Los Angeles

Screwy Transit Logic

Randal OToole — Tue, 10 Sep 2019 21:20:59 -0400

Bus ridership in Los Angeles is plummeting, says the Wall Street Journal, but LA Metro CEO Phil Washington thinks he has the solution.

“It’s too easy to drive in this city,” says Washington. To get people back on the buses, the city needs to “actually making driving harder.”
The main way he wants to do that is to turn existing street lanes into exclusive bus lanes. The increased congestion, he says, would help “change behavior in a city whose culture is largely built around driving.”

Transit carries less than 2 percent of passenger miles in the Los Angeles urban area, while automobiles carry well over 90 percent. Unfortunately for Washington, those pesky auto drivers for some reason are resisting his efforts to take away their driving lanes.

“Sometimes you have to tell people what’s good for them,” Washington told the Journal.

According to the 2017 National Transit Database (the Antiplanner’s summary here), LA Metro’s buses use more energy (about 4,300 BTUs per passenger mile) and emit more greenhouse gases (about 355 grams of CO2 per passenger mile) than the average SUV (about 3,800 BTUs and 250 grams of CO2, based on average SUV occupancies of 1.83 as calculated from the National Household Travel Survey).

According to the University of Minnesota Center for Transportation Studies, the average Los Angelean can reach 50 percent more jobs in a 20-minute auto drive than a 60-minute transit ride. Adding a few exclusive bus lanes isn’t going to change that much.
So tell me again, Mr. Washington, how is transit so good for people that it is worth slowing down the 90 percent of them who don’t ride it just to fill a few more bus seats?

The Utah Transit Authority (UTA) has an answer to that question. According to a study from University of Utah researchers done in cooperation with UTA, transit is less polluting than driving. Never mind the fact that Salt Lake City’s light-rail cars are powered by electricity generated from coal-fired power plants. Those power plants are “outside the Wasatch Front,” say the researchers, “hence the emissions aren’t in Salt Lake’s air.”

It’s true: the main coal-fired power plants supporting the Salt Lake region are on the other side of the Wasatch Mountains in Carbon and Emery counties and in Wyoming. Apparently, when it comes to transit, greenhouse gas emissions don’t count if they are emitted in someone else’s backyard.

Meanwhile, in Las Vegas, where transit ridership is also declining, a member of the Regional Transportation Commission’s advisory committee argues that Uber and Lyft are unfairly taking customers from the transit system. “I’m a capitalist,” he says, “but they’re not competing, they’re cannibalizing.” He’s referring to the fact that, so far, Uber and Lyft are losing money. But Amazon and a lot of other companies lost money when they began and eventually became profitable. The “advisory committee,” by the way, appears to consist of consultants and contractors who could make big bucks from building new transit infrastructure.

The article in the Nevada Current argues that “much of the community” in Las Vegas “has been clamoring for an expanded and more efficient transit system,” but with ridership dropping, the transit commission won’t be able to do that. However, the only evidence provided that people are “clamoring” for more transit is another article in the Current that mainly quotes transit agency officials and board members. Despite this lack of clamor, the agency is considering putting a sales tax that would subsidize it on the ballot.

Transit agencies (and reporters) need to recognize that they exist to serve people; people don’t exist to serve transit. If transit is no longer providing the service that people need, then it is time for the agencies to reduce their services, not to increase taxes.

This article first appeared on the Antiplanner

Randal O'Toole is an economist with forty years of experience critiquing public land, urban, transportation, and other government plans.

Photo credit: METRO96 via Wikimedia under CC 3.0 License.

The Regression of America’s Big Progressive Cities

Joel Kotkin — Mon, 05 Aug 2019 01:33:38 -0400

If there’s anything productive to come from his recent Twitter storm, President Trump’s recent crude attacks on Baltimore Congressman Elijah Cummings have succeeded in bring necessary attention to the increasingly tragic state of our cities. Baltimore’s continued woes, after numerous attempts to position itself as a “comeback city,” illustrates all too poignantly the deep-seated decay in many of our great urban areas.

Baltimore represents an extreme case, but sadly it is not alone. Last year our three largest urban centers — New York, Los Angeles and Chicago — lost people while millennial migration accelerated both to the suburbs and smaller, generally less dense cities. These demographic trends, as well as growing blight, poor schools, decaying infrastructure and, worst of all, expanding homelessness are not merely the result of “racism” or Donald Trump, but have all been exacerbated by policy agendas that are turning many great cities into loony towns.

Politics run amok

Take tech rich San Francisco, where decades of tolerance for even extreme deviant behavior has helped create a city with more drug addicts than high school students, and so much feces on the street that one website has created a “poop map.” In Southern California’s far more proletarian city of Los Angeles, we have a downtown filled with overbuilt, overpriced apartments and is, like Baltimore, being overrun with rats. A UN official last year compared conditions on the city’s Skid Row to those of Syrian refugee camps.

One would think such nasty problems would spark something of a political rebellion, as seen in previous decades with the rise of successful, pragmatic mayors — Bob Lanier and Bill White in Houston, Rudy Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg in New York, and Richard Riordan in Los Angeles. But so far, at least, many of today’s big city mayors seem more interested in bolstering their “resistance” bona fides than governing effectively.

Los Angeles’ Eric Garcetti, for example, speaks enthusiastically about his own “green new deal” and turning the city into a transit Valhalla even as blight and homelessness expand inexorably. The mayor is less rhapsodic about practical things that people actually need, such as decent roads, reliable water supply or electricity.

Economic growth generally is not much of a priority for the woke urban political class. In New York, Rep. Ocasio Alexandria Cortez’s allies succeeded in driving Amazon’s new headquarters out of her district. Meanwhile her socialist comrades in Seattle have helped persuade the on-line giant to relocate more of its employees out to a massive new building in the suburb of Bellevue while the Emerald City hosts a rising homeless population.

The demographics of ultra-progressivism

Ironically, this far-left trend partially can be traced to the post-2000 urban resurgence, sparked by the now unappreciated pragmatic mayors who made cities safer and more business friendly. Safe streets and thriving businesses lured large numbers of young people, many well-educated and mostly liberal, to the urban core in numbers not seen for generations.

Yet since the 1970s the middle class in cities has been in a precipitous decline while poverty has remained stubbornly high. Philadelphia’s central core, for example, rebounded between 2000 and 2014, but for every one district that gained in income, two suffered income declines. In 1970, half of Chicago was middle class; today, according to a new University of Illinois study, that number is down to 16 percent. Meanwhile, the percentage of poor people has risen from 42 to 62 percent.

The most attractive blue cities — led by New York, San Francisco, San Jose, Los Angeles and Boston — now suffer, according to Pew research, the largest gaps between the bottom and top quintiles of all U.S. cities.

The post-2000 urban success increased housing prices but failed to create a new stable urban middle class. Most young urbanites don’t stay long enough to build long-term communities; once they hit the family formation period in their thirties, they still largely depart for the suburbs. As the Atlantic recently noted the number of babies born in Manhattan this decade dropped nearly 15 percent; already home to a majority of single households, the nation’s premier urban center could see its infant population cut in half in 30 years.

Remaking urban politics

The new demographics have hollowed out the political middle in most cities.

The old urban middle class leaned Democratic, but they were largely interested in practical outcomes — like paved roads, fixed lights, and access to jobs. Their departure, and replacement by temporary hipster populations, has helped insulate city governments from constituents who would be most adamant about reforming usually failed school districts or demanding improvements in public infrastructure or maintaining public order.

Electoral engagement has faded in most cities, with turnout for mayor averaging 15 percent for mayoral races in our most populous cities. In Los Angeles, the 2013 turnout that elected progressive Eric Garcetti was roughly one-third of that in the city’s 1970 mayoral election. Garcetti’s 2017 re-election boasted a similarly low turnout.

