NewGeography.com blogs

Running a little behind this week, so I just wanted to pass along this story from USA Today on domestic airports adding rail service. People love the service, of course, and many airports are doing it, but later in the article they get to the economic irrationality of it in America's decentralized car-centric cities (as opposed to Europe and Asia).

Still, airport-rail ridership in the USA is woefully low compared with other countries, says Andrew Sharp, director general of the U.K.-based International Air Rail Organisation. In many European and Asian airports, 20% to 30% of travelers get to and from the airport using rail. In the USA, ridership typically ranges from 2% to 5%, he says.

...

Ongoing debates

Like most large construction projects, airport rail proposals face stiff headwinds. Opponents challenge funding sources and new taxes and cite preferences for cars and buses. But the central argument in most debates has centered around ridership, specifically whether airports have enough demand to justify millions in cost.

BART's connection to SFO, completed in 2003, has yet to reach BART's initial ridership forecast and is still not profitable. Prior to construction, BART projected there would be 17,800 average daily boardings to and from the airport by the year 2010. As of this month, SFO ridership was at about 11,000.

Frank Sterling and Juliet Ellis, activists in the Bay Area, also questioned BART's plans to spend $500 million for Oakland International's people-mover and its decision to charge $6 for the service vs. $3 for the current shuttle bus.

"The proposal to charge double that for the new connector might drive away customers, unless it delivers twice the value," they wrote in a recent newspaper commentary, "Can East Bay residents afford this?"

Then they use some of my favorite arguments from past posts:

These are appropriate debates, Coogan says. Some cities are better off sticking to buses, he says. For example, LAX's FlyAway Bus, which provides non-stop rides to various neighborhoods in Southern California, is more convenient for many travelers than the metro.

For some cities, it'd be wiser to spend scarce funds for extending metro to public transportation-friendly suburbs before considering airports, Coogan adds.

"How often does a person go to work? And how often does a person go to Paris in a year?" he says.

More on these arguments here, here, and here (near the bottom). As I said in one of those posts: I agree, and I've said before that the market here is a niche one plenty well served by buses: young singles who can't get a ride to/from the airport. Business travelers will almost always rent a car or take a taxi. Families won't schlep their luggage on transit. Most others will have friends or family pick them up or drop them off. And our off-site airport parking is dirt cheap. The ridership drivers just aren't there.

Further demonstrating the ability of technology to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, Mitsubishi has announced development of a lithium battery driven car, to be sold within two years. The car, the "MIEV Plug-In Electric First Drive" would travel as much as 100 miles (160 kilometers) between charges.

United States Data and Comparisons: GHG Emissions per Passenger Mile/Passenger KM are indicated below (From power plants – variation is due to mix of fuel sources used in producing electricity)

Average United States: 61 grams/37 grams

Lowest (Vermont): 1.4 grams/0,7 grams

Highest (North Dakota): 102 grams/62 grams

The average GHG reduction compared to the current US automobile and sport utility vehicle fleet average would be 83 percent. The car would emit approximately less than one-half the GHGs per passenger mile as transit in New York area (the best in the nation) and one-fourth the overall US transit average.

European Union Comparison: The MIEV would be 40 percent less GHG intensive that is required by the newly adopted European Union fuel economy requirements for 2020 (the equivalent of 101 grams per passenger mile or 62 grams per passenger kilometer).

The above calculations assume the US national vehicle occupancy rate of 1.6. The comparison to the present fleet includes upstream production and transport activities.

Sources: Mitsubishi site, Edmunds Review

Chicago's urban core has boomed in a way that makes most other cities jealous. Every time you turn around, it seems, another gem is added to it. The Renzo Piano designed Modern Wing at the Art Institute recently opened its doors to general, if not universal, acclaim, for example.

But while this boom is to be celebrated, and clearly it has been necessary to sustain the animating life force of the city as a whole, there are long term threats that need to be considered.

The first is that all booms tend to contain within themselves the seeds of their own collapse. We've seen that with the dot.com bubble, the real estate bubble, and the finance bubble, the last two of which are really weighing on Chicago. Growth feeds on itself in a type of positive reinforcement loop. If it hits a certain point, it can really take off, as in a typically "hockey stick" diagram. The problem is that some point the trend reaches the point of exhaustion, and the hangover can be a bear. Most stable systems employ negative feedback controls or stabilizers to "take away the punch bowl just as the party is getting started".

The real challenge, however, is what Jane Jacobs called the "self destruction of diversity". Thriving urban districts require a mixtures of users and uses acting to mutually sustain and energize a neighborhood. But what has a tendency to happen is that, as an area becomes popular, land values go up and rents go up. There is greater demand for and competition for the space. Because of this, the most economically successful use of the moment tends to become increasingly dominant. This is particularly the case if that use benefits from face to face interactions among multiple players in the space and clustering economics.

Jacobs also talked about the requirement that neighborhoods contain buildings of a mixture of ages, such that they require differing levels of economic rent. New enterprises, particularly in wholly new fields, often require space that is available at low cost. So if there are no low cost buildings in an area, tomorrow's new industries can't often get started in a place at all. While she didn't quite put it this way, this notion is often paraphrased as "new ideas require old buildings".

