has diminished. In the 1980s and 1990s, tech booms stretched prosperity throughout its surrounding regions and as far as Sacramento. Now it barely covers half the Bay Area; unemployment in Oakland remains at around 13 percent and one child in three lives in poverty.

Part of this reflects the shift from an industrial high-tech focus to one fixated on software and social media. Given the extraordinary ease with which support and even research operations can be moved, once companies start to grow, they easily head to India, China or over to lower-cost locales like Utah or Texas. "Sure, we are getting half of all the venture capital investment but in the end we have relatively small research and development firms only," observes Jack Stewart, president of the California Technology and Manufacturing Association. "Once they have a product or go to scale, the firms move elsewhere. The other states end up getting most of the middle-class jobs."

This can be seen in the long-term trends in STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics-related) jobs. Over the past decade, even with the current bubble, Silicon Valley's STEM employment, according to estimates by Economic Modeling Specialists Inc., has increased by a mere 4 percent over the past decade. In contrast, science-based employment jumped 25 percent in Seattle, 20 percent in Houston and 16.8 percent in Austin, Texas.

The tech scene in the Los Angeles Basin is doing even worse. STEM employment in the Los Angeles-Santa Ana area is still stuck below 2002 levels, partially a residue of the continued decline of the region's once-globally dominant aerospace industry. The region, once arguably the world's largest agglomeration of scientists and engineers, has now dipped below the national average in proportion of STEM jobs.

Far greater problems can be seen further down the economic food chain, where many working-class and middle-class Californians traditionally have been employed. The state's heavy industry – traditionally the source of higher-paid blue-collar employment – has missed out on the nation's broad manufacturing resurgence. Over the past 10 years, according to an analysis by the Praxis Strategy Group, California has ranked 45th among the states in terms of heavy metal job creation, losing 126,000 jobs – more than 27 percent; San Francisco-Oakland ranked last among 51 large metropolitan areas. Both Los Angeles-Orange and San Bernardino ranked in the bottom 10.

Despite hype about "green jobs," the immediate prospect for a big manufacturing turnaround is not bright. Because of its high energy costs and other regulatory costs, industrial investment has dried up in California. According to the California Technology and Manufacturing Association, California in 2011 did not even make the top 10 states in terms of new industrial investment, accounting for a paltry 2 percent. This was about one-third or less the share garnered by rivals such as Texas, North Carolina and rebounding "rust belt" states, like Pennsylvania.

Construction, another pillar of higher-paid blue-collar employment, has recovered a bit but remains in worse shape than elsewhere. Overall, the state has lost almost 300,000 construction jobs from the 2007 peak, an almost 40 percent loss compared with 29 percent for the country as a whole.

Even the trade sector, stalwart performer in producing high-wage jobs, may soon be declining. Recent labor disputes by highly paid, politically powerful California port workers – shutting down operations for eight days in Los Angeles and Long Beach – has reinforced the notion that the state's an increasingly unreliable place to do business. After peaking around 2002, our ports are watching growth shift to the Gulf ports, such as Houston, and to the ports of the south Atlantic. The challenge will become far greater once the Panama Canal is widened in 2014 to accommodate larger ships from Asia.

California is also squandering its chance to participate in a potential fourth source of basic employment, the massive expansion in domestic oil-and-gas production. The Golden State sits on potentially the largest gusher in the nation – the Monterey Formation is now estimated to be four times as rich in oil as North Dakota's Bakken Formation. But our green consciousness dictates we don't exploit our resources too much. In the past decade, Texas created some 200,000 generally high-paying energy jobs, while greener-than-thou California has generated barely one-tenth as many.

As a result, wealthier, older, whiter, generally better-educated coastal areas can recover, but the prospects are dismal the further you head into the increasingly Latino, younger and less-educated inland areas. You have flush times for venture capitalists and celebrities, but growing poverty elsewhere. For at least two decades California's poverty rate has remained higher than the national average. Now, notes a new Census estimate, the Golden State has a poverty rate of more than 23 percent, the highest in the country, something unthinkable a generation ago.

Clearly, progressive policies are having socially regressive effects. Over the past few years the state, as a recent Public Policy Institute of California study demonstrates, has become ever substantially more unequal than the rest of the nation. Typical California middle-income workers have seen their median wage, adjusted for inflation, decline 4.5 percent since 2006, and now is at the lowest level since 2008. Only the highest-paid workers have avoided a decline in earnings.

Fortunately, the elements to regain our former broad-based prosperity are still in place. The critical human assets are there: entrepreneurs, hardworking immigrants, top universities. We boast advantages from legacy industries – entertainment and fashion to technology and agriculture. And, perhaps most importantly, California retains its remarkable natural blessings of massive energy resources, fertile soil and a benign climate.

The imperative now is to take fuller advantage of all these blessings in the coming years. Otherwise California will become poorer, more socially bifurcated and relegated by other places to the proverbial "dustbin of history."

This piece first appeared in the Orange County Register.

Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and contributing editor to the City Journal in New York. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

A Housing Preference Sea Change? Not in California

Wendell Cox — Tue, 13 Nov 2012 09:55:20 -0500

For some time, many in the urban planning community have been proclaiming a "sea-change" in household preferences away from suburban housing in the United States.

Perhaps no one is more identified with the "sea-change" thesis than Arthur C. Nelson, Presidential Professor, City & Metropolitan Planning, University of Utah. Professor Nelson has provided detailed modeled market estimates for California in a paper published by the Urban Land Institute, entitled The New California Dream: How Demographic and Economic Trends May Shape the Housing Market: A Land Use Scenario for 2020 and 2035 (He had made generally similar points in a Journal of the American Planning Association article in 2006).

Professor Nelson says that the supply of detached housing on what he defines as conventional sized lots (more than 1/8 acre) is far greater than the demand in California (Note 1). He further finds that the demand of detached housing on smaller lots is far greater than the supply. Professor Nelson's conclusions are principally modeled from stated preference surveys, which can mislead if people act differently when they make choices in the real world.

The Modeled Demand Estimates

Nelson models the demand for housing types in California's largest four planning regions (Southern California Association of Governments for the Los Angeles area, and the Bay Area Association of Governments for the San Francisco-San Jose area, the San Diego Association of Governments and the Sacramento Area Council of Governments). He estimates 2010 both supply and demand. His demand estimates rely strongly on data from three early 2000s stated preference surveys conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC).

Nelson's data indicates a strong preference for multi-family housing, which he places at 62% of demand in 2010, compared to the 2000 supply of 42%. Thus, the demand for multi-family housing is suggested to be one half above the supply.
The most stunning conclusion, however, is an over-supply of detached housing on conventional lots that Nelson estimates. Compared to a 2000 supply of 42% of the market, Nelson estimates the demand to be only 16%. This would indicate the supply of such housing to be more than 2.5 times the demand as is indicated in Figure 1.

Nelson's findings on conventional lot detached housing have obtained the most attention. He surmises that virtually all of the demand over the next 25 years can be met by the existing stock of conventional lot detached housing. This is music to the ears of many urban planners, who have for decades demonized the suburbanization that has been preferred by the overwhelming majority of Californians (and Americans, and people elsewhere in the world where they can afford them).

Actual Demand: Revealed Preferences: 2000-2008

To perform a similar analysis, we used revealed preference data: the actual change in housing by type from the 2000 Census data to the latest American Community Survey (ACS) 2006-2010 data at the census tract level (Note 2).

In contrast to Professor Nelson's estimates, the demand data indicates a strong continuing preference among Californians for detached housing on conventional lots. From 2000 to 2008 (the middle year for the 2006-2010 data), 51 percent of the new occupied housing in the four planning areas is estimated to have been detached on conventional lots (Figure 2). This is more than three times the 16% demand estimate in Professor Nelson's data. In fact, the actual demand was higher than the 2000 supply (42%), indicating that the demand for detached houses on conventional lots has increased.

If there is a sea change, it would appear to be in multi-family housing. In contrast with the 62% share for multi-family dwellings modeled by Nelson, the actual demand indicated in the census tract data was two-thirds less, at 19% (Figure 3), well below the supply of 43 percent in 2000. This suggests a tanking of demand for multi-family housing, even as builders, in California and elsewhere, put more product on the market.

Why Accounts for the Difference

Various factors appear likely to contribute to the difference between the modeled demand and the actual demand.