The prime beneficiaries of these changes have been the well-organized. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio Cortez’s primary victory rested on 16,000 votes out of a total Democratic registration of almost 215,000. She won not by sweeping the proletarian or minority masses, but marshalling the votes of white young educated hipsters. These voters are driving the rise of far-left socialists in other cities, including Denver, who seek to replace not Republicans but more traditional liberal Democrats.

Can this be turned around?

The new urban politics threatens the future of family neighborhoods, local entrepreneurial ventures as well as an apolitical, exuberant diversity. Immigrants and aspiring minorities want good schools, safe streets and less onerous regulation. Resolutions on sanctuary cities, condemnations of Trump tweets, social justice demands and boasts about combating climate change do little to improve tangibly reality that cities like Baltimore or even superstars like San Francisco, Washington, and New York.

Only when grassroots people and concerned businesses decide to challenge the urban status quo and the virtue-signaling political class can decay and the relentless bifurcation of our cities be reversed. After all, large and powerful companies, like Amazon, can always pack up and migrate to less insane political environments. But those with a strong stake in the local economy and neighborhoods have fewer options. It will be up to them, to restore our cities’ historic role as places for both families and middle-class economic aspiration.

This piece originally appeared in The Orange County Register.

Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com. He is the Roger Hobbs Distinguished Fellow in Urban Studies at Chapman University and executive director of the Houston-based Center for Opportunity Urbanism. His newest book is The Human City: Urbanism for the rest of us. He is also author of The New Class Conflict, The City: A Global History, and The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050. He lives in Orange County, CA.

Photo: Lynn Friedman, via Flickr, using CC License.

Primer on Politics of Homelessness in LA

Jerry Sullivan — Tue, 25 Jun 2019 01:30:38 -0400

I’ll start by giving you all a chance to consider some basic questions that Mayor Eric Garcetti and his staff failed to address –- and the mainstream media left hanging -- in the wake of a report that confirmed the obvious rise in homelessness in Los Angeles over the past year or so.

Here they are, as submitted to Garcetti’s office:

Could you please answer a few questions about this paragraph from today’s [June 5] story in the LA Times?:

More than 20,000 people were helped into housing last year, a record number. Other cities and counties in Southern California reported bigger increases in homelessness than Los Angeles did, a sign that local policies are working, Garcetti said.

1) What is the source of the claim of 20,000 people helped into housing?

2) By what measure/benchmark is that a record?

3) How many of the 20,000 people were helped via city funds and programs established since the passage of Prop HHH?

4) How many people were helped, using the same measure, in each of the prior 5 years?

I asked these questions because they matter in light of the numerous public programs that have been funded for years to provide housing and other help for folks in need.

Did the 20,000 cases of people being helped mark significant progress or an incremental gain that cost hundreds of millions of dollars?

Let’s move on to the politics behind the homeless crisis in LA.

Anyone from LA has obvious reasons for interest. Anyone from places where homelessness is not a crisis can take this as a cautionary tale.

I know that there's a notion about the current crisis on homelessness really being a housing crisis – that's becoming a mantra among politicians, big representatives of the nonprofit world such as United Way, various for-profit entities, and other segments of society. It’s likely that many are sincere – and it’s just as likely that many are over-eager for a bumper sticker answer to this complicated and comprehensive challenge.

Beware in this case.

The challenge of addressing homelessness should be simplified, to be sure, but there’s reason to doubt that connecting it to the separate problem of housing affordability for the middle class is the proper frame for the task at hand.

Mother’s Milk

Let’s first consider the beginning of the mess behind homelessness: Money is the mother’s milk of politics, as the old saying goes – and elected officials make money with their decisions on matters of public policy.

The financial payoffs the politicians get traditionally run the gamut from technically legal campaign contributions granted or bundled up by special interests to envelopes of cash.

The setup means that politicians like to be in a position to make lots of decisions that matter to special interests.

And the real estate business puts politicians in such a position when it comes to zoning laws, building codes, possible variances, density bonuses, tax credits and so on.

The whole process of real estate development is chock full of chances for elected officials and their minions to grab campaign donations or other perks or envelopes of cash.

“Progressive” Approach

The benefits that come with inserting themselves as decision makers in the process mean that politicians want lots of development. Running out of room in a city where traffic is already clogged and the roads are in terrible condition? Just proclaim that the solution is high-density housing and call it a “progressive” approach.

Put that scenario against the picture being painted to equate the crisis on homelessness with a housing crisis. It's based on some faulty logic that’s been parroted everywhere from the New York Times to the LA Times lately. The picture starts with a citation of a median rent of $2,471 per month in LA County, according to Downtown LA-based nonprofit California Housing Partnership. It includes the suggestion that anyone who wants to rent in LA needs to make $47.52 an hour – about $99,000 a year and more than triple the local minimum wage.

The point of those data points – according to proponents and members of the press who’ve swallowed them whole – is that there is a need for a great deal of new development and construction of low-cost housing to solve the challenge of homelessness.

Here’s what they might not have considered as they drive toward what looks to be an inordinately expensive and over-engineered response to homelessness:

A median is not an average. The median cited on rent is the point at which there are equal numbers of tenants paying more and less than $2,471 a month.

Also unaddressed is the fact that many households have more than one member working.

Neither of those points render the data irrelevant, but they provide context that starts to give shape to a different perspective.

1.8 Million Rental Units

Now consider that LA County has nearly 1.8 million renter-occupied housing units, with nearly three people living in each on average. That’s according to the U.S. Census Bureau’s five-year estimate, which covers 2013-2017, the most recent data available.

More than 600,000 of the units were rented for somewhere between $1,000 and $1,500 a month, according to the federal agency.

Another 350,000 or so went for $500 to $999 a month.

And somewhere around 85,000 units leased for less than $500 a month.

That’s more than 1 million units of housing at less than $1,500 a month – and that’s a far cry from the picture painted by citing the median rent of nearly $2,500 a month.

Yes, prices have probably increased some in the past 18 months, but not enough to fundamentally change the point here.

And no, I’m not claiming that all of those units are idyllic.

But I’m reasonably certain that nearly all of them represent a better option than facing homelessness. Simply having a door to close to mark off some private space is likely a relief that few who have never been homeless can understand.

And we have bureaucracies to handle substandard housing – so this might also provide a spark for them to engage their missions on a new level.

1 Million at $1,500-a-Month or Less

Official tallies indicate, in any case, that we have about 60,000 homeless folks throughout Los Angeles County and 1 million units of housing priced at $1,500 a month or less – a level that could likely accommodate significant numbers of the individuals and families who are on the streets or living in vehicles simply because the cost of monthly rent is out of reach.

The vacancy rate for apartments in LA County is about 3.8%, according to NAI Capital, a real estate brokerage based in Encino.

That would suggest – and this is rough figuring – nearly 40,000 rental units on the market at $1,500 a month or less.

Simply paying the full rent for a homeless person or family that has a chance to achieve stability with the benefit of that sort of financial break would cost $18,000 a year – probably much less expensive than the true, comprehensive cost of their going homeless.

Pay the full rent on 15,000 of those units and you’d make a 25% dent in homelessness at the cost of $270 million for the year. Figure out a proactive approach and you might stem the flow of new cases, too.

Compare that with the $600 million the city and county joined forces to spend last year amid smoke and mirrors and ribbon cuttings only to see homelessness increase by 16%.

What about cases where household incomes come up a bit short of the monthly charge – maybe another $300 a month would make them stable renters? Why not give grants to bridge the gap? Do that for a year in 15,000 cases, and it would cost $54 million.

