Northrop Grumman Corp started California’s New Year by announcing it is moving its headquarters to the Washington D.C. area. Unfortunately, they are neither the first nor the last major corporation to leave Southern California. It is a trend, one that may not last much longer, though since aren’t that many major corporations still headquartered in greater Los Angeles.
For decades, Southern California was the center of the aerospace world, a basic part of the Southern California’s DNA. Now, once Northrop leaves, there will be no major aerospace companies still headquartered in Southern California.
Aerospace is not the only industry abandoning Southern California. The region was once host to financial giants, like Bank of America, Security Pacific Bank, Countrywide, and First Interstate. Today, there are none. California was once a major automobile manufacturing state, with a dozen plants. Even the entertainment industry is slowly shifting away from its Hollywood roots.
When you lose corporate headquarters, you lose more than jobs. You lose the tax base, the leadership, the philanthropic giving, and the intangibles. Corporate headquarters are usually very good citizens.
Many local political leaders ignore this business’ exodus, or make excuses. The decline of the U.S. defense spending, aerospace spending in particular, is often given as a reason for the decline. But the last decade was not a bad one for defense; the industry thrived, just not in Southern California.
The reasons for this exodus are both simpler and less flattering than those usually given. One big reason is selfishness. California’s decline chose to consume, and not to produce. Wealthy, aging, Baby Boomers control the state. In the cause of “quality of life,” or “the environment,” they have succeeded in limiting opportunity for everyone else.
The other big reason for decline lies with governments, state and local, that now exist to serve themselves and not their citizens. The level of government goods and services, even infrastructure and basics, has declined, but state spending, adjusted for inflation and population, has continued to soar. The difference has been going into public employee’s pockets, through higher salaries, benefits, and generous retirement programs.
Remarkably, no Southern California economic sector is in ascendancy. Unemployment remains well above the national average, particularly in the middle class Inland Empire. The growth in bankruptcies has been about twice that of the United States. The state is becoming less equitable, the divide between those who have and those who do not have constantly growing, the middle class declining.
Southern California is starting to look a lot like a third-world economy, service based, inequitable, serving a wealthy, mostly aging few, with little opportunity for younger workers and a large underclass. Changing the region’s prospects will be very difficult. Nothing short of a major generational change in leadership is likely to change the current sad trajectory.
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernacke called for stronger regulation to avoid future asset bubbles, such as the housing bubble that precipitated the international financial crisis (the Great Recession) in an Atlanta speech.
The Chairman appears to miss the fact that regulation itself was a principal cause of the Great Recession. The culprit, however, was not financial regulation, but rather land use regulation, which drove house prices so high in highly regulated markets. When households that could not afford their mortgages defaulted, the losses were far too intense for the mortgage industry to sustain, and thus the Great Recession.
This is not to ignore the role of Congress and others, which fueled more liberal mortgage credit, and created the excess and credit-unworthy
additional demand for home ownership.
This higher demand, however, was only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for creating the bubble, which when burst, precipitated the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. In many markets, there was relatively little increase in house prices relative to incomes, as prices remained at or below the historic Median Multiple (median house price divided by median household income) standard of 3.0. In other markets, however, prices reached from 5 to 11 times incomes.
Perhaps the first principle of regulation is understanding what to regulate. In the case of the housing bubble, it was land use regulations themselves that needed to be regulated.
To avoid future housing bubbles, no more effective action could be taken than to repeal the restrictive land use regulations, without which the last bubble would have been, at most, only slight compared to the destructive reality that ensued.
Executive compensation is the subject of many academic studies, but one focused on Fannie Mae from two Harvard Law School professors is especially well-named: “Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay and Camouflage”. Executives are able to take unlimited risks and reap unlimited upside rewards knowing that US taxpayers will foot the bill on the downside. The mortgage-backed securities issued by the two firms remain at the center of the causes-and-effects of the financial meltdown.