Smaller Lots and Higher Density Do Not Mean Shorter Commutes: The PPIC survey questions implied a connection between larger lots (lower density) and longer commutes. This is the broadly shared perception, but in reality houses on smaller lots (necessarily in higher density neighborhoods) do not mean shorter commutes. This is illustrated in a chart by Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) researchers on page 62 of The New California Dream. In the original SCAG document, the authors note that "commuting time is about the same for all density" (Figure 4). This is not surprising, since higher densities are associated with more intense traffic congestion and with greater transit use, both of which lengthen commutes (Note 3).

The "higher density means shorter commute" myth is rooted in the obsolete mono-centric conception of the city. Almost all US urban areas have become poly-centric with job locations highly-dispersed, as jobs have followed people to the suburbs. Gordon and Lee (Note 4) have shown that work trip travel times in the United States are shorter to dispersed employment locations than to central business districts or secondary business centers (such as "Edge Cities").

Invalid Perceptions of Transit Mobility: Professor Nelson also stresses stated preference responses showing that many people would prefer to live near transit service. All things being equal, who wouldn't?

But all things are not equal. Living near transit does not mean practical transit access to most of the urban area. In most cases, only a car can provide that. Transit systems are necessarily focused on downtown areas (central business districts), which contain, on average, only 8% of employment in the four planning regions. , Travel to other destinations is usually inconvenient, because of time-consuming transfers, or not available at all.

A Brookings Institution report indicated that 87 percent of people in California's major metropolitan areas (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Riverside-San Bernardino, San Diego and Sacramento) live within walking distance of transit. Yet, the average employee can reach only 6% of the jobs in their respective metropolitan area in 45 minutes (Figure 5). By contrast, the average work trip travel time ranges from 25 minutes to under 30 minutes in the four planning regions .

Households thinking about a move to higher density could have been, upon more serious examination, deterred by transit's severe mobility limitations.

Data Insufficiently Robust for the Modeling: There is also the potential that the PPIC surveys, with their general questions, were not of sufficient robustness to support Professor Nelson’s assertions. For example, PPIC did not define the size of small lots.

Planning and Reality

If households were so eager to move from detached houses on conventional lots to smaller lots, 2000 to 2008 would have been the ideal time. The mortgage industry was literally falling over itself to fund home purchases. Urban core wannabes could have flooded the market pursuing their smaller lot "stated preferences." The actual, revealed preference data says they did not, which is also indicated by the continuing strength of suburban growth relative to central city growth (Note 5).

Thus, the modeled demand estimates in The New California Dream appear to be at substantial odds with the actual demand.This is much more than an academic issue. The conclusions of The New California Dream have achieved the status of sacred text in the canon of urban planning and are mouthed unquestioningly by organizations like the Urban Land Institute.

Worse, demand estimates from The New California Dream are being relied upon in regional transportation plans being developed by California's metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs). This is particularly risky because these same MPOs have been granted greater power over housing under California's Senate Bill 375, goaded on by a sue-happy state Attorney General's office. The attempt by MPOs to impose their housing plans and regulations on consumers could well backfire, for investors in condominium and multifamily housing. This would not be a first time that developers followed urban planning illusions like lemmings over a cliff, to which huge losses in the last decade attest. The more destructive effects, however, are likely to be paid by households and the economies of California's metropolitan areas.

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Note 1: More than 70% of the detached housing stock was on conventional lots in 2000.

Note 2: There is no census tract data on detached house lot size. We scaled the detached housing data from the 2000 census to match Professor Nelson's distribution of detached housing supply by lot size, using population density. Nelson's method and ours were sufficiently similar that the results should have been roughly comparable. As the text indicates, they were not.

Note 3: In each of the three PPIC surveys, respondents are asked to choose between housing alternatives that are high in the questions to commute "lengths." From the description and survey instruments in the PPIC reports, there is no indication that respondents were given any idea what commute "length" means. There are two way to judge commute "length." One is distance or miles, while the other is time. Based upon the PPIC survey instrument, it cannot be known which definition was perceived by the respondents.

Even so, it seems more likely that the term "commute length" was perceived by respondents in time rather than in distance by respondents. Each day, people have only so many hours and minutes available. However, distance is not so constrained, depending upon the speed of the commute. Further, the extensive research on commuting often refers to "travel budgets," which are expressed in time, not distance.

Note 4: Reference: Gordon, P. and B. Lee (2012), "Spatial Structure and Travel: Trends in Commuting and Non-Commuting Travels in US Metropolitan Areas," draft chapter for the International Handbook on Transport and Development edited by Robin Hickman, David Bonilla, Moshe Givoni and David Banister.

Note 5: The most recent year (2010-2011), for which the Census Bureau had issued invalid municipal population estimates, indicated a continued the trend toward suburban rather than urban core growth, as has been shown by Trulia Chief Economist Jed Kolko (see: Even After the Housing Bust, Americans Still Love the Suburbs).

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Photograph: Suburban San Diego

Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life.”

How California Lost its Mojo

Bill Watkins — Tue, 09 Oct 2012 01:38:23 -0400

The preferred story for California's economy runs like this:

In the beginning there was prosperity. It started with gold. Then, agriculture thrived in California's climate. Movies and entertainment came along in the early 20th Century. In the 1930s there was migration from the Dust Bowl. California became an industrial powerhouse in World War II. Defense, aerospace, the world's best higher education system, theme parks, entertainment, and tech combined to drive California's post-war expansion.

Then, in the evening of November 9th, 1989, the Berlin Wall came down. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved. The Cold War was over. America responded by cutting defense spending and called the savings the Peace Dividend.

California paid that peace dividend. A huge portion of California's military industrial complex was destroyed. The aerospace industry was downsized, never to come back. Hundreds of thousands of well-paying manufacturing and engineering jobs were lost.

The ever-resilient California bounced back though. Tech, driven by an entrepreneurial culture and fed by California's great universities drove California's economy to new heights.

Then, there was the dot.com bust. A mild national recession was much more painful for a California dependent on its tech sector. Eventually California recovered. California's tech sector and climate, aided by a housing boom, restored California's prosperity.

The housing boom was followed by a housing bust. Again, California paid a high price, and unemployment skyrocketed to 30 percent above the national average.

Today, California is recovering. Its tech sector is once again bringing prosperity to the state. Furthermore, California's green legislation is providing the motivation for a brave new future of economic growth and environmental virtue.

The story is true through the Peace Dividend. California did pay a high price for the collapse of the Soviet Union. California's defense sector did begin a decline, and it never recovered. But, defense recovered in other places, as the country expanded defense spending by 21 percent in the 2000s. The United States has constantly been engaged in wars and conflicts for over a decade. On a real-per-person basis, the United States is spending as much on defense as it has at any time since 1960.

But when it comes to the present, the narrative falls down. Defense has rebounded, but not in California. California's defense sector is small and declining, not because of a permanently smaller U.S. defense sector, but because of something about California.

California's tech sector did boom after the collapse of California's defense sector, but that doesn't mean that California recovered. In fact, much of California never recovered. It's the aggregation problem.

The 1990s' recovery was largely a Bay Area recovery. Los Angeles hardly saw any uptick in employment. Here is a chart comparing Los Angeles County's jobs growth rate with the San Jose Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA):

San Jose probably had California's fastest growing job market in the 1990s. Los Angeles was not the states slowest. Still, the differences are striking.

A few years ago, a couple of my graduate students looked at California data from 1990 through 1999. They divided California into two regions, the Bay Area and everywhere else. The Bay Area was defined as Sonoma, Marin, Napa, Solano, Contra Costa, Alameda, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, San Mateo, and San Francisco counties. Using seven indicators of economic growth, they performed relatively simple statistical tests to see if the two geographies experienced similar economies. The indicators were employment, wages, home prices, bank deposits, population growth, construction permits, and household income.

By every measure except population growth, the Bay Area outperformed the rest of the state. The exception was probably due to commuters to the Bay Area, given that region’s exceptionally high housing prices.

Some economists will tell you that California saw faster-than-national job growth from the mid 1990s until the great recession. This is another aggregation problem. The claim is technically true, but only in the sense that California had a higher proportion of the nation's jobs in 2007 than it did in 1995. If you look at annual data, you will see that California's share of the nation's jobs only grew from 1995 through 2002. Since then, California's share of United States jobs resumed its decline:

In reality, California never recovered from the dot.com bust. California, perhaps the best place on the planet to live, couldn't keep up in a housing boom. Something was wrong.