It’s clear that there’s plenty of work to do in vetting such candidates and sorting situations. Thousands of more individuals and families will likely require greater assistance for their physical and mental health. Some might require permanent care from a public institution.

Wise Up

That will surely get more expensive, which makes it all the more important to use the money taxpayers have committed to this cause wisely.

Let’s start by making the cost-effective decisions to help folks who could stand on their own two feet with the benefit of a hand up, getting them off the slippery slope of homelessness.

And that should start with a deeper understanding of a median rent and an hourly wage and other dramatic bits of data that could be used to trick us all into letting politicians turn another crisis into an opportunity for their selfish interests.

Jerry Sullivan is founder and chief columnist for SullivanSaysSoCal.com.

Photo: Stephen zeigler [CC BY-SA 4.0], via Wikimedia Commons

Homelessness in Hollywood

Alicia Kurimska — Sat, 11 May 2019 01:33:38 -0400

The allure of Los Angeles may be the good weather, beaches, and the glitz and glam of Hollywood. However, the Los Angeles area has around 50,000 people who are currently experiencing homelessness. Natasha Sokol, a student at Chapman University, shows us how extreme the inequality really is in her video below.

Transit in Los Angeles: Lost Opportunities

Wendell Cox — Tue, 30 Apr 2019 01:33:38 -0400

Low fares and more bus service, rather than urban rail, is the key to improving transit ridership in Los Angeles. That conclusion can be easily drawn from a recent installment of transportation consultant Thomas A. Rubin and Professor James E. Moore II in their series on transit in Los Angeles. This article covers Improving Bus Service and Reducing Fares have Greatly Increased Transit Use in Los Angeles as part of a series entitled A Critical Review of Los Angeles Metro’s 28 by 2028 Plan being published by the Reason Foundation and its earlier installments were covered in a previous New Geography article.

Rubin is a former Chief Financial Officer at the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) and founder of the Deloitte transportation practice, and Professor Moore serves at the University of Southern California. Both have published extensively on transportation issues, and in particular, on developments in Los Angeles.

The authors describe the ebbs and flows of transit ridership (Figure 1) on the principal Los Angeles transit system, now called Metro, previously known as the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) after its merger with the policy-only Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC) in 1993. Their analysis can be broadly divided into four periods from 1970 to 2018.

Period 1: 1970-1985: Emphasis on Low Fares (15 Years)

The early 1970s were a time of economic disruption in the United States, with the OPEC oil embargo. Rubin and Moore describe the events that led to a near doubling of Metro (SCRTD) ridership in the 1970s:

“Gasoline was in short supply and difficult to find. The inflation-adjusted average price for a gallon of gasoline in California increased 117% from calendar year 1972, pre-oil embargo, to 1981. In addition, Los Angeles County experienced a large and rapid demographic shift that included increased the number of lower-income residents who had limited options with respect to automobility. Many of these residents relied on transit.”

Between 1970 and 1980, transit ridership increased by 102 percent. The key was a new $0.25 flat fare, that replaced the previous fare system that increased with distance. I had been a beneficiary of these transit improvements and began riding SCRTD’s new route 721 park and ride line to downtown Los Angeles from the San Fernando Valley’s Van Nuys Drive-In (which was located on Roscoe Boulevard between Van Nuys Boulevard and Sepulveda Boulevard), happily abandoning my car pool.

Transit ridership hit a modern peak, at 397 million in 1980. County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn, then also Chairman of the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC), proposed a one half-cent sales tax referendum for the 1980 ballot that would reduce the fare to a flat $0.50 for three years. By this time, SCRTD had raised the fare to $0.65.

At that meeting, as a board member of LACTC, I introduced the amendment that created the rail funding set aside in Proposition A, out of a belief that such a system would alleviate traffic congestion in Los Angeles. This motion was seconded by County Supervisor Baxter Ward (whose support of rail was legendary) and passed. Experience has disabused me of any belief that urban rail can materially reduce traffic congestion in a metropolitan areas (see: Evaluating Rail Transit).

After declining from 397 million rides to 354 million with the higher fares, the $0.50 fare, implemented in 1983, drove boardings to a new peak in 1985, at 497 million. This record still stands. Between 1970 and 1985 transit boardings rose more than 150 percent, at an annual rate of 6.4 percent (Figure 2). This was the high point for LA transit. From 1985 to 2018, boardings were to decline 21 percent, though the actual door-to-door ridership loss may have been double that, as is indicated in Note 1.

Period 2: 1985-1996: Emphasis on Rail Construction (11 Years)

In 1986, the 35 percent rail funding set aside took effect and rail construction became the priority. During this period, the Blue Line (light rail downtown to Long Beach), the Green Line (along the I-105 freeway), and part of the Red Line subway (ultimately downtown to North Hollywood) were opened. The three year 50 cent fare mandate expired in 1985 and the fare was raised 70 percent to $0.85 in 1986. Ultimately it was increased to $1.35 in 1994.

The higher fares took a toll on boardings, which dropped 27 percent, despite the new rail lines. The annual percentage loss was 2.8 percent (Figure 2).

Period 3: 1996-2007: Shift of Emphasis to Lower Fares (11 Years)

The high fare, which was at least partly due to the concentration of the budget on rail construction, was a burden on low-income riders and ridership losses provoked legal action. As Rubin and Moore relate:

“The 1994 fare increase included the elimination of monthly passes. These were extensively used by the most transit-dependent riders and, in combination with the other changes, their elimination amounted to approximately doubling Metro’s average fares. Opposition to this change generated a major Federal Title VI (discrimination in the utilization of federal funding) legal action, Labor/Community Strategy Center v MTA. This suit resulted in a consent decree (CD) that went into effect from December 1996, approximately half-way through Metro FY97, and which remained in force for approximately 11 years.”

The consent decree required reintroduction of a monthly pass that had been discontinued and creation of a $11 weekly pass, which was more affordable to low income riders who faced with greater cash flow challenges. The consent decree also required a substantial increase in service and replacement of virtually obsolete buses with new, less polluting vehicles.

Metro’s ridership turned around sharply. From 1996 to 2007, boardings increased 36 percent, a 2.8 percent annual rate. Boardings neared the 1985 record, (Figure 2) though actual passenger trips could have been materially lower, as is described in Note 1.

Notably, in 2007, Metro ridership nearly reached (Note 2) that of the nation’s historically second ranked transit system the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA). After closing the gap over a long period, Metro came within 0.4 percent of CTA ridership in 2007. However, that was not to last. By 2018, Metro boardings had fallen 20 percent behind CTA.

Period 4: 2007-2018: Emphasis on Rail Construction (11 Years)

With the expiration of the consent decree, Rubin and Moore report, fares were raised, spending on rail was increased and bus service was reduced. While rail boardings increased by 27.9 million annually, bus ridership dropped 132.2 million. Roughly five bus riders fled the system for every new rail customer. Overall boardings dropped 104.3 million. By 2018, boardings had dropped to 390.6 million (and perhaps lower, see Note 1). This was below the 1980 figure that had been achieved at the end of the fiscal year just before LACTC approved the ballot issue, with rail funding.

Increasing Transit Ridership: Simple Inexpensive Steps

According to Rubin and Moore:

“On three occasions simple, inexpensive, and risk-free steps have substantially increased unlinked passenger trips on Metro’s system. Increases of 36% to 101% have been achieved over a few years by taking three actions: increasing the number of buses in service and the hours and miles they operate, improving the quality of bus service provided (operating enough bus service to relieve extreme overcrowding) and reducing fares or avoiding fare increases.”

