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Petrol a Green Fuel? The Volkswagen 261 Mile per Gallon Car

There have been reports for some years about the Volkswagen 1-litre car, so called because it would travel 100 kilometers on one litre of fuel. That is the equivalent of 235 miles per gallon. Earlier reports were that the car would be marketed by now.

Now Volkswagen indicates that the car will be produced "within the next few years." The car will be called the XL1. However, rather than being a 1 L car it will be a 0.9 L car, achieving 261 miles per gallon. The improvement is the result of adding an electric motor that will make the car a plug-in hybrid.

This is just further indication of reality that technological improvements can materially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, if the entire automobile fleet could obtain this fuel efficiency by 2050, greenhouse gas emissions from cars would be reduced more than 80 percent, despite substantial increases in driving. This development may mean that petroleum itself could emerge as a "green fuel."

Moreover, this advance is consistent with finding by McKinsey & Company and the Conference Board, in a report sponsored by the Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Shell, National Grid, DTE Energy and Honeywell that "....no change in thermostat settings or appliance use, no downsizing of vehicles, home or commercial space and traveling the same mileage” and no “shift to denser urban housing" would be necessary to achieve substantial greenhouse gas emission reductions in the United States.

Volkswagen L1 (2009) photo by RudolfSimon

A $53 Billion High-Speed Rail Program to Nowhere

Vice President Joe Biden announced today a plan to spend $53 billion over the next six years on passenger high-speed rail projects that will help reach the goal of giving 80 percent of Americans access to high-speed rail within 25 years. According to the announcement, the proposal will place high-speed rail "on equal footing with other surface transportation programs." The initiative includes $8 billion in the President’s FY 2012 budget proposal, of which $4 billion will be focused on building new infrastructure and $4 billion will be dedicated to system preservation and renewal. The announcement makes no mention how the plan will be paid for.

Congressional reaction to the announcement was immediate. House Transportation Committee Chairman John Mica (R-FL) and Railroads Subcommittee Chairman Bill Shuster (R-PA) issued a press release expressing "extreme reservations" regarding the Administration’s plan. Several congressional sources we reached for comment pronounced the Administration initiative "dead on arrival."

"What the Administration touted as high-speed rail ended up as embarrassing snail-speed trains to nowhere," Mica said. "Rather than focusing on the Northeast Corridor, the most congested corridor in the nation...the Administration continues to squander limited taxpayer dollars on marginal projects," Mica added. "This is like giving Bernie Madoff another chance at handling your investment portfolio."

Rep. Shuster was equally critical. "The Administration continues to fail in attracting private investment, capital and the experience to properly develop and cost-effectively operate true high-speed rail," he said. "Government won’t develop American high-speed rail. Private investment and a competitive market will." Shuster was also critical of the manner in which the Administration has administered the program. "Selecting routes behind closed doors runs counter to the Administration’s pledges of transparency. ... High-speed rail funding could become another political grab bag for the President. ...If the Obama Administration is serious about high-speed rail, they should stop throwing money at projects in the same failed manner."

The strong condemnation by two leading congressional transportation spokesmen poses a serious obstacle for the Administration’s proposal on Capitol Hill. They are not alone. House leadership has called for cancelling the high-speed rail program as part of its deficit reduction plan.

Opposition from governors and state legislatures adds another hurdle to the Administration’s plan. Without state support high-speed rail projects cannot go forward. But, as we have seen, the governors of Wisconsin and Ohio have declined to participate in the Administration’s HSR programs. Other governors, concerned about potential operating subsidies, open-ended risk of construction overruns or unable to raise the required matching funds, may do likewise.

Florida’s Gov. Scott, in introducing his budget proposal on February 7, offered a hint about his thinking, that makes HSR boosters uneasy. "Over the last few years,’ the Governor said, "Florida accepted one-time hand-outs from th federal government. Those temporary resources allowed state and local governments to spend beyond their means. There was never any reason to think that Florida taxpayers could afford to continue that higher level of spending once the federal hand-outs are gone. The false expectations created by the federal hand-outs are the reason we hear about a multi-billion dollar deficit." The words "high-speed rail" and  "operating subsidies" were not mentioned, but the implication was clear.

Several other high-speed rail projects are in danger of collapse because of stringent conditions demanded by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)— conditions that the host railroads find unacceptable. As reported by the respected railroad observer Fred Frailey, high-speed rail projects in Washington State, North Carolina and Virginia, totaling $1.4 billion in HSR grants, are in jeopardy because the service agreements negotiated by the states with Class 1 railroads have been rejected by the FRA as not strict enough. At the core in each case is the railroads’ insistence that passenger train operations must not interfere with freight operations and their refusal to accept penalties for potential delays suffered by passenger trains.

If these projects fall through, there will be little to show for the $10.5 billion HSR program other than a 48-minute reduction in travel time between Chicago and St. Louis as a result of an ongoing project with Union Pacific (see, "The Uncertain Future of the High-Speed Rail Prgram," InnoBrief, January 5, 2001). It is revealing that the only example the White House announcement chose to highlight  was a $38 million program of track improvements between Portland and Brunswick, ME to permit a 30-mile extension of the five Downeaster round trips to and from Boston at slightly increased speeds, as Frailey pointed out.