California had lost its mojo.

Opportunity is now greater outside California than inside California. For almost 150 years, California was as widely known for its opportunity as it was for its sunshine. The combination was like a drug. George Stoneman, an army officer destined to become California's 15th governor, spoke for millions when he said "I will embrace the first opportunity to get to California and it is altogether probable that when once there I shall never again leave it."

They did come to California, and they made an amazing place. Opportunity-driven migrants are different than other people. They take big risks to leave everything they know for an uncertain future in a new place. They are confident, bold, and brash. California became just as confident, bold, and brash. The Anglo-American novelist Taylor Caldwell spoke the truth when she said "If they can't do it in California, it can't be done anywhere."

That was then. Today, California can't even rebuild an old Hotel.

The Miramar Hotel is a partially-demolished eyesore beside the 101 Freeway in Montecito, just south of Santa Barbara. The Hotel's initial structure was built in 1889. Over the years, it was expanded to a 29 structure luxury hotel and resort. In September 2000 it was closed for renovations which were expected to take 18 months. That was when the fighting started. Community groups, neighbors, and governments all had their own idea of what the Miramar should be. Two owners later, and after millions of dollars, the future to the Miramar is still uncertain.

The Miramar Hotel is a case study of what is wrong with post-industrial California, precisely because it should have been easy, and because it is not unique. Everything is hard to do in California. The state that once moved rivers of water hundreds of miles across deserts and over or through mountain ranges can't rebuild a hotel.

The situation will get worse. California has become the place people are leaving. The following chart shows that for 20 years more people have left California for other states than came to California from other states:

California's population is still increasing because of births and international immigration.

Two decades of negative domestic migration has taken its toll. Millions of risk-taking, confident, bold, and brash people have left California. They took California's mojo with them.

That seems pretty clear when you look at some statistics: California's unemployment is way above the national average. With only about 12 percent of the nation's population, California has over 30 percent of the nation's welfare recipients. San Bernardino has the nation's second highest poverty rate among cities over 200,000.

Sometimes though, aggregated data can hide California's weakness, and some, representing the always-present constituency for the status quo, use these data to deny that California's future is any less golden.

Most recently, those representing the constituency for the status quo have used California's aggregated jobs data to argue that all is well in California. They argue that California's tech sector is leading California to a new golden future.

Year-over-year data confirm that, through August 2012, California gained jobs at a faster pace than the United States. Once again, though, that growth is largely confined to one industry and one geography. California's tech sector is recovering, and amidst a generally weak recovery, it appears strong enough to generate pretty impressive aggregated results. If we disaggregate California's data, we will find that there is not just one California. There is a rich and mostly coastal California, with a few smaller inland counties on the San Francisco-Lake Tahoe corridor. Another California is very poor and mostly inland.

Here's a list of California's poorest counties by poverty rate:

County	Poverty Rate	Child Poverty Rate	Rank
Del Norte	23.5	30.6	3
Fresno	26.8	38.2	1
Imperial	22.3	31.8	6
Kern	21.4	30.3	10
Kings	22.5	29.7	5
Madera	21.7	31.7	8
Merced	23.1	31.4	4
Modoc	21.9	32.5	7
Siskiyou	21.5	30.7	9
Tulare	33.6	33.6	2

Here's a list of California richest counties by poverty rate:

County	Poverty Rate	Child Poverty Rate	Rank
Calaveras	11.1	18.3	10
Contra Costa	9.3	12.7	4
El Dorado	9.4	11.6	5
Marin	9.2	10.9	3
Mono	10.8	15	8
Napa	10.7	14.7	7
Placer	9.1	10.7	2
San Mateo	7	8.5	1
Santa Clara	10.6	13.3	6
Ventura	11	15.3	9

There are some big differences here. The percentage of Fresno's children living in poverty is four and half times the percentage of San Mateo children living in poverty. In fact, the data for California's poorest counties looks like third-world data.

When disaggregated, the job-growth data shows the same story. Through 2012's second quarter, jobs in the San Jose MSA were up 3.6 percent on a year-over-year basis. In Los Angeles, jobs were up only 1.1 percent, while in Sacramento they were up only 0.6 percent. For comparison, U.S. jobs were up about 1.3 percent for the same time period.

You can perform this analysis for all types of data. When the data are disaggregated, the story is always the same. It's telling us that California needs to get its mojo back, and the current tech boom is likely not to be enough for its recovery.

Bill Watkins is a professor at California Lutheran University and runs the Center for Economic Research and Forecasting, which can be found at clucerf.org.

Unemployment photo by BigStockPhoto.com.

Is California the New Detroit?

Robert J. Cristiano — Fri, 17 Aug 2012 01:38:44 -0400

Most Californians live within miles of its majestic coastline – for good reason. The California coastline is blessed with arguably the most desirable climate on Earth, magnificent beaches, a backdrop of snow-capped mountains, and natural harbors in San Diego and San Francisco. The Golden State was aptly named. Its Gold Rush of 1849 was followed a century later by massive post-war growth.

There is no mystery why California’s population and economy boomed after the Second World War. Education in California became the envy of the world. California’s public school system led the nation in innovation with brand new schools and classrooms. The Community College system that fed its universities was free for its students. A college education at the UC and Cal State systems was inexpensive. UC-Berkeley, with its graduate schools, was arguably the greatest in the world while Stanford developed into the Harvard of the West. An efficient highway system moved California’s automobile driven commerce while fertile soil of the Central Valley became the fruit and vegetable basket of the world.

The next wave hit in the 80s as former orchards south of San Francisco morphed into the Silicon Valley. Intel and other chip manufacturers led the computer and software revolution bringing high tech jobs and immense new wealth to the Golden State. The dot-com revolution of the 90s brought more gold to California. Innovators like Google and Apple cashed in by nurturing the Internet era. The next decade heralded the greatest housing and mortgage boom in the nation’s history. Developers from Orange County, south of Los Angeles, invented creative financing vehicles that drove home sales, and profits, to record heights by 2006.

This success has created a problem: Californians, due to their golden history, live unreflective lives. The Tea Party movement generated a political tsunami that swept more than 60 incumbents from political office in 2010, but the wave petered out at California’s state line as Democrats take every elected office in the state.

The state budget, mandated to balance by law, has been billions in the red for ten straight years. Yet Californians re-elect the same politicians, year after year, who produce budgets with multi-billion dollar deficits. California voters rejected Meg Whitman, the billionaire founder of Ebay, in favor of Jerry Brown. California now has a $16 billion deficit which “assumes” that California voters will pass massive tax increases on themselves. If they do not, the 2013 deficit becomes a mind numbing $20 billion. Yet despite the red ink, Governor Brown signed into law a “high speed rail” bill that will spend $6 billion on a train between Fresno and Bakersfield – not LA and San Francisco as promised. Polls turned against the choo-choo, but there remain no outcry from California voters.

California voters rejected Carly Fiorina, who ran Hewlett Packard, for Barbara Boxer in the 2010 Senate race. To protect the endangered Delta Smelt, a fish known better as bait, water has been diverted from Central Valley farms to the Pacific Ocean. Orchards in the Central Valley were allowed to wither and die resulting in unemployment in the Central Valley as high as 40%. Imagine Californians on food stamps, living in what was the fruit basket of American.

California’s business climate now ranks dead last according to 650 CEOs measured by Chief Executive Magazine. Apple will take 3,600 jobs to its new $280,000,000 facility in Austin Texas – jobs that California would have had in the past. Texas ranked first in the same survey. California’s unemployment rate is consistently higher than 10% of its work force, and there are few jobs for college students who graduate with as much as $100,000 in student loans. Despite overwhelming evidence that bad public policy is chasing away jobs, the same state politicians are sent back to Sacramento every two years.

California’s public education system, once the envy of the world, now ranks 46th in the nation in per pupil spending and faces a $1.4 billion cut in the fall. In the last month, three California cities declared bankruptcy. More will follow. Take Poway for example. Its school board borrowed $100,000,000 (for 33,000 students) through a Capital Appreciation Bond. The politicians told the voters there would be no payments for 20 years. What they did not explain was the residents must pay back $1 billion dollars on their $100 million loan. Beginning in 2021, tiny Poway will be forced to pay $50 million per year in bond payments. Huge property tax assessments will be required if homes do not appreciate 400% by then, which is unlikely under foreseeable circumstances.