Rubin and Moore conclude that:

“More rail service means more rail riders, but shifting resources from bus service to rail lines means many more stop using Metro’s buses than start using its trains. Therefore, the more Metro emphasizes rail construction, the fewer total riders it carries.”

There may have been lost opportunities of substantial proportions, not only for increased transit ridership, but more fundamentally for people that rely on transit.

Los Angeles County has large low-income areas. It seems likely that lower transit fares and higher levels of bus service could have made more jobs accessible to people not otherwise able to reach employment in reasonable time. The higher incomes could have strengthened businesses in marginal neighborhoods, not to mention the overall local economy.

Moreover, UCLA study suggests a strong trend toward more vehicles per household in Southern California since 2000. Some of these new vehicles may have been purchased by carless passengers driven off Metro services by higher fares and lower service levels. Rail transit not only failed to reduce traffic congestion, but excessive emphasis on rail construction may have increased total vehicle miles.

In a later installment, Rubin and Moore find that “Los Angeles ridership successes have been reversed as major over-investments in new rail lines have drained resources required for maintaining well-utilized bus service, producing continuing reductions in transit use.” Servicing the large, lower income customer base requires substantial reordering of priorities.

Note 1: It is likely that actual Metro ridership (door to door trips) has fallen even more than the present 1985-2018 data indicates. In the previous article, Rubin and Moore estimate that the reported 21 percent decline boardings may in fact be a 42 percent ridership decline. This is because passengers are counted each time they board a vehicle (boardings). Thus, if, for example, a passenger transfers from one bus to another traveling from home to work, the number of boardings is two, rather than one. Each transit vehicle, bus or rail, counts as a boarding. Some trips require the use of three or more transit vehicles.

Note 2: Based on Federal Transit Administration monthly data using the Los Angeles Metro fiscal year, July to June.

Wendell Cox is principal of Demographia, an international public policy and demographics firm. He is a Senior Fellow of the Center for Opportunity Urbanism (US), Senior Fellow for Housing Affordability and Municipal Policy for the Frontier Centre for Public Policy (Canada), and a member of the Board of Advisors of the Center for Demographics and Policy at Chapman University (California). He is co-author of the "Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey" and author of "Demographia World Urban Areas" and "War on the Dream: How Anti-Sprawl Policy Threatens the Quality of Life." He was appointed by Mayor Tom Bradley to three terms on the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, where he served with the leading city and county leadership as the only non-elected member. Speaker of the House of Representatives appointed him to the Amtrak Reform Council. He served as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, a national university in Paris.

Photo: Los Angeles MTA Building, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MTA_Building#/media/File:Los_Angeles_Gatew...

New York, Los Angeles and Chicago Metro Areas All Lose Population

Wendell Cox — Sat, 20 Apr 2019 01:33:38 -0400

There was big news in the 2018 population estimates just released on metropolitan areas in the United States. For the first time all three of the largest metropolitan areas lost population. This unprecedented development includes New York, Los Angeles and Chicago. All of the other 12 top metropolitan areas in the nation increased their population, including Detroit, which has lost population in many years.

Dallas-Fort Worth was the biggest gainer, adding 132,000 residents over the past year, to rise above 7.5 million for the first time. Phoenix and Houston gained between 90,000 and 100,000 residents, while Atlanta gained 76,000 (Figure 1). Detailed data is for all of the 106 metropolitan areas with more than 500,000 population is at the bottom of this article.

Proportional Population Gains

In percentage terms, the strongest major metropolitan areas (the 53 with more than 1,000,000 population) the biggest population gains were Austin, Orlando, Las Vegas, Raleigh and Phoenix (Figure 2). All five exceeded an annual increase of two percent. The largest losing areas in percentage terms were Pittsburgh, New York, Chicago, Cleveland and Los Angeles (Figure 2).

Among the 53 middle-sized metropolitan areas (500,000 to 1,000,000), Lakeland (FL), Boise (ID) and Provo (UT) led the percentage gainers. Honolulu and Youngstown (OH-PA) experienced the greatest percentage losses, at 0.5 percent or more (Figure 3). Overall, there are nearly 400 metropolitan areas, most of which are smaller than the major and middle-sized metropolitan areas.

Proportional Net Domestic Migration

The strongest net domestic migration percentage gains among the major metropolitan areas were in Las Vegas, Austin, Jacksonville, Phoenix, Tampa-St. Petersburg and Charlotte, all exceeding a rate of one percent compared to 2017. San Jose, New York, Miami, Los Angeles and Chicago had the largest net domestic migration percentage losses, all exceeding a rate of minus 0.8 percent (Figure 4).

Among the middle-sized metropolitan areas, Lakeland, Boise and Sarasota (FL) had the largest percentage gains, all over 2 percent of their 2018 population. The largest net domestic migration percentage losses were in Honolulu, El Paso, Bridgeport-Stamford (CT), Jackson (MS) and New Haven (CT), all exceeding minus 0.5 percent (Figure 5).

Domestic Migration by Metropolitan Area Population

The middle-sized metropolitan areas again substantially outperformed the major metropolitan areas in net domestic migration, gaining nearly 100,000. By contrast, the major metropolitan areas lost over 200,000 net domestic migrants. As Figure 6 indicates, the middle-sized metropolitan areas have been generally expanding the net domestic migration gap with the larger metropolitan area cousins in recent years.

The largest major metropolitan areas sustained substantial net domestic migration losses, with the megacities (New York and Los Angeles) losing more than 318,000, and the seven metropolitan areas with from 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 population losing 122,000. This category, however, included strong gainers Dallas-Fort Worth and Atlanta, whose gains were more than offset by metropolitan areas with surprising losses, such as Miami, Washington and Boston (Figure 7). Gains were registered in each of the smaller population categories.

The middle-sized metropolitan areas had the largest net domestic migration gain, at 0.26 percent of their 2017 population, slightly more than the 0.25 percent among the 1,000,000 to 2,500,000 million category, and the 0.20 percent in the 2,500,000 to 5,000,000 category. The net domestic migration rate turns into minus 0.25 percent in the 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 category. The megacities, New York and Los Angeles (over 10 million) hemorrhaged net domestic migrants at by far the highest rate, minus 0.95 percent (Figure 8).

Net Domestic Migration: Suburbs v. Core Counties

One of the enduring myths in recent years has been that urban core (Note 1) domestic migration exceeded that of the suburbs during or after the Great Recession. Figure 9 shows this to be untrue (as was also the case in the late 2000s). However urban cores certainly performed better than before during those difficult times.

Figure 9 shows that the suburbs have done far better than the core counties in more recent years. In fact, for the last two years, suburban net domestic migration minus that of the core counties has exceeded 700,000, as is indicated in Figure 10 (Note).

Future Trends?

Much of what has been observed in recent years continues. People continue to migrate to the South and the Southwest, but not into California.

But the most recent data may portend even more important changes. It would have been inconceivable 10 years ago that Los Angeles, which was long, by some accounts, second only to Tokyo in population growth, to sustain a population loss. Chicago’s four years of losses are at odds with its modest growth that had been the rule for decades. New York, which now the Census Bureau estimates has lost population for the last two years, suffered had a large population loss in the 1970s, but had gains after that and as late as 2011 added more than 125,000 residents. Whether these losses will continue is, of course, unknown.

Finally, the growing net domestic migration trends in the middle-sized metropolitan trends could provide some strongly needed impetus to economies that have experience challenging times.

In sum, the new numbers show what has become the dominant trend of this decade: a shift to metropolitan areas that mainly have post-War suburbs, are affordable and and have lower costs. It’s time for city leaders to stop pretending there’s still a massive “return to the cities” and start addressing the reasons why so many of their residents are choosing to leave.