The boom in Chicago causes concern on both of these fronts. Firstly, the great Loop area is increasingly dominated by two uses: financial and business services for the global city function of Chicago, and entertainment/tourism. To some extent, the Loop has always had these characteristics as a typical CBD. And in many respects, the streets are far more active today than they were in an era not that long ago when the streets in the Loop really did roll up at 6pm.

The real problem is that the boom in the Loop has generated enormous opportunity for profit in the redevelopment of older buildings. Many older buildings have been demolished completely, or preserved only the form of the "facadectomy". A number of vintage office skyscrapers have been converted to residential use. The high rent district, which used to apply mostly to the core of Loop, now extends far to the West and South instead of just the traditional north. The number of places where one can obtain low-rent space in the greater Loop area would appear to have declined significantly.

The same forces are operating in residential areas, which are increasingly taking on the cast of New Urbanist suburbs. Housing prices keep out all but the already affluent in many places. Rents have followed suit, leading to a predominance of swanky establishements catering primarily to consumption by the upscale: restaurants, clubs, boutiques, spas, etc. A number of formerly industrial districts have been reborn as more or less single use large format retail strips.

What will the long term affect of this be? I don't know. I do think it is something worth of consideration. Affordable housing is obviously something that is on the radar of many groups. But the idea of affordable office or industrial space less so. We want the Loop to be successful, but also I think there should be policies developed that are designed to actively sustain its diversity over time.

The danger is that the Loop becomes increasingly concentrated in ever most high value specialized services. (I've even suggested how we might encourage this through cross-regional collaboration). This can be good in that it keeps Chicago a player at the pinnacle of the global economy. But it also exposes Chicago to the risk of niche exhaustion. And with the global city functions an artifact of globalization as we know it today, any disruption or further evolution of that model could seriously hit Chicago.

As I've long argued, in an ever more rapidly changing, uncertain world, it is critical for cities to have a diversity of strategies and future options for success, and not put all their eggs in one basket. Chicago needs to continue reinforcing its success, but it also needs to look at how to diversify that success so that when, as it inevitably will, economic needs change, Chicago is right there with the next new thing. While picking winners and losers is a problematic concept, at a minimum the city should be looking at how to preserve the conditions necessary for success.

Interestingly, the city has already taken some steps here. It created the concept of a "Planned Manufacturing District" to prevent residential encroachment into surviving manufacturing zones like the Kinzie Corridor. A good move. While mono-use isn't always a good thing, for a traditionally manufacturing area, I think this is a decent strategy. We should be looking at similar means of preserving the favorable economics for new ideas in the urban core as well.

More Chicago:

Chicago: A Declaration of Independence

Reconnecting the Hinterland Series
Part 1A: Metropolitan Connections
Part 1B: High Speed Rail
Part 2A: Onshore Outsourcing
Part 2B: On Innovation

On the Chicago Economy
Chicago: Corporate Headquarters and the Global City
The Financial Crisis: Good for Chicago?

The battle to find ways to close California's gaping $24 billion budget shortfall continues, with Governor Schwarzenegger calling for deep cuts and reorganization throughout state government. Last week, making a "rare speech to a joint session of the Legislature," Gov. Schwarzenegger argued that the state has "run out of time," and faces a situation where "Our wallet is empty, our bank is closed, and our credit is dried up".

The challenges facing California's policy makers in balancing the budget can be examined by checking out the Los Angeles Times' "Interactive California Budget Balancer". While the state has many different options available to it, making cuts to potentially popular programs will only serve to irritate interest groups which argue for the efficacy and essential nature of their favored programs. Couple this reluctance to make cuts with popular resistance to tax increases, recently seen when voters rejected a set of measures on May 19, and one can better understand the true magnitude of the budget impasse facing the state.

“A new business model” is what Jack Nerad of Kelly Blue Book called the proposed sale of Saturn by General Motors (GM) to Roger Penske’s Penske Automotive Group.

What makes it a new model is that Penske would only buy the brand and the dealer network. Penske would subcontract vehicle production other manufacturers, though for the first two years, the GM Saturn plant would produce the cars. Doubtless, Penske will buy vehicles from assembly plants able to provide the best quality for the dollar, establishing competition at the factory rather than corporate level. This radical departure solves the fundamental problem leading to the near-death of the American automobile industry.

Following World War II, America had little competition. Industrial powers such as in Europe and Japan were flat on their backs and American manufacturers had a “clear field.” American labor and management bid up the price of heavy manufactured goods so much that they became less competitive when war torn economies recovered.

Americans paid over and over again in their automotive purchases. They paid first through reliability difficulties that were the inevitable result of attempting to compete on price with foreign firms with costs that were competitive in world markets. Finally, they paid with more than $60 billion in loans to General Motors, GMAC and Chrysler. Canadians also paid twice, most recently in more than $13 billion in loans that make their per capita contribution substantially higher than that of Americans. It is not at all clear that North American taxpayers will ever see these amounts repaid (American taxpayers are still waiting for the first penny of repayment from Amtrak on loans made more than 25 years ago).

The recent loans were the result of a political consensus that GM and Chrysler were “too big to fail.” In an industry characterized by the Penske-Saturn model, the too-big-to-fail problem would be removed.