Rather than stare at themselves in the mirror, Californians should take a look at Michigan. In the 50s greater Detroit was the fourth-largest city in America with 2 million inhabitants and the world’s most dominant industry: the automobile.

Most people had a good paying job. Its burgeoning middle class was the model of the world with excellent public schools and universities. Detroit in 2012 is a shadow of that once great metropolis. Its population has shrunk to 714,000. The average price of a home has fallen to $5,700. Unemployment stands at 28.9%. It has a $300,000,000 deficit. There are 200,000 abandoned buildings in the derelict city. Its public education system, in receivership, is a disgrace producing more inmates than graduates. In 2006, the teacher’s union forced the politicians to reject a $200,000,000 offer from a Detroit philanthropist to build 15 new charter schools. Jobs long ago abandoned Detroit for places like South Carolina and Alabama, with their “right to work” laws and low taxes.

Now Detroit’s Mayor has proposed razing 40 square miles of the 138 square miles of this once great American city returning 70,000 abandoned homes to farmland. Even such a draconian plan may not be enough to save the city. If a hurricane had hit Detroit, more of us would know of this tragedy in our midst, but this fate was man-made and not wrought by nature. Detroit has had one party rule for more than fifty years. Louis C. Miriani served from September 12, 1957 to January 2, 1962 as Detroit's last Republican mayor. Since that time the Democrats have ruled the Motor City. John Dingell has served region since 1956. His father was the Congressman from 1930 to 1956. Despite the disastrous decline of their city, Detroit voters send him back to Congress twenty-two times.

Like Detroit, California now has one party rule. The Democrats of California did not need a single Republican vote to pass their budget. Governor Brown’s plan is to address the nation’s largest deficit by raising taxes instead of cutting spending. If passed, the deficit would drop from $20 billion to a mere $16 billion. The budget does nothing to cure the systemic problems of a bloated bureaucracy. It does not eliminate one of California’s 519 state agencies.

Caltrans stopped building highways under Brown’s first term, but the people kept coming. Now 37 million Californians are locked in traffic jams each day. Brown was rewarded for such prescience with re-election as Governor. California’s egotistical politicians passed the Global Warming Solutions Act in 2006 (AB32) to “solve” climate change. Dan Sperling, an appointee to the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and a professor of engineering and environmental science at UC Davis, is the lead advocate on the board for a “low carbon fuel standard.” The powerful state agency charged with implementing AB 32 and other climate control measures, claims the low carbon fuel standard will “only” raise gasoline prices $.30 gallon in 2013. The California Political Review reported implementation of these the policies will raise prices by $1.00 per gallon.

Detroit was once the most prosperous manufacturing city in the world, a title later secured by California. Will California follow Detroit down a tragic path to ruin? In 1950, no one could imagine the Detroit of 2010. In 1970, when foreign imports started to make a foothold, the unions and their bought and paid for politicians resisted any change. In the 1990s as manufacturers fled to Alabama and South Carolina, the unions and their political minions held firm, even as good jobs slipped away. No one in Detroit envisioned their future.

Today, California is following Michigan’s path with exploding pension obligations, a declining tax base, and disastrous leadership. Housing prices have fallen 30 to 60% across the state, evaporating trillions of dollars of equity and wealth. Unemployment remains stubbornly high and under-employment is rife. Do our politicians need any more signs?

Governor Brown’s budget will first slash money to schools and raise tuition on its students while leaving all 519 state agencies intact. He apparently will protect political patronage at all costs. Jobs, and job creators, are fleeing the state. Intel, Apple, and Google are expanding out of the state. The best and brightest minds are leaving for Texas and North Carolina. The signs are everywhere. Meanwhile, the voters send the same cast of misfits back to Sacramento each year – just as Detroit did before them.

The beaches are still beautiful. The mountains are still snow capped and the climate is still the envy of the world. Detroit never had that. But will California’s physical attributes be enough? If the people of California want to glimpse their future, they need look no farther than once proud City of Detroit and the once wealthy state of Michigan.

It can happen here.

Robert J Cristiano PhD is the Real Estate Professional in Residence at Chapman University in Orange, CA, a Senior Fellow at the Pacific Research Institute in San Francisco, CA and President of the international investment firm, L88 Companies LLC in Denver – Newport Beach – Washington DC - Prague. He has been a successful real estate developer for more than thirty years.

High Speed Rail Advocates Discredit Their Cause - Again

Aaron M. Renn — Fri, 13 Jul 2012 01:38:31 -0400

Is there any high speed rail boondoggle big enough to make rail transport advocates reject it? Sadly, for all too many of them, the answer is No, as two recent developments make clear.

The first is in California, where the state continues to press forward on a high speed rail plan for the state that could cost anywhere from $68 billion to $100 billion. Voters had previously approved $10 billion in bonds for the project, but as the state's economy and finances have continued to sour – including multiple major cities going bankrupt – the polls have turned against it, and with good reason. The state faces the prospect of already enacted education cutbacks if Gov. Jerry Brown's tax increase proposal in not approved in a vote this fall. Other painful service cuts loom. Voters are rightly asking themselves if now is the time to be borrowing public money for very expensive, speculative infrastructure.

Equally, many of the much cited overseas examples of high-speed rail seem, well, to be off the tracks. China's rail system has serious safety problems, for example. And developing the most extensive high speed rail system in Europe hasn't stopped Spain from seeing 50% youth unemployment, a 3 percentage point increase in the VAT tax, and a humiliating bailout from the rest of the EU.

Nevertheless, the California assembly recently voted to go full speed head on its high speed rail plans. As part of an overall $8 billion rail spending package, the state is borrowing $2.6 billion to complement $3.2 billion in federal funds left over from the stimulus (shovel ready???) to build a starter segment of the line linking Bakersfield and Madera through the Central Valley. This is the easiest segment on which to build – though legal action is likely to delay construction – but doesn't do anything to link the state's huge population centers around LA and the Bay Area. With no more significant federal funds likely to be forthcoming, and the state's finances a wreck, this segment risks becoming an embarrassing white elephant, or, as critics call it, “a train to nowhere”.

After this vote it came to light that respected French high speed rail operator SNCF had approached California officials, private funding in hand, with a preliminary offer to build the LA-SF link themselves on a better and cheaper alignment along I-5 that would cost only $38 billion. But this was rejected by the state. The Times account suggests this rejection came about due to a combination of a political preference for the inefficient Central Valley segment and the clout of Parsons Brinckerhoff, the lead contractor. Some commentators have referred to this revelation as a “bombshell.”

Despite management misstep after management deception, rail advocates around the country cheered California's decision to build the Central Valley segment. Jerry Brown, with not much to show for his reprise as Governor, is excited of course. Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood called it a “big win.” America 2050 (an offshoot of the Regional Plan Association of New York), “commended” the state for “taking a big step forward.” Streetsblog called it a “major victory.” While I respect what these organizations do in other contexts, this high speed rail vote is not a major victory, but a major defeat for common sense.

But apparently not willing to let California take the prize in the rail boondoggle category without a fight, Amtrak shortly thereafter issued a “vision” for rail in the Northeast Corridor that would provide faster service between Boston and Washington, DC – at a cost of $151 billion. Strange as it sounds, some commentators actually lauded Amtrak for reducing costs since the previous plan was $169 billion. The Brookings Institution was measured in its reaction to the plan, but managed to describe it as “more rational.” With Republicans seemingly safely in charge of the House for now, and large federal deficits projected for the mid-term future, $151 billion for Amtrak seems purest fantasy.

These developments are unfortunate because high speed rail could play an important role in US transportation, particularly in the Northeast. But that's unlikely to happen because of the indiscriminate way establishment advocates have supported anything with the “high speed rail” label attached, ranging from $2 billion, 110 MPH peak speed Toonerville Trolleys in Illinois that barely beat Megabus in terms of journey time to the California rail boondoggle, regardless of merit. All they know that if it claims to be high speed rail, they are in favor of it.

There are other people who take a more serious view. Unfortunately, they tend to be outsiders with little influence. For example, Alon Levy suggested a set of near term, incremental Northeast Corridor improvements that might cost 90% less than Amtrak's plan.