Note 1: The core county contains the city hall of the historical core municipality. There is one core county per metropolitan area, except in New York, where all five boroughs (counties) are classified as core counties. Counties are the lowest level of geography for which the Census Bureau estimates provide net domestic migration data.

Note 2: There were changes to the Census Bureau’s methodology, which are explained in this document. Previous year’s data can vary from amounts reported in earlier estimates. For example, the New York population loss was not reported in the 2017 release, but the data has been revised to show a 2017 loss in the 2018 release.

Metropolitan Areas Over 500,000: Population Estimates: 2018
Corrected from original

		Population (000s)			2017-2018 Change
Rank	Metropolitan Area	2010	2017	2018	Population	Rank	Net Domestic Migration	Rank
1	New York, NY-NJ-PA	19.567	19.999	19.979	-0.10%	100	-0.99%	104
2	Los Angeles, CA	12.829	13.299	13.291	-0.05%	97	-0.89%	101
3	Chicago, IL-IN-WI	9.461	9.521	9.499	-0.23%	102	-0.88%	100
4	Dallas-Fort Worth, TX	6.426	7.408	7.540	1.78%	14	0.63%	28
5	Houston, TX	5.920	6.906	6.997	1.33%	30	-0.13%	65
6	Washington, DC-VA-MD-WV	5.636	6.200	6.250	0.81%	51	-0.49%	93
7	Miami, FL	5.565	6.150	6.199	0.80%	52	-0.95%	102
8	Philadelphia, PA-NJ-DE-MD	5.965	6.078	6.096	0.29%	73	-0.20%	73
9	Atlanta, GA	5.287	5.874	5.950	1.29%	31	0.44%	38
10	Boston, MA-NH	4.552	4.845	4.875	0.64%	58	-0.45%	86
11	Phoenix, AZ	4.193	4.762	4.858	2.02%	10	1.31%	11
12	San Francisco, CA	4.335	4.711	4.729	0.40%	68	-0.52%	94
13	Riverside-San Bernardino, CA	4.225	4.570	4.622	1.14%	34	0.45%	37
14	Detroit, MI	4.296	4.322	4.326	0.11%	82	-0.34%	79
15	Seattle, WA	3.440	3.884	3.939	1.41%	27	0.20%	46
16	Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI	3.349	3.593	3.629	1.02%	40	0.21%	45
17	San Diego, CA	3.095	3.325	3.343	0.54%	64	-0.33%	77
18	Tampa-St. Petersburg, FL	2.783	3.091	3.143	1.66%	19	1.13%	15
19	Denver, CO	2.543	2.893	2.932	1.36%	29	0.59%	30
20	St. Louis,, MO-IL	2.788	2.806	2.805	-0.01%	92	-0.34%	80
21	Baltimore, MD	2.710	2.799	2.803	0.15%	80	-0.33%	78
22	Orlando, FL	2.134	2.513	2.573	2.39%	5	0.68%	27
23	Charlotte, NC-SC	2.217	2.525	2.569	1.76%	17	1.03%	17
24	San Antonio, TX	2.143	2.474	2.518	1.77%	16	0.92%	18
25	Portland, OR-WA	2.226	2.456	2.479	0.91%	43	0.27%	43
26	Sacramento, CA	2.149	2.320	2.345	1.07%	38	0.45%	36
27	Pittsburgh, PA	2.356	2.330	2.325	-0.24%	103	-0.18%	72
28	Las Vegas, NV	1.951	2.183	2.232	2.21%	6	1.62%	6
29	Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN	2.115	2.180	2.190	0.47%	65	0.03%	57
30	Austin, TX	1.716	2.115	2.168	2.51%	4	1.39%	8
31	Kansas City, MO-KS	2.009	2.127	2.144	0.77%	55	0.24%	44
32	Columbus, OH	1.902	2.082	2.107	1.16%	33	0.32%	42
33	Cleveland, OH	2.077	2.059	2.057	-0.07%	98	-0.36%	81
34	Indianapolis. IN	1.888	2.027	2.049	1.08%	36	0.41%	39
35	San Jose, CA	1.837	1.994	1.999	0.28%	74	-1.19%	105
36	Nashville, TN	1.671	1.901	1.931	1.60%	21	0.86%	19
37	Virginia Beach-Norfolk, VA-NC	1.677	1.725	1.729	0.22%	77	-0.31%	76
38	Providence, RI-MA	1.601	1.617	1.621	0.26%	75	-0.08%	63
39	Milwaukee,WI	1.556	1.575	1.576	0.06%	84	-0.52%	95
40	Jacksonville, FL	1.346	1.505	1.535	1.98%	12	1.33%	9
41	Oklahoma City, OK	1.253	1.383	1.396	0.95%	41	0.35%	41
42	Raleigh, NC	1.130	1.334	1.363	2.11%	7	1.18%	12
43	Memphis, TN-MS-AR	1.325	1.348	1.351	0.23%	76	-0.29%	75
44	Richmond, VA	1.208	1.293	1.306	1.03%	39	0.48%	33
45	Louisville, KY-IN	1.236	1.293	1.297	0.35%	71	-0.08%	62
46	New Orleans. LA	1.190	1.270	1.270	-0.01%	90	-0.43%	85
47	Salt Lake City, UT	1.088	1.205	1.223	1.44%	26	0.01%	58
48	Hartford, CT	1.212	1.207	1.206	-0.03%	95	-0.60%	96
49	Birmingham, AL	1.128	1.150	1.152	0.18%	79	-0.01%	60
50	Buffalo, NY	1.136	1.130	1.130	0.04%	86	-0.17%	71
51	Rochester, NY	1.080	1.072	1.071	-0.05%	96	-0.39%	82
52	Grand Rapids, MI	0.989	1.060	1.069	0.86%	48	0.16%	49
53	Tucson, AZ	0.980	1.028	1.039	1.13%	35	0.78%	22
54	Fresno, CA	0.930	0.987	0.994	0.80%	53	-0.10%	64
55	Tulsa, OK	0.937	0.992	0.994	0.22%	78	-0.23%	74
56	Honolulu, HI	0.953	0.986	0.980	-0.64%	106	-1.32%	106
57	Worcester, MA-CT	0.917	0.942	0.948	0.59%	60	-0.15%	69
58	Bridgeport-Stamford, CT	0.917	0.943	0.944	0.04%	87	-0.76%	99
59	Omaha, NE-IA	0.865	0.932	0.942	1.07%	37	0.18%	47
60	Albuquerque, NM	0.887	0.913	0.916	0.33%	72	0.03%	56
61	Greenville, SC	0.824	0.895	0.907	1.25%	32	0.84%	20
62	Bakersfield, CA	0.840	0.889	0.897	0.87%	46	-0.04%	61
63	Knoxville, TN	0.838	0.876	0.883	0.86%	47	0.80%	21
64	Albany, NY	0.871	0.882	0.883	0.12%	81	-0.13%	66
65	McAllen, TX	0.775	0.858	0.866	0.89%	45	-0.41%	84
66	New Haven CT	0.862	0.858	0.858	-0.02%	93	-0.60%	97
67	Oxnard, CA	0.823	0.851	0.851	0.02%	88	-0.47%	91
68	El Paso, TX	0.804	0.845	0.846	0.05%	85	-0.96%	103
69	Allentown, PA-NJ	0.821	0.838	0.843	0.58%	62	0.08%	52
70	Columbia, SC	0.768	0.825	0.833	0.92%	42	0.49%	32
71	Baton Rouge, LA	0.802	0.831	0.831	0.02%	89	-0.47%	90
72	Sarasota, FL	0.702	0.805	0.822	2.04%	9	2.15%	3
73	Dayton, OH	0.799	0.804	0.807	0.35%	70	0.07%	53
74	Charleston, SC	0.665	0.775	0.788	1.62%	20	1.14%	14
75	Greensboro, NC	0.724	0.763	0.768	0.55%	63	0.11%	50
76	Cape Coral, FL	0.619	0.740	0.755	2.04%	8	1.64%	5
77	Stockton, CA	0.685	0.743	0.753	1.37%	28	0.60%	29
78	Little Rock, AR	0.700	0.738	0.741	0.42%	67	0.00%	59
79	Colorado Springs, CO	0.646	0.725	0.739	1.86%	13	1.14%	13
80	Boise, ID	0.617	0.710	0.730	2.87%	2	2.23%	2
81	Lakeland, FL	0.602	0.686	0.708	3.23%	1	2.44%	1
82	Akron, OH	0.703	0.704	0.705	0.07%	83	-0.15%	68
83	Ogden, UT	0.597	0.665	0.675	1.58%	23	0.46%	35
84	Winston-Salem, NC	0.641	0.667	0.671	0.71%	56	0.48%	34
85	Madison, WI	0.605	0.655	0.660	0.89%	44	0.17%	48
86	Daytona Beach, FL	0.590	0.648	0.660	1.77%	15	1.84%	4
87	Des Moines, IA	0.570	0.645	0.655	1.60%	22	0.72%	24
88	Syracuse, NY	0.663	0.651	0.651	-0.08%	99	-0.46%	87
89	Wichita, KS	0.631	0.645	0.645	-0.01%	91	-0.47%	88
90	Provo, UT	0.527	0.618	0.634	2.59%	3	0.78%	23
91	Springfield, MA	0.622	0.630	0.632	0.36%	69	-0.47%	89
92	Augusta, GA-SC	0.565	0.600	0.604	0.69%	57	0.36%	40
93	Toledo, OH	0.610	0.604	0.603	-0.16%	101	-0.47%	92
94	Melbourne, FL	0.543	0.588	0.597	1.46%	25	1.52%	7
95	Jackson, MS	0.567	0.582	0.580	-0.24%	104	-0.62%	98
96	Durham, NC	0.504	0.566	0.575	1.57%	24	0.72%	25
97	Harrisburg, PA	0.549	0.571	0.575	0.62%	59	0.10%	51
98	Spokane, WA	0.528	0.564	0.573	1.69%	18	1.31%	10
99	Chattanooga, TN-GA	0.528	0.556	0.561	0.85%	49	0.71%	26
100	Scranton, PA	0.564	0.556	0.555	-0.03%	94	-0.14%	67
101	Modesto, CA	0.514	0.545	0.550	0.83%	50	0.07%	54
102	Fayetteville, AR-MO	0.463	0.538	0.549	1.99%	11	1.07%	16
103	Lancaster, PA	0.519	0.541	0.544	0.46%	66	-0.17%	70
104	Youngstown, OH-PA	0.566	0.542	0.539	-0.54%	105	-0.40%	83
105	Portland, ME	0.514	0.532	0.535	0.59%	61	0.54%	31
106	Lexington, KY	0.472	0.513	0.517	0.77%	54	0.05%	55
Derived from US Census Bureau Population Estimates

