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In 1995, seeking to streamline mortgage processing, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and a group of banks came together to create a new company to register and assign mortgages. The company, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), served as a way for mortgage originators to quickly process new mortgages, centralizing files and cutting down on the need to deal with local government record keepers. With banks increasingly focused on bundling, securitizing, and selling off mortgages they had originated, MERS was designed to move mortgages more rapidly off their hands and into the booming mortgage-backed securities market. The goal of the process, as stated by MERS, was to simplify “the way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked” while also eliminating “the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential and commercial mortgage loans.”

The business model proved wildly successful. According to the New York Times MERS now “claims to hold title to roughly half of all the home mortgages in the nation — an astonishing 60 million loans.” However, as the system boomed in an era of rampant mortgage speculation and securitization, criticism arose. Detractors, such as Professor Christopher L. Peterson of the University of Utah School of Law, argue that MERS is based on a “problematic legal doctrine,” and that by “adopting such a radical shift in how mortgages are recorded and foreclosed, without legislative change, the mortgage finance companies have rebuilt their industry on a legal foundation of sand.” According to Peterson,

“The shift away from recording loans in the name of actual mortgagees and assignees represents an important policy change that erodes not only the tax base of local governments, but also the usefulness of the public land title information infrastructure. MERS did not, by itself, cause the mortgage finance crisis and its ensuing aftermath. But it was an important cog in the machine that churned out the millions of unsuitable, poorly underwritten, and incompletely documented mortgages that were destined for foreclosure.”

As foreclosure rates have risen, so have legal challenges to the role of MERS in the process. Such cases have, among other issues, questioned the right of MERS to act as the “mortgagee of record,” and to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Results have been mixed. Judges in California, Massachusetts, and Kansas have ruled that MERS “has the authority to initiate home foreclosure proceedings.” MERS itself points to rulings in several other states that it claims show it stands on solid legal ground. However, courts in New York, Florida and Oregon have ruled otherwise, with multiple rulings in Oregon throwing a wrench into the foreclosure market in the state. MERS, in an apparent attempt to clear up issues of standing in foreclosure proceedings,recently began encouraging its members to stop making foreclosures in its name, and is now proposing new rules to curtail the practice.

Some local governments are also exploring potential legal and legislative investigatory proceedings against MERS, upset at the banking industry’s use of MERS to avoid paying local recording fees for mortgages. Given the dire state of state and local budgets, and the unpopularity of the financial industry, it bears watching to see if more local governments follow their lead in an attempt to recoup a source of funding that was previously theirs. MERS and its financial industry backers appear to be girding themselves for coming legislative battles, launching "an aggressive campaign on Capitol Hill to bolster the legality of the way companies have turned mortgages into securities." With housing markets already on shaky ground, and talk of a double dip in prices beginning to surface, the uncertain future of MERS and the mortgages it holds is yet more potentially bad news for areas struggling to recover from the housing bust.

Data is now available for 20 of the nation’s 52 metropolitan areas with more than 1,000,000 population. The early results indicate a pattern of accelerating dispersion of the population to the suburbs as is indicated in the table below. Thus far, historic core municipality growth has been approximately one-half the 1990s rate. During the 2000s, the historic cores have accounted for 8.8 percent of metropolitan growth, down nearly one-half from the 1990s rate.

Results just announced for the 2010 Census show that the Kansas City metropolitan area grew 10.8 percent from 2010, from 1,836,000 to 2,035,000 persons. As in all of the major metropolitan areas (over 1,000,000 population) for which data has been reported, the bulk of the growth was in the suburbs, rather than in the historical core municipality (Kansas City).

The suburbs captured 91 percent of the metropolitan area growth, with a growth rate of 13.0 percent. Nearly one-half of the metropolitan area growth was in Johnson County, Kansas. The Kansas City metropolitan area is unusual among bi-state metropolitan areas, because the population is relatively evenly split between Missouri (location of the historical core municipality) and Kansas, with 58 percent in Missouri and 42 percent in Kansas.

The historical core municipality of Kansas City gained 4.1 percent, from 442,000 to 460,000. Based upon the 2009 Census estimates, this population was approximately 24,000 lower than expected. The 2010 population remains below the 1970 peak of 507,000 and is only marginally above the 1950 figure (457,000). However, in 1950, the density of the city was substantially higher, contained in a land area of 81 square miles. Kansas City now covers nearly four times as much land area, at 314 square miles. A large portion of Kansas City is actually rural and thus outside the urban area (See 2000 urban area map). This open land provides the city of Kansas City with greenfield land for new suburban development. The suburban development within Kansas City, however, has been substantially less than in other suburban areas of the metropolitan area.

Kansas City, Kansas, which was also developed around a pre-World War II core, had a population decline from 147,000 to 146,000.

The continuing dispersion of the Kansas City metropolitan area is indicated by the employment trends from 2001 to 2010 (June). Employment was down 22,000 in the metropolitan area. However, employment was down 42,000 in Jackson County, which includes the urban core of the region (the non-suburban portion of Kansas City). All employment growth has been in the suburbs (20,000).

Population data from the 2010 Census has been made available for Richmond and Virginia Beach- Norfolk. In both cases, the bulk of the population growth is in the suburbs.

Virginia Beach-Norfolk: The Virginia Beach-Norfolk metropolitan area grew from 1,576,000 in 2000 to 1,672,000 in 2010, a gain of 6.0 percent, which is a decline from 8.8 percent in the 1990s. The municipal core municipality of Norfolk gained from 234,000 to 243,000, an increase of 3.6 percent.

Suburban growth was 6.5 percent and the suburbs accounted for 91 percent of the population growth. The suburbs include Virginia Beach, which is largely a post-World War II suburban municipality. The metropolitan area is principally named for Virginia Beach because it is the largest municipality.

Richmond: The Richmond metropolitan area grew from 1,097,000 in 2000 to 1,258,000 in 2010, a gain of 14.7 percent. The historical core municipality of Richmond grew from 198,000 to 204,000, for an increase of 3.2 percent. Richmond remains below its population peak of 249,000, reached in 1970. In both the 2010 and 1970 censuses, Richmond’s land area was 60 square miles. In 1950, the population (237,000) was higher than in 2010, despite a land area of only 37 square miles.

The suburbs added 17.2 percent to their population and accounted for 96 percent of the metropolitan area growth.

The 2010 census data, just released, shows a strong trend toward dispersal in Delaware. The state’s largest county, New Castle, added eight percent to its population, rising from 500,000 to 538,000. All of that gain in the county was outside the city of Wilmington, which lost three percent of its population (from 73,000 to 71,000). Wilmington and New Castle County is a former metropolitan area that has been engulfed by the growth of the larger Philadelphia metropolitan area. Philadelphia has spread from its Pennsylvania base, with a large share of the metropolitan area now in New Jersey, along with New Castle County in Delaware and Cecil County in Maryland.

Delaware’s other two counties, both to the south of New Castle County, are growing rapidly as the population moves outside metropolitan areas. Kent County, with the state capital in Dover, gained 28 percent from 127,000 to 162,000. Southern most Sussex County added 26 percent to its population, rising from 157,000 to 197,000. Thus, much smaller Sussex County added more people than New Castle County, which began the decade of the 2000s with three times the population.