$8 billion in stimulus dollars have gone to purchase us nothing of any real significance in terms of rail infrastructure. That money, invested wisely in high priority projects in the Northeast Corridor, could have made a big difference and started building a real demonstrated case for high speed rail investment in America. Unfortunately, the way high speed rail has been botched by its advocates, all the money we've spent on it has accomplished just the opposite. If California's Central Valley segment is built and the complete line is never finished, it will likely discredit high speed rail in America for the long term.

Aaron M. Renn is an independent writer on urban affairs and the founder of Telestrian, a data analysis and mapping tool.

CA route map by Wikipedia user CountZ.

The Export Business in California (People and Jobs)

Wendell Cox — Thu, 10 May 2012 01:38:37 -0400

California Senate President Pro-Tem Darrell Steinberg countered my Wall Street Journal commentary California Declares War on Suburbia in a letter to the editor (A Bold Plan for Sustainable California Communities) that could be interpreted as suggesting that all is well in the Golden State. The letter suggests that business are not being driven away to other states and that the state is "good at producing high-wage jobs," while pointing to the state's 10 percent growth over the last decade. Senate President Steinberg further notes that the urban planning law he authored (Senate Bill 375) is leading greater housing choices and greater access to transit.

This may be a description of the California past, but not present.

Exporting People

Yes, California continues to grow. California is growing only because there are more births than deaths and the state had a net large influx of international immigration over the past decade. At the same time, the state has been hemorrhaging residents (Figure 1).

Californians are leaving. Between 2000 and 2009 (Note), a net 1.5 million Californians left for other states. Only New York lost more of its residents (1.6 million). California's loss was greater than the population of its second largest municipality, San Diego. More Californians moved away than lived in 12 states at the beginning of the decade. Among the net 6.3 million interstate domestic migrants in the nation, nearly one-quarter fled California for somewhere else.

The bulk of the exodus was from the premier coastal metropolitan areas. Since World War II, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego and San Jose have been among the fastest growing metropolitan areas in the United States and the high-income world. Over the last decade, this growth has slowed substantially, as residents have moved to places that, all things being considered, have become their preferences.

More than a net 1.35 million residents left the Los Angeles metropolitan area, or approximately 11 percent of the 2000 population. The San Jose metropolitan area lost 240,000 residents, nearly 14 percent of its 2000 population. These two metropolitan areas ranked among the bottom two of the 51largest metropolitan areas (over 1,000,000 population) in the percentage of lost domestic migrants during the period. The San Francisco metropolitan area lost 340,000 residents, more than 8 percent of its 2000 population and ranked 47th worst in domestic migration (New York placed worse than San Francisco but better than Los Angeles). Each of these three metropolitan areas lost domestic migrants at a rate faster than that of Rust Belt basket cases Detroit, Cleveland and Buffalo.

San Diego lost the fewest of the large coastal metropolitan areas (125,000). Even this was double the rate of Rust Belt Pittsburgh.

Exporting Jobs

California is no longer an incubator of high-wage jobs. The state lost 370,000 jobs paying 25 percent or more of the average wage between 2000 and 2008. This compares to a 770,000 increase in the previous 8 years. California is trailing Texas badly and the nation overall in creating criticial STEM jobs and middle skills jobs (Figures 2 & 3) Only two states have higher unemployment rates than California (Nevada and Rhode Island) . California has the second highest underemployment rate (20.8 percent), which includes the number of unemployed, plus those who have given up looking for work ("discouraged" workers) and those who are working only part time because they cannot find full time work. Only Nevada, with its economy that is overly-dependent on California, has a higher underemployment rate.

Business relocation coach Joseph Vranich conducts an annual census of companies moving jobs out of California and found a quickening pace in 2012. Often these are the very kinds of companies capable of creating the high-wage jobs that used to be California's forte. Vranich says that the actual number may be five times as high, which is not surprising, not least because there is no reliable compilation of off-shoring of jobs to places like Bangalore, Manila or Cordoba (Argentina).

To make matters worse, California is becoming less educated. California's share of younger people with college degrees is now about in the middle of the states, while older, now retiring Californians are among the most educated in the nation (Figure 4).

Denying Housing Choice

It is fantasy to believe, as Steinberg claims, that there are enough single family (detached) houses in the state to meet the demand for years to come. More than 80 percent of the new households in the state chose detached housing over the last decade. People's actual choices define the market, not the theories or preferences of planners often contemptuous of the dominant suburban lifestyle.

In contrast, however, the regional plans adopted or under consideration in the Bay Area, Los Angeles and San Diego would require nearly all new housing be multi-family, at five to 10 times normal California densities (20 or more units to the acre are being called for). New detached housing on the urban fringe would be virtually outlawed by these plans. And, when Sacramento does not find the regional plans dense enough, state officials (such as the last two state Attorneys General) are quick to sue. If the "enough detached housing" fantasy held any water, state officials and planners would not be seeking its legal prohibition. To call outlawing the revealed choice of the 80 percent (detached housing) would justify the equivalent of a Nobel Prize in Doublespeak.

At the same time by limiting the amount of land on which the state preferred high density housing must be built, land and house prices can be expected to rise even further from their already elevated levels (already largely the result of California's pre-SB 375 regulatory restrictions).

Transit Rhetoric and Reality

Transit is important in some markets. About one-half of commuters to downtown San Francisco use transit. The assumptions of SB 375 might make sense if all of California looked like downtown San Francisco. It doesn't, nor does even most of the San Francisco metropolitan area. Only about 15 percent of employment is downtown, while the 85 percent (and nearly all jobs in the rest of the state) simply cannot be reached by transit in a time that competes with the car. Even in the wealthy San Jose area (Silicon Valley), with its light rail lines and commuter rail line, having a transit stop nearby provides 45 minute transit access to less than 10 percent of jobs in the metropolitan area.

A recent Brookings Institution report showed that the average commuter in the four large coastal metropolitan areas can reach only 6.5 percent of the jobs in a 45 minute transit commute. This is despite the fact that more than 90 percent of residents can walk to transit stops. Even when transit is close, you can't get there from here in most cases in any practical sense (Figure 5).

SB 375 did little to change this. For example, San Diego plans to spend more than 50 percent of its transportation money on transit over the next 40 years. This is 25 times transit's share of travel (which is less than 2 percent). Yet, planners forecast that all of this spending will still leave 7 out of 8 work and higher education trips inaccessible by transit in 30 minutes in 2050. Already 60 to 80 percent of work trips in California are completed by car in 45 minutes and the average travel time is about 25 minutes.

For years, planners have embraced the ideal of balancing jobs and housing, so that people would live near where they work, while minimizing travel distances. This philosophy strongly drives the new SB 375 regional plans. What these plans miss is that people choose where to work from the great array of opportunities available throughout the metropolitan area. These varied employment opportunities that are the very reason that large metropolitan areas exist, according to former World Bank principal planner Alain Bertaud.

People change jobs far more frequently than before and multiple earners in households are likely to work far apart. Similar intentions led to the development up to four decades ago of centers like Tensta in Stockholm, which ended up as concentrated low income areas (Photo). It California, such a concentration would do little to improve transit ridership, even low-income citizens are four to 10 times as likely use cars to get to work than to use transit.

Tensta Transit Oriented Development: Stockholm

All of this means more traffic congestion and more intense local air pollution, because higher population densities are associated with greater traffic congestion. Residents of the new denser housing would face negative health effects because there is more intense air pollution, especially along congested traffic corridors.

Self-Inflicted Wounds

Worst of all, California's radical housing and transportation strategies are unnecessary. The unbalanced and one-dimensional pursuit of an idealized sustainability damages both quality of life and the economy. This is exacerbated by other issues, especially the state's dysfunctional economic and tax policies. It is no wonder California is exporting so many people and jobs. California's urban planning regime under SB 375 is poised to make it worse.

Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life”.