Photo: Los Angeles: losing population (by author)

Clippers Offer A Better Model For SoCal Than The Lakers

Joel Kotkin — Mon, 15 Apr 2019 01:32:03 -0400

This year’s basketball season, with the collapse of the Lakers and the surprising rise of the Clippers, poses a metaphor for the region. On the one hand, there’s the Laker obsession with the “star system” and impressing outsiders, notably on the East Coast. The Clipper model, reflecting a culture of hard work and teamwork, relies not only on celebrity but the raising of often obscure people into prominence.

Southern California has long exhibited these two narratives. When operating together, as it did at least till the 1990s, the Los Angeles region functioned as both a cultural hub and a place meeting the aspirations for the millions who flocked here. Even as the area was becoming a fashion and entertainment powerhouse, it also became the nation’s largest industrial area, with a powerful aerospace industry. We built mansions for the A-list stories but also lots of affordable single-family housing. A massive investment in prosaic things such as roads, water systems and affordable electricity made it all possible.

Today this approach is seen widely in growing regions like Houston, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Charlotte, Salt Lake and Nashville, which are growing both in the center city and their periphery. In contrast, the recent L.A. narrative has become dominated by the star system, the emphasis on celebrity culture as well as the desire to duplicate superstar city New York. Great emphasis, for example, is put on the transformation of our long-doughty downtown into a gleaming mass of new high-rise residential towers, casting shade on the massive encampments of poor and homeless people.

Largely left out of the discussion has been the other L.A., which the vast majority inhabit, a city of small industries, neighborhoods, backyard barbecues and church communities. These grassroots forces remain under constant assault, as regulations, taxes and costs force more of the working middle class, and their jobs, out of the region.

Learning from the Clippers

In the past decade the Los Angeles Lakers have followed the star-first approach, building teams around narcissistic aging superstars, first Kobe Bryant and this year LeBron James. The problem is that aging stars decline, and get injured. They also encourage a “win now” strategy, placing less emphasis on the development of home-grown talent, and finding underappreciated players. This has now failed to land the Lakers into the playoffs, not to mention contenders against the historically great Warriors team.

The Clippers present a very different, but more inspiring story. Bought by Microsoft’s Steve Ballmer from the miserable Donald Sterling in 2014, the Clippers have been quietly building something every successful team, and region, needs , a sense of esprit de corps. They have taken players cast off or undervalued elsewhere — Lou Williams, Landry Shamet, Danilo Gallinari, Montrezl Harrel, Patrick Beverley — and molded a cohesive, competitive team.

Under coach Doc Rivers, general manager Lawrence Frank and the true L.A. genius (via West Virginia) Jerry West, the Clippers now seems a greater destination for free agents, like Kawhi Leonard, than the LeBron-led Lakers, marked by division and dysfunction, as indicated by Magic Johnson’s recent resignation as team president.

Implications for southern California

Political prisoners of the star system such as Mayor Eric Garcetti are always focused on hyperbole, making the case L.A. needs to be “the greenest big city” in America, and embracing the notion of L.A. as “the next great transit city.” This strategy may have worked for contractors and some developers but has not for many Angelenos, according to a recent UCLA study, with roughly half of all people under 30 and residents of central L.A. expressing negative feelings about the area.

Certainly the transit gambit has been disappointing; despite spending $20 billion building subways and light rail, transit has lost market share and riders since before the first line opened in 1990. Similarly, downtown suffers a high vacancy rate, and an impending glut of high-cost units. Most important, our region has been losing jobs that pay more than $75,000 annually for a decade, while suffering the highest levels of housing over-crowding , the lowest homeownership rates and the second largest concentration of homeless in the nation.

Clippers offer hope

A great city, or region, like a great basketball team, must be built around not one or two players, but the entire lineup. L.A. may have the Olympics, Hollywood and LeBron, but its largely blue-collar residents need industrial, middle-management service and construction jobs more than celebrity photo-ops. Building Hong Kong-like high-rises to appeal to foreign buyers may enrich some investors, but building middle-class housing, whether in single-family or moderate-density townhouses, should be the priority.

Like the Clippers, Los Angeles needs to blend many differing talents that grow from our diverse neighborhoods.

Rather than follow the Lakers’ star system, let’s embrace the Clippers bottom-up approach, a commitment to patient team-building. This not just because they have performed better, but because they demonstrate how even the most troubled teams can be turned around, and creating the basis for a potential champion in the next few years.