Given this meager progress, given more than ample evidence of congressional and state-level opposition, and with so many, much more deserving infrastructure needs awaiting federal support (incl. rail in the Northeast Corridor), one wonders why the Administration has chosen to doggedly pursue its unrealistic vision of a nationwide high-speed rail network. We hope Congressmen Mica and Shuster will try to get some answers.

More Condescension Surrounds Los Angeles Stadium Plan

The head of the group pushing the Los Angeles plan for an NFL stadium, Anschutz Entertainment Group, doesn't understand why anyone would be suspicious of the finances behind his plans for a downtown football stadium. From the LAT:

"Almost every other community in the world would be throwing parades," Leiweke said.

Really? A power-hungry developer backed by a reclusive Denver billionaire comes along with a plan to tear down part of the city-owned-and-operated convention center and jam in a stadium without providing any specifics on how the deal would be structured - other than his promise that it won't cost taxpayers a dime - and he's wondering why so many people are skeptical?

"When the proposal gets there, everyone's going to take a deep breath and realize: There is zero risk to the taxpayer," Leiweke said. "This is people trying to scare people. And it's a shame."

More disinterested voices continue to point out that pro sports teams do little, if anything, to boost local economies - and that the job creation figures being bandied about for the downtown stadium are crazy high. From the LAT:

Villaraigosa said the stadium complex would create more than 22,000 jobs, an assertion that drew a laugh from Brad Humphreys, an economics professor at the University of Alberta, Canada, who has studied such facilities for years. "That's way outside the usual garbage that I read," he said. "The best estimate ... would be zero jobs created." Construction jobs, he explained, would be the most visible, but they would be short-term.

Humphreys and colleagues studied every city in North America that had built sports facilities in the last 40 years, "and we were unable to find any evidence that the local economy ever did any better," he said. What such developments tend to do is move existing money, and presumably jobs, around -- as, say, entertainment dollars that would have been spent in Westwood are spent instead downtown.

This piece originally appeared at Mark's LA Biz Observed blog.

The Real Answer to Houston's Traffic Congestion

The Houston Chronicle editorial board recently argued that light rail is key to combating Houston's traffic congestion problems. But if you look at the three cities with worse traffic congestion than Houston - DC, Chicago, and LA - they have much more transit, including tons of light rail in LA. Transit clearly hasn't solved the problem in these cities. These people aren't stuck in that traffic because they like it - it's because the transit doesn't go where they need to go or isn't timely. This is especially true with the rise of dispersed job centers in those cities where the trains don't go or don't provide good connectivity to the suburbs where people live.  Let's see, in Houston we have downtown (<7% of jobs), uptown/Galleria, the med center, Greenway, Greenspoint, the Energy Corridor, Ship Channel, and NASA - among others.  If that's not a dispersed set of job centers poorly suited to rail connectivity, then I don't know what is.

It's absurd to argue a light rail network focused inside the 610 Loop is going to do anything to relieve congestion or provide relief to commuters from the vast suburbs outside the loop.  The solution is not doubling down on our multi-billion dollar LRT network, but instead scaling it back (University line only, IMHO) and instead spending the funds on a radical increase in express bus commuter services connecting all suburbs to all job centers with frequent nonstop 60+ mph transit using high-speed HOV/HOT lanes.  Imagine driving to your local suburban transit center (which might just be a mall parking lot) and finding regular, frequent express buses (of all sizes) serving every major job center in Houston.  These buses could have amenities like wifi and laptop trays.  They might even be run by private operators (with subsidized fares) competing on routes, schedule, reliability, service, and amenities.  And after they get to the job center, they can circulate to get you right to your building - no long walks in heat, cold, or rain.  Finally, all of this is a single-seat service without annoying and time-consuming transfers from bus-to-rail or rail-to-bus (or even rail-to-rail).

It's a much more practical solution for a city like Houston, but one that requires innovating 'outside the box' as a transit agency rather than parroting the "more rail" mantra that every other transit agency in the country repeats endlessly.

For more details, see these two previous posts:

This post originally appeared at Houston Strategies.

Confirming International Research: Hudson Tunnel Costs Explode

Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey is looking like a prophet now. In late October, the Governor cancelled a new tunnel across the Hudson River between New Jersey and New York City, because of the potential for cost overruns, which would be the responsibility of New Jersey taxpayers. By that point, the cost of the tunnel had escalated at least $1 billion to $9.7 billion. The tunnel was to have doubled New Jersey Transit and Amtrak capacity into Penn Station from New Jersey.

Now Amtrak proposes to build the tunnel itself, a scaled down version of the previous tunnel. The new tunnel would increase capacity for New Jersey Transit and Amtrak trains by 65 percent.

However, the cost is not scaled down. For one-third less the capacity, initial estimates place the cost of the new tunnel at 40 percent more ($13.5 billion) than the already escalated cost of the cancelled tunnel.

Of course, it is likely that if planning and construction proceed, the cost of the tunnel could increase substantially beyond initial estimate. This virtual inevitability is indicated in international research by Oxford University professor Bengt Flyvbjerg and others.