Net Domestic Migration: 2000-2009
Rank	Metropolitan Area	Net Domestic Migration	Compared to 2000 Population
1	Raleigh, NC	194,361	24.2%
2	Las Vegas, NV	311,463	22.4%
3	Charlotte, NC-SC	248,379	18.5%
4	Austin, TX	234,239	18.5%
5	Phoenix, AZ	543,409	16.6%
6	Riverside-San Bernardino, CA	469,093	14.3%
7	Orlando, FL	225,259	13.6%
8	Jacksonville, FL	126,766	11.3%
9	Tampa-St. Petersburg, FL	260,333	10.8%
10	San Antonio, TX	177,447	10.3%
11	Atlanta, GA	428,620	10.0%
12	Nashville, TN	123,199	9.4%
13	Sacramento, CA	141,117	7.8%
14	Richmond, VA	75,886	6.9%
15	Portland, OR-WA	121,957	6.3%
16	Dallas-Fort Worth, TX	317,062	6.1%
17	Houston, TX	243,567	5.1%
18	Indianapolis. IN	72,517	4.7%
19	Oklahoma City, OK	41,082	3.7%
20	Denver, CO	66,269	3.0%
21	Louisville, KY-IN	34,381	3.0%
22	Birmingham, AL	26,934	2.6%
23	Columbus, OH	34,204	2.1%
24	Kansas City, MO-KS	31,747	1.7%
25	Seattle, WA	40,741	1.3%
26	Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI	(19,731)	-0.7%
27	Memphis, TN-MS-AR	(8,583)	-0.7%
28	Hartford, CT	(9,349)	-0.8%
29	Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN	(17,648)	-0.9%
30	Virginia Beach-Norfolk, VA-NC	(20,005)	-1.3%
31	Baltimore, MD	(36,407)	-1.4%
32	St. Louis, MO-IL	(43,750)	-1.6%
33	Philadelphia, PA-NJ-DE-MD	(115,890)	-2.0%
34	Pittsburgh, PA	(52,028)	-2.1%
35	Washington, DC-VA-MD-WV	(107,305)	-2.2%
36	Providence, RI-MA	(49,168)	-3.1%
37	Salt Lake City, UT	(34,428)	-3.5%
38	Rochester, NY	(40,219)	-3.9%
39	San Diego, CA	(126,860)	-4.5%
40	Buffalo, NY	(55,162)	-4.7%
41	Milwaukee,WI	(74,453)	-5.0%
42	Boston, MA-NH	(235,915)	-5.4%
43	Miami, FL	(287,135)	-5.7%
44	Chicago, IL-IN-WI	(561,670)	-6.2%
45	Cleveland, OH	(136,943)	-6.4%
46	Detroit, MI	(366,790)	-8.2%
47	San Francisco-Oakland, CA	(347,375)	-8.4%
48	New York, NY-NJ-PA	(1,962,055)	-10.7%
49	Los Angeles, CA	(1,365,120)	-11.0%
50	San Jose, CA	(240,012)	-13.8%
51	New Orleans, LA	(301,731)	-22.9%
Data from US Census Bureau

-----

Note: 2000 to 2010 data not available

Lead photo: Largely illegal to build housing under California Senate Bill 375 planning

Megalopolis and its Rivals

Richard Morrill — Tue, 24 Apr 2012 01:10:13 -0400

Jean Gottman in 1961 coined the term megalopolis (Megalopolis, the Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the Unites States) to describe the massive concentration of population extending from the core of New York north beyond Boston and south encompassing Washington DC. It has been widely studied and mapped, including by me. (Morrill, 2006, Classic Map Revisited, Professional Geographer). The concept has also been extended to describe and compare many other large conurbations around the world.

Maybe it’s time to see how the original has fared? And what has happened to other metropolitan complexes in the US, most notably Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago and should we say Florida?

Table 1 summarizes the population of Megalopolis from 1950 to 2010 and Table 2 compares Megalopolis with other US mega-urban complexes. Megalopolis grew fastest in the 1950s and 1960s, with growth rates of 20 and 18.5 percent. The northeast has since been outpaced by the growth in other regions, but growth was still substantial in the last decade. Megalopolis added almost 3 million people, by 6.8 %, to reach an amazing 45.2 million.

Table 1: Growth of Megalopolis 1950-2010
Year	Population	Change	% Change
2010	45,357	2,983	7
2000	42,374	5,794	15.8
1990	36,580	2,215	6.4
1980	34,365	360	1.2
1970	34,005	5,436	18.5
1960	29,441	4,910	20
1950	24,534

From Table 2 I note four major subregions of Megalopolis: Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Washington, DC. New York is still the biggest player, but the locus of growth over time has shifted South. This reflects the increasing world importance of Washington, DC. New York’s almost 20 million may not surprise, but the fact that greater Boston has grown to almost 9.5 million may be more surprising. The Washington-Baltimore area grew by far the fastest at almost 15 percent (not much sign of shrinkage of government!). In contrast New York, Boston and Philadelphia’s growth was relatively paltry.

Table 2: Megalopolis and Its Rivals
Place	2010 Pop	2000 Pop	Change	% change

Megalopolis
New York	19,923	19,209	717	3.7
Boston	9,445	8,967	478	5.3
Philadelphia	8,415	76,781	773	9.5
Baltimore-Washingt	7,403	7,681	960	14.9
All	45,181	42,302	2,888	6.8

Chicago	10,817	10,305	512	5

Los Angeles	12,151	11,789	362	3.1
Central	903	857	46	5.4
North	928	634	294	46
East	2,884	2,105	475	37
South	3,543	3,210	337	10.4
All Los Angeles	20,404	18,599	1,810	9.8

San Francisco-Sacramento
San Francisco	7,330	6,946	384	5.5
Sacramento	3,171	2,604	572	22
All San Francisco-Sacramento	10,501	9,550	951	10

Florida
Miami	6,027	5,311	716	13.5
Tampa	4,818	3,894	974	25.3
Orlando	2,915	2,193	722	33
Jacksonville	1,483	1,191	2,242	24.5
All Florida	15,243	12,544	2,699	21.5

Greater Los Angeles is the second largest conurbation, with some 20.4 million, growing by 1.8 million, and 10 percent from 2000. In the table I distinguish between the core Los Angeles urbanized area and the satellite urbanized areas west, north, south and east. The core LA area grew by only 3 percent, while the spillover areas to the north and east had astonishing growth, at 46 and 37 percent over the decade. These include several places with a fairly long history, such as Riverside and San Bernardino, San Diego and Santa Barbara, but many are rapidly growing large suburbs and exurbs, a spillover of growth from the Los Angeles core. Much of the fastest growth has been in Mission Viejo, Murietta-Temecula, Indio, Lancaster, Santa Clarita and Thousand Oaks.

For greater San Francisco, I distinguish two subregions, the Bay area of San Francisco-San Jose (west) and Sacramento (central valley). Some might consider these totally distinct, but they have become one in a conurbation sense, as evidenced by commuting patterns. Many people live in the less costly Central Valley area but commute to the expensive Bay Area cities. Together, the conurbation is now 10.5 million, up 10 percent from 2000. The central valley (Sacramento) portion grew far more rapidly than San Francisco-San Jose (22 percent compared to 5.5 percent).

Compared to its rivals the Chicago conurbation has grown less rapidly but is still large, with a population of 10.8 million in 2010 , growing 512,000 (5 percent) since 2000. Chicago and Milwaukee are the well-known core cities, but there are also less well known components with far faster growth such as Round Lake-McHenry and West Bend, WI.

Florida

The more interesting and difficult conurbation to try to define is what might be called the Florida archipelago. Greater Miami has long been recognized as a conurbation, but I contend that virtually all the urbanized areas of the state are in effect a complex web of urban settlement, with little clear demarcation. This is in part a reflection of rapid and expansive growth. Nevertheless it makes sense to recognize four sub-regions, centered on Miami, Tampa-St. Petersburg, Orlando and Jacksonville.

Together these areas have reached an astonishing 15.2 million, up 2.7 million or 21.5 percent in one decade. Because settlement is spread across the state in such a web-like fashion with no single dominant center, they constitute a newish form of urban concentration. Besides the well-known centers such as Miami, Tampa-St. Petersburg ), Orlando and Jacksonville, there are many satellite cities, often quite large. These include North Port, Cape Coral encompassing older Ft. Meyers, Bonita Springs, Kissimmee, Palm Bay-Melbourne, Palm Coast-Daytona, and Port St. Lucie. An interesting but hard to answer question is how much of Florida’s phenomenal growth is a result of transfer of people and accumulated wealth from the North (and especially from the original Megalopolis).