This piece originally appeared in The Orange County Register.

Joel Kotkin is the Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures at Chapman University, director of the Chapman Center for Demographics and Policy and executive director of the Center for Opportunity Urbanism in Houston, Texas. He is author of eight books and co-editor of the recently released Infinite Suburbia. He also serves as executive director of the widely read website www.newgeography.com and is a regular contributor to Forbes.com, Real Clear Politics, the Daily Beast, City Journal and Southern California News Group.

Photo Credit: Der-wuppertaler [CC BY-SA 3.0], via Wikimedia Commons

Los Angeles Rail: Ridership Decline Estimated at 42 Percent

Wendell Cox — Wed, 13 Mar 2019 01:33:38 -0400

The Reason Foundation has just published an important review of transit in Los Angeles County, by transportation consultant Thomas A. Rubin and University of Southern California Professor James E. Moore II. A total of four reports have been released, under the title A Critical Review of Los Angeles Metro’s 28 by 2028 Plan. Links are provided at the end of this article. More reports are to follow.

Rubin, former Chief Financial Officer at the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD) and founder of the Deloitte transportation practice, and Professor Moore have published extensively on transportation issues, and in particular, on developments in Los Angeles.

Background on the Rail and Busway System

Four decades ago (1980), Los Angeles County embarked on a huge rail transit development program, when the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC) adopted Proposition A, which was enacted by the voters and took effect after successfully defending a California state Supreme Court challenge (Note). As a board member of LACTC, I was pleased to have drafted and introduced the amendment that created the rail funding set aside in Proposition A, out of a belief that such a system would alleviate traffic congestion in Los Angeles. Experience has proven otherwise, as traffic delays per commuter have risen 60 percent since the early 1980s, according to the Texas A&M Transportation Institute Annual Mobility Report.

Financial Assessment

Rubin and Moore demonstrate that building the rail (and fixed busway) system has cost considerably more than anticipated while the revenue from the multiple sales taxes passed by voters has fallen short of projections. Nearly $20 billion (not inflation adjusted) was spent on construction through 2016.

The net effect has been multiple and highly regressive sales tax increases, starting with the original 0.5 percent from Proposition A, and now with three more sales taxes approved (for a gross rate of 2.0 per cent). Yet, much of the proposed 1980 Proposition A system has not been completed. Proposition A fall far short of funding the 11 planned lines, fully funding only the Blue Line (Los Angeles to Long Beach light rail), and parts of the Red Line (downtown to North Hollywood subway), Purple Line (Wilshire-Vermont to Wilshire-Western subway), and the Green Line (I-105 Corridor). These lines were completed from subsequent tax increases.

Additional lines have been funded from the subsequent taxes, such as the Orange Line (San Fernando Valley busway), the Expo Line (downtown to Santa Monica), and the two Gold Line legs (downtown to Atlantic Blvd and downtown to Glendora). Other lines are under construction, such as a costly transit tunnel under Sepulveda Pass, the route of I-405.

Ruben and Moore conclude that: “Metro has a history of over-promising and then failing to deliver on such projects, ultimately making conditions worse for Los Angeles transit users.”

Ridership the History

Obviously, the success of any transit program depends on the extent to which more customers use the system. Los Angeles had an enviable record in that regard in the decade before the adoption of Proposition A, and until 1985. Between 1970 and 1980, one-sixth of all new transit ridership in the nation was on the Los Angeles SCRTD bus system.

Rubin and Moore show that SCRTD ridership increased by more than 125 percent, from 218 million ridership in 1974 to 497 million in 1985 (Reports 1 and 2, below). This was accomplished by programs that lowered transit fares, and substantially increased service on what was, at that time, exclusively a bus system. There has probably never been such a large percentage increase in transit ridership for such a large transit system in modern US history.

Nearly two-thirds of the increase occurred between 1974 and 1980, when there was only modest tax support, at least in context to today. Between 1970 and 1980, there was federal funding as well as a ¼ cent sales tax, which was followed by three years of the first 0.5 percent sales tax.

Of course, I and others who supported the rail program anticipated that ridership increases would continue with the addition of rail (that’s of course, what the “experts” said would happen).

Driving Down Ridership with Rail

Finally, and most astoundingly, ridership, measured by “boardings,” has fallen as more rail has been opened (see below).

After the 1985 peak, fares were raised (1986), boardings dropped by nearly 10 percent, to 450 million. The higher fares eventually led to a further boardings decline of 20 percent decline, to decline of nearly 20 percent, to 362 million in 1995. By 2007, boardings had increased to nearly the 1985 level, but by 2019 had fallen back to 390 million, 21 percent short of the peak all-bus level.

Transit Customer Decline: 42 Percent (or More)

However, even that 21 percent ridership decline is optimistic. Rubin and Moore estimate that there has been an actual decrease in customers that is twice as much, 42 percent. This is because of the way transit ridership is reported. Passengers are counted each time they board a vehicle (boardings). Thus, if, for example, a passenger transfers from one bus to another traveling from home to work, the number of boardings is two, rather than one. Each transit vehicle, bus or rail, counts as a boarding. Some trips require the use of three or more transit vehicles.

Generally, the addition of a rail system tends to increase the number of transfers. This is because transit agencies, including SCRTD/Metro reorient their services so that bus riders are often forced to transfer to rail lines to complete their trips. The 42 percent reduction rate is based on the change in transfer rates from the early 1990s to 2004. During that time, the transfers per trip doubled. However, rail service has been expanded since 2004, and, as a result it’s likely the transfer rate has increased. This would suggest that the number of customers may be even lower than Ruben and Moore have estimated based on the latest, but stale data.

Regrettably, LACMTA no longer reports transfer data. This means that policy makers have no information on the number of customers using the system and how that has changed to the present.

Prospects for the Future

The four reports set the foundation for an evaluation of an Metro’s program, entitled “28 by 2028” program, which would complete 28 major projects by the 2028 summer Olympics, which will be held in Los Angeles. Ruben and Moore conclude that Metro has attempted to “accomplish too much too fast” and suggest a “high likelihood of making transit in Los Angeles County worse for transit riders and other users of the local surface transportation system.” They further suggest that the “implications are worst for the most vulnerable group: the very large number of low-income and otherwise disadvantaged residents who are strongly dependent on public transit in their daily lives.”

Links to the four reports are below.

1. Introduction, Overview, and the Birth of Transit in Los Angeles
2. The Rise of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro)
3. Metro’s Transit Ridership Is Declining
4. Metro’s Long Range Plans Overpromise and Underdeliver

Note: LACTC and SCRTD merged in 1993, creating Metro (the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority).

Photo: Los Angeles MTA Building Credit: Dave Parker [CC BY 3.0], via Wikimedia Commons

Gentrification in Los Angeles

Marshall Toplansky - Karla Lopez del Rio - Ken Murphy — Thu, 31 Jan 2019 00:33:38 -0500

What role does gentrification play in Los Angeles? In their essay, "Gentrification in Los Angeles", Marshall Toplansky, Karla López del Río and Ken Murphy examine how gentrification has impacted the polycentric and dispersed city. Their piece is part of the latest report from the Center for Opportunity Urbanism, Beyond Gentrification: Towards More Equitable Growth, which explores how unbalanced urban growth has exacerbated class divisions, particularly in the urban centers of our largest's metropolitan areas. To read or download the full report click here.

Read an excerpt of their piece below.

Like Chicago, Los Angeles represents a distinct face of American urbanity. It has led the way toward the polycentric and dispersed form that now characterizes virtually all major metropolitan areas. Unlike traditional, monocentric cities, Los Angeles accommodated growth by expanding outwards. Only in recent years has LA experienced gentrification of its older, urban core.