The United States is a large and diverse country, with many other giant cities and a vast countryside. But it is important to realize the importance of these megalopolitan areas, with an aggregate population of 102.6 million, one third of the nation’s population.

What’s next? Look for the rise of now just somewhat smaller conurbations such as Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, Minneapolis, Seattle, Phoenix, and Denver. In terms of numbers and rates of growth Texas is a front runner, but its stars do not coalesce into a megalopolis, at least not yet. The belt of urban growth from Atlanta, through Greenville, SC, Charlotte to Raleigh-Durham is also a likely future conurbation candidate.

Richard Morrill is Professor Emeritus of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Washington. His research interests include: political geography (voting behavior, redistricting, local governance), population/demography/settlement/migration, urban geography and planning, urban transportation (i.e., old fashioned generalist).

Public Pensions: Reform, Repair, Reboot

Rick Cole — Sun, 25 Dec 2011 00:38:02 -0500

Ill-informed chatter continues to dominate the airwaves when it comes to California public pensions. It’s a big, complex and critical issue for government at all levels in the Golden State. What makes debate so distorted is that public pensions actually differ from agency to agency — and advocates on the issue often talk past each other. Pension critics often point to outrageous abuses as if they were typical. On the other hand, pension defenders often cite current averages that understate long-term costs. All this fuels the typical partisan gridlock that Californians lament yet seem powerless to change in our state.

Credit Governor Jerry Brown for trying to overcome the polarization. That’s what most California voters want him to do, according to a new Field Poll, one of the leading opinion research firms in California. His 12-point pension package (unveiled in October) is successfully framing the debate — and enjoys encouraging support from voters. I agree with them. While Brown’s plan is far from perfect (as he acknowledged in presenting it as a way to build consensus) it sensibly tackles some of the most challenging areas where reform is needed. Among the key reforms he’s proposed:

Increasing the retirement age from 55 to 67 (with a lower age to be spelled out for public safety workers).
Replacing the current “defined benefit” pensions with a hybrid program that includes a defined benefit component, but also a 401(k)-like defined contribution component
Prohibiting retroactive pension increases.
Requiring all employees to contribute at least 50 percent of the cost of their pensions

These generally follow the surprisingly strong stand taken by the League of California Cities, which was based on recommendations from a committee of City Managers that I served on. Our work was grounded in four core principles:

Public retirement systems are useful in attracting and retaining high-performing public employees to design and deliver vital public services to local communities;
Sustainable and dependable employer-provided defined benefits plans for career employees, supplemented with other retirement options including personal savings, have proven successful over many decades in California;
Public pension costs should be shared by employees and employers (taxpayers) alike; and
Such programs should be portable across all public agencies to sustain a competent cadre of California public servants.

Our goal was to ensure the public pension system is reformed, instead of destroyed. Our reform package mirrors Brown’s calls for a hybrid system, raising retirement ages and increasing the portion of pension costs borne by employees. We also backed his bid to base retirements on the top three highest years of pay, curbing the abuses that often artificially raise final year salaries to “spike” pension pay-outs.

Typical of California’s other challenges, the issue faces long odds in the Legislature and uncertain fate at the ballot box. Partisan Democrats are leery of crossing unions by embracing Brown’s package. Partisan Republicans are demanding more far-reaching changes. Brown hopes to bridge the differences to win majority support by drawing on moderates in both parties. “He hasn’t riled up one side or the other,” noted Field Poll director Mark DiCamillo. “He’s managed to strike the middle ground on a very polarizing issue.” Unfortunately, moderates are hard to find in Sacramento.

That leaves the roll of the dice that comes with ballot initiatives. Since it takes millions to bankroll a successful ballot measure, few sensible measures get far without support from well-heeled interests.

In the eternal game of chicken that goes on in Sacramento, the Legislature keeps one eye on those special interests. About the only hope for reform is if a majority is worried that failure to act might spur an expensive ballot box war and an even worse outcome.

This issue might be the exception, however. Public outrage is real. So is the need for reform. In Ventura, we took an early lead on this issue, first with our Compensation Policies Task Force, then union contracts that established a lower benefit and later retirement age for new hires and increased contributions from all employees of at least 4.5% of their pay. But real reform to level the playing field can only come at the State level.

Before this issue devolves into another ballot box catastrophe that radically oversimplifies the issues to a “yes” or “no” choice on an initiative bankrolled by special interests, legislators in both parties need to come together on sensible reform. The Governor has put such a program on their desks. Reasonable people can differ on the details. But only unreasonable people want all-or-nothing victories. This is an issue that both sides should be willing to compromise on. The only way that will happen is if voters push both parties toward sensible compromise in the year ahead!

Photo by Randy Bayne

Rick Cole is city manager of Ventura, California, and recipient of the Municipal Management Association of Southern California's Excellence in Government Award. He can be reached at RCole@ci.ventura.ca.us

California’s Jobs Engine Broke Down Well Before the Financial Crisis

Wendell Cox — Sun, 13 Nov 2011 23:40:37 -0500

Everybody knows that California’s economy has struggled mightily since the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent recession. The state’s current unemployment rate, 12.1 percent, is a full 3 percentage points above the national rate. Liberal pundits and politicians tend to blame this dismal performance entirely on the Great Recession; as Jerry Brown put it while campaigning (successfully) for governor last year, “I’ve seen recessions. They come, they go. California always comes back.”

But a study commissioned by City Journal using the National Establishment Time Series database, which has tracked job creation and migration from 1992 through 2008 (so far) in a way that government statistics can’t, reveals the disturbing truth. California’s economy during the second half of that period—2000 through 2008—was far less vibrant and diverse than it had been during the first. Well before the crisis struck, then, the Golden State was setting itself up for a big fall.

One of the starkest signs of California’s malaise during the first decade of the twenty-first century was its changing job dynamics. Even before the downturn, California had stopped attracting new business investment, whether from within the state or from without.

Economists usually see business start-ups as the most important long-term source of job growth, and California has long had a reputation for nurturing new companies—most famously, in Silicon Valley. As Chart 1 shows, however, this dynamism utterly vanished in the 2000s. From 1992 to 2000, California saw a net gain of 776,500 jobs from start-ups and closures; that is, the state added that many more jobs from start-ups than it lost to closures. But during the first eight years of the new millennium, California had a net loss of 262,200 jobs from start-ups and closures. The difference between the two periods is an astounding 1 million net jobs.

Between 2000 and 2008, California also suffered net job losses of 79,600 to the migration of businesses among states—worse than the net 73,800 jobs that it lost from 1992 through 2000. The leading destination was Texas, with Oregon and North Carolina running second and third (see Chart 2). California managed to add jobs only through the expansion of existing businesses, and even that was at a considerably lower rate than before.

Another dark sign, largely unnoticed at the time: California’s major cities became invalids in the 2000s. Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area had been the engines of California’s economic growth for at least a century. Since World War II, the L.A. metropolitan area, which includes Orange County, has added more people than all but two states (apart from California): Florida and Texas. The Bay Area, which includes the San Francisco and the San Jose metro areas, has been the core of American job growth in information technology and financial services, with San Jose’s Silicon Valley serving as the world’s incubator of information-age technology. During the 1992–2000 period, the L.A. and San Francisco Bay areas added more than 1.1 million new jobs—about half the entire state total. But between 2000 and 2008, as Chart 3 indicates, California’s two big metro areas produced fewer than 70,000 new jobs—a nearly 95 percent drop and a mere 6 percent of job creation in the state. This was a collapse of historic proportions.

Not only did California in the 2000s suffer anemic job growth; the new jobs paid substantially less than before. Chart 4 reveals the sad reversal. From 2000 to 2008, California had a net job loss of more than 270,000 in industries with an average wage higher than the private-sector state average. That marked a turnaround of nearly 1.2 million net jobs from the 1992–2000 period, when 908,900 net jobs were created in above-average-wage industries. Further, during the earlier period, more than 707,000 net jobs were created in the very highest-wage industries—those paying over 150 percent of the private-sector average.

Chart 5, which indicates job growth or decline in selected industries, again suggests that a lopsided amount of California’s economic growth in the 2000s was in below-average-wage fields. It included nearly 590,000 net jobs in “administration and support”—clerical and janitorial jobs, for example, as well as positions in temporary-help services, travel agencies, telemarketing and telephone call centers, and so on. The largest losses in the state during the 2000s were in manufacturing, which traditionally provided above-average wages. After adding a net 64,900 manufacturing jobs from 1992 to 2000, California hemorrhaged a net 403,800 from 2000 to 2008. But information jobs also went into negative territory, while professional, scientific, and technical-services employment experienced far lower growth than in the previous decade.

The chart also shows that California’s growth in the 2000s, such as it was, took place disproportionately in sectors that rode the housing bubble. In fact, 35 percent of the net new jobs in the state were created in construction and real estate. All those jobs have vaporized since 2008, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data. They are unlikely to come back any time soon.

These are troubling numbers. Fewer jobs and lower wages do not a robust economy make. A continuation of this trend, even if California’s recession-battered condition improves, would result in a far more unequal economy, shrunken tax revenues, and a likely increase in state public assistance—all at a time when officials are struggling with massive deficits.

A final indicator of California’s growing economic weakness during the 2000–2008 period is that the average size of firms headquartered in the state shrank dramatically. As Chart 6 shows, California had a huge increase over the 1992–2000 period in the number of jobs added by companies employing just a single person or between two and nine people, even as larger firms cut hundreds of thousands of jobs. Many of the single-employee companies may simply be struggling consultancies: if they were doing better, they’d likely have to start hiring at least a few people. While start-ups are indeed crucial to economic growth, small companies are especially vulnerable to economic downturns and often feel the brunt of taxes and regulations more acutely than larger firms do. The awful job numbers for the bigger companies—including a net loss of nearly 450,000 positions for firms with 500 or more employees—suggest the toxicity of California’s business climate. After all, bigger firms have the resources to settle and expand in other locales; in the 2000s, they clearly wanted nothing to do with the Golden State.

What is behind California’s shocking decline—its snuffed-out start-ups, unproductive big cities, poorer jobs, and tinier, weaker, or fleeing companies—during the 2000–2008 period? Steven Malanga’s “Cali to Business: Get Out!” identifies the major villains: suffocating regulations, inflated business taxes and fees, a lawsuit-friendly legal environment, and a political class uninterested in business concerns, if not downright hostile to them. One could add to this list the state’s extraordinarily high cost of living, with housing prices particularly onerous, having skyrocketed in the major metropolitan areas before the downturn—thanks, the research suggests, to overzealous land-use regulation.

One thing is for sure: California will never regain its previous prosperity if it leaves these problems unaddressed. Its profound economic woes aren’t just the result of the Great Recession.

This piece originally appeared in City Journal. City Journal thanks the Hertog/Simon Fund for Policy Analysis for its generous support of this issue’s California jobs package.

Wendell Cox is a Visiting Professor, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris and the author of “War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life”

Photo by Altus via Flickr

The Golden State Is Crumbling

Joel Kotkin — Sun, 04 Sep 2011 13:08:50 -0400

The recent announcement that California's unemployment again nudged up to 12 percent—second worst in the nation behind its evil twin, Nevada—should have come as a surprise but frankly did not. From the beginning of the recession, the Golden State has been stuck bringing up a humbled nation's rear and seems mired in that less-than-illustrious position.

What has happened to my adopted home state of over last decade is a tragedy, both for Californians and for America. For most of the past century, California has been "golden" not only in name but in every kind of superlative—a global leader in agriculture, energy, entertainment, technology, and most important of all, human aspiration.

In its modern origins California was paean to progress in the best sense of the word. In 1872, the second president of the University of California, Daniel Coit Gilman, said science was "the mother of California." Today, California may worship at the altar of science, but increasingly in the most regressive, hysterical, and reactionary way.

California's dominant ruling class—consisting of public-employee unions, green jihadis, and Democratic machine politicians—has no real use for science as Gilman saw it: as a way to create prosperity for its citizens. Instead, the prevailing credo of the state has been how to do everything possible to return to its pre-settlement condition, with little regard for what that means to the average Californian.

Nowhere was California's old technological ethos more pronounced than in agriculture, where great Californians such as William Mulholland, creator of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, and Pat Brown, who forged the state water project, created the greatest water-delivery system since the Roman Empire. Their effort brought water from the ice-bound Sierra Nevada mountains down to the state's dry but fertile valleys and to the great desert metropolis of Southern California. Now, largely at the behest of greens, California agriculture is being systematically cut down by regulation. In an attempt to protect a small fish called the Delta smelt, upward of 200,000 acres of prime farmland have been idled, according to the state's Department of Conservation. Even in the current "wet" cycle, California's agricultural industry, which exports roughly $14 billion annually, is slowly being decimated. Unemployment in some Central Valley towns tops 30 percent, and in cases even 40 percent.

And now, notes my friend, Salinas Mayor Dennis Donohue, green regulators are imposing new groundwater regulations that may force the shutdown of production even in areas like his that have their own ample water supplies.

Salinas was the home town of John Steinbeck, author of The Grapes of Wrath and great chronicler of Depression-era California. Today for many in hardscrabble, majority-Latino Salinas, home to 150,000 people, The Grapes of Wrath is less lyrical than real. "California," notes Donohue, a lifelong Democrat, "remains intent on job destruction and continued hyper-regulation."

California's pain is not restricted to farming towns. The state's regulatory vigilantes have erected a labyrinth of rules that increasingly makes doing almost anything that might contribute to increased carbon emissions—manufacturing, conventional energy, home construction—extraordinarily onerous. Not surprisingly, the state has not gained middle-skilled jobs (those requiring two years of college or more) for a decade, while the nation boosted them by 5 percent and archrival Texas by a stunning 16 percent over the same time period.

There is little chance that the jobs lost in these fields will ever be recovered under the current regime. As decent blue-collar and midlevel jobs disappear, California has gone from a rate of inequality about the national average in 1970, to among the most unequal in terms of income. The supposed solution to this—Gov. Jerry Brown's promise of 500,000 "green jobs"—is being shown for what it really is, the kind of fantasy you tell young children so they will go to sleep.

Many Californians who aren't slumbering are moving out of the state—and not only the pathetic remains of the old Reaganite majority. According to the most recent census, those leaving the state include old boomers, middle-aged families, and increasingly, many Latinos as well. Outmigration rates from places like Los Angeles and the Bay Area now rival those of such cities as Detroit. In the last decade, California’s population grew only 10 percent, about the national average, largely due to immigrants and their offspring. Population increases in the Bay Area were less than half that rate, while the City of Los Angeles gained fewer new residents—less than 100,000—than in any decade since the turn of the last century!

Increasingly, California no longer beckons ambitious newcomers, except for a handful of the most affluent, best educated, and well connected. Through the 1980s and even through the late '90s, the aspirational classes came to California. Now they head to other, more opportunity-friendly places like Austin, Houston, Dallas, Raleigh-Durham, even former “dust bowl” burghs like Des Moines, Omaha, and Oklahoma City. Meanwhile, Golden California, particularly its expensive, ultragreen coast, gets older and older. Marin County, the onetime home of the Grateful Dead and countless former hippies, is now one of the grayest urban counties in the country, with a median age of 44.

Of course, the self-described "progressive" mafia that runs California will point to Silicon Valley and its impressive array of startups. But for the most part, firms like Google, Twitter, and Facebook employ only a small cadre of highly educated workers. Overall, during the past decade the state's high-tech employment fell by almost 4 percent, while Texas's science-based employment grew by a healthy 11 percent. The sad reality is that turning T-shirt-wearing kids like Mark Zuckerberg into multibillionaires doesn't do much to reduce unemployment, which even in San Jose—the largely blue-collar "capital" of Silicon Valley—now hovers around 10 percent.

Magazine cover stories and movies cannot obscure the fact that entrepreneurial growth—the state’s most critical economic asset—has now stalled. In fact, according to a study by Economic Modeling Specialists Inc., last year the Golden State ranked 50th among the states in creating new businesses.

California remains rich in promise, home to spectacular scenery; a great Pacific location; leading firms like Apple and Disney; and a still-impressive residue of talented, diverse, entrepreneurial, and ingenious people. But the state will never return until the success of the current crop of puerile billionaires can be extended to enrich the wider citizenry. Until the current regime is toppled, California's decline—in moral as well as economic terms—will continue, to the consternation of those of us who embraced it as our home for so many years.

This piece originally appeared at The Daily Beast.

Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

Photo by wstera2.