The process of gentrification — repairing or rebuilding homes and businesses in a deteriorating neighborhood, accompanied by an influx of the middle-class or affluent — often results in the displacement of earlier, usually poorer residents. One criterion used to quantify gentrification is the movement of people from the 40th percentile (or below) of income to the 60th percentile (or above), a metric recommended by Governing Magazine.

The Trajectory of LA Gentrification

Los Angeles has a lack of access to affordable housing, goods, and services in low-income neighborhoods that is arguably worse than in the early 90s, the time of the riots. Many in the area, according to surveys, feel a repeat is entirely possible, if not inevitable. Since 1990, only a handful of LA neighborhoods have experienced gentrification. Within the Los Angeles-Anaheim Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), they represent between 1% and 2% of all census tracts.

Gentrification started later in LA than it did in Chicago or New York. Spurred by the city’s 1999 Adaptive Reuse Ordinance, massive investment accelerated in the long neglected core. Affected sectors included housing and transportation (notably the subway and light rail lines). In addition, the library was restored, the convention center was improved, and the Staples Center, which cost city taxpayers an estimated $71.1 million, was built.

Read the full report here (PDF).

Marshall Toplansky is Clinical Assistant Professor of Management Science at Chapman University’s Argyros School of Business and Economics, and Research Fellow at the university’s C. Larry Hoag Center for Real Estate. He is also Senior Advisor of The Cicero Group, based in Salt Lake City, Utah. A pioneer in the use of big data and sentiment analysis, Marshall is formerly Managing Director at KPMG, and co-founder of the firm’s Lighthouse Center of Excellence for Data & Analytics.

Karla López del Río is a community development executive committed to supporting low- and moderate-income families build wealth and thriving communities. Her work fosters public-private-grassroots partnerships resulting in innovative community-led projects, affordable housing solutions, homeownership opportunities, and small business development across Southern California. Karla contributes to the field her insight as a first-generation immigrant, a background in real estate, experience in social enterprise management, as well as a Bachelor’s in Development from the University of California, Berkeley. She has received awards from UC Berkeley’s Blum Center for Developing Economies and NeighborWorks America in the categories of poverty alleviation and community building.

Kenneth E. Murphy is the associate provost responsible for leading the academic operations of Chapman University. He is a leader in implementing business analytics at the University with the goal of applying data driven decision-making to academic, business and social challenges. He is the business leader of the university-wide business intelligence project, “Panther Analytics”, as well as a visionary for process improvement and technology implementation projects in academic operations. Additional duties include managing learning and office spaces, hiring of lecturers, scheduling of classes and allocating other academic resources to advance Chapman’s mission of delivering a personalized education of distinction.

Photo: In Santa Ana, makeshift rooms between single-family homes for construction workers that are not able to find affordable rooms for rent. Credit: Julie Leopo

Gentrification Is Failing in Los Angeles

Joel Kotkin and Marshall Toplansky — Tue, 29 Jan 2019 00:33:38 -0500

If Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti runs for president, he will no doubt point to the high-rises that have transformed downtown L.A. into something of a hipster haven. He could also point to fevered dense development, both planned and already in process, spreading across the Los Angeles basin, particularly near transit stops, as well as an increasingly notable art scene.

Yet for all the changes in the city, have things improved for most Angelenos? Sadly, the answer is no. For all the speculative capital pouring into the city from China and elsewhere, the L.A. area suffers the highest levels of crowding, the greatest levels of poverty, the least affordable housing, the lowest homeownership rates and the second-largest concentration of homeless in the nation.

In many ways this reflects national trends, where, despite gentrification efforts, the number of poor districts in cities has continued to rise. And there are signs, in the most recent census numbers, that the “back to the city” trend has slowed considerably, including among millennials.

Gentrification is a function of real estate speculation

Compared to other more traditional cities, such as New York or Chicago, multi-polar L.A.’s gentrification reflects less organic development than massive real estate speculation, supported by public dollars and policy. In a new report on gentrification nationwide co-authored with Karla Lopez del Rio and Chapman University researcher Kenneth Murphy, released by the Center for Opportunity Urbanism, barely 1 percent of the city of Los Angeles has gentrified, mostly around downtown.

L.A. gentrification has been driven by changes in zoning, public infrastructure including the rail system, laws promoting density and support for facilities such as the Convention Center as well as Staples Center. The city has lured large developers in some key areas, including Hollywood. The L.A. area ranked as the No. 1 choice in North America in a survey of global commercial real estate investors, who had a combined total of $1.7 trillion to spend on property in 2017.

Yet this investment has not created the kind of job growth we see in Chicago’s Loop, Manhattan or San Francisco. There may be more life and housing in downtown, but downtown’s share of total employment so far has not grown since 2010.

Good for a few, not for many

Neither downtown revitalization nor policies to boost density have made the city richer. New sports stadia have created many lower-wage jobs, but overall L.A. has lost jobs that pay more than $75,000 annually over the past decade. It may have enriched some luxury high-rise developers, but gentrification has not improved life for most. From 2000-12, median rents increased by 25 percent in L.A. County while income declined 9 percent.

It’s dubious there’s anything like a sustainable demand for expensive residences in downtown. Some landlords of luxury apartments offer free parking and periods of free rent. Savvy Chinese real estate website Mingtiandi is warning investors that DTLA is heading for “an imminent glut of luxury condos, amid a wave of up to 30,000 new residential units to hit the city’s market over the next three years.”

Other city-sanctioned high-density developments have had unintended results. Efforts to densify areas around transit stops have boosted prices and rents, but have replaced mostly poor transit riders, who are now compelled to purchase cars, with affluent residents who already drive, notes a recent University of California study.

The politics of gentrification

Perhaps the most controversial impact of gentrification lies with rising rents. This has sparked a grassroots rebellion in the Crenshaw district, Chinatown, south Los Angeles, and, most especially, east Los Angeles. In 2015, a real estate firm littered downtown L.A.’s Arts District with a “Why Rent Downtown When You Could Own in Boyle Heights?” flyer. Realtors promoted a bike tour through the “charming, historic, walkable and bikeable neighborhood.” After the realtor received messages such as “Stay outta my hood” and “I hope your 60-minute bike ride is a total disaster,” the event was canceled.

There is widespread concern about changes in local zoning ordinances, notes Koreatown attorney Grace Yoo, all for developers who built housing out of reach for local residents. Nor is this policy helping to keep L.A.’s beleaguered middle class. Nearly one in five LA census tracts have seen drops in home ownership since 2010, and the city continues to suffer mounting rates of out-migration. Nice restaurants, entertainment and sports venues may be considered cool, and win the plaudits of urban taste-makers, but can’t substitute for affordable housing, higher-wage jobs and better schools, the proven ways of making life better for residents.

If Garcetti wants to make a case for L.A.’s future, not to mention his, he needs to refocus urban policy away from real estate speculation and gentrification to one that serves the need of most middle- and working-class Angelenos. Ultimately the health of a city is not how many restaurants or high-rise towers are built, or how generously developers fill the coffers of accommodating politicians, but how the city serves as an incubator of social mobility.

This piece originally appeared on The Orange County Register.

Marshall Toplansky is Clinical Assistant Professor of Management Science at Chapman University. He is co-principal investigator, with Joel Kotkin on “The Orange County Model”, a demographic and econometric research project to identify growth strategies for that region. He is formerly Managing Director of KPMG’s national center of excellence in data and analytics, and is co-founder of Wise Window, a pioneer in sentiment analysis and the use of big data for predictive models. He lives in Orange, California.

Photo: Camiloarenivar [CC BY-SA 4.0], from Wikimedia Commons