Back to the current problem of paying $6 million to run a bankrupt company whose every financial obligation is guaranteed by taxpayer money. Who is on the compensation committee that recommended this pay day? Dennis Beresford from Ernst & Young (E&Y); Brenda Gaines, recently from Citigroup; Jonathan Plutzik, from Credit Suisse First Boston; and David Sidwell, from Morgan Stanley.
And to the rest of you out there reading this, take some time to contemplate the words of Bill Moyers as he concluded a rather shocking essay of the role of lobbyists in the recent “healthcare reform” legislation: “Outrageous? You bet. But don't just get mad. Get busy.”
The European Commission has just made a Google Earth overlay available showing annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 10 square kilometer quadrants. The overlay can be manipulated to show estimates from every year beginning in 1970. One of the most fascinating features is the GHG emissions on the oceans, from shipping lanes. All are green (fewer GHG tons), but one route stands out as by far the busiest, from Hong Kong and Japan through the Straits of Malacca and the Suez Canal to northern Europe.
The application is useful for broad reviews of GHG emissions by same-sized areas, though the zoom feature does not provide high resolution enough photography to discern differences at the smallest area level.
This week, Time magazine named Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke “Person of the Year 2009.” CNBC’s panel of experts gave Bernanke the “Man of the Year” title (no misogynists there!) in 2008. And well they should since their sponsors are among the biggest recipients of the Paulson-Bernanke-Geithner bailout. As I select the link from their website to imbed in this story, an ad from Wells Fargo (NYSE: WFC) is displayed in the right half of the screen. Click on “home” and it’s an ad from General Motors (OTC: MTLQQ).
I imagine Bernanke is quite embarrassed this holiday season as a result of the many, many less than flattering comparisons he is receiving. CNBC’s sister network, MSNBC, took exception to anything flattering in the designation by reminding everyone that being named Person of the Year is not an honor. Time’s definition, according to MSNBC, is: “The person or persons who most affected the news and our lives, for good or for ill…” They list a few of the previous winners, including Adolf Hitler (1938), Joseph Stalin (1939), and Ayatollah Khomeini (1979). One writer likened Bernanke receiving the award to “celebrating an arsonist for his heroics in putting out a fire that he set.”
Regardless of Time managing editor Rick Stengel’s qualifying statements, the tone of the write-up suggests, to Charles Scaliger at The New American at least, that Bernanke has a “cult of personality” within the Washington, D.C. Beltway. If you’ve never met Bernanke, which I never have, it’s hard to imagine there is the kind of personality there that one could be cult-ish about. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who I also never met, regardless of his other shortcomings had the ability to say what it took to get the economy to do what he wanted it to do – he didn’t always pick the best things to get it to do, but he was able to get a message across. Bernanke, on the other hand, never seems quite comfortable in front of Congress the way Greenspan used to appear. A nervous central banker is very bad for the economy.
The designation – whether or not it is an honor – came the day before the Senate Banking Committee approved President Obama’s nomination of Bernanke to four more years as Chairman of the Federal Reserve. That nomination and approval represent further steps in what Rolling Stone writer Matt Taibbi calls “Obama’s Big Sellout.” The President, and 16 out of 23 Senators on the Banking Committee, seem to hold the mistaken impression that those who got us into this mess are going to be able to get us out. Republican Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina was among the dissenters: "We can't have a Federal Reserve that the majority of Americans no longer trust, and that's what we have today." Bernanke himself told Congress less than ten months ago that he didn’t know what to do about the economy. Maybe the eventual good that will come from Bernanke’s 2009 affect on our lives will be the demise of the Federal Reserve system in the United States and an end to the mountains of fiat money that it produced in vain efforts to solve the financial crisis that will forever be linked to Ben Bernanke’s name: Person of the Year “for good or for ill.”
The press’s love affair with President Obama goes so far as to give him credit for actions of his predecessor, George W. Bush. Over the last week, the New York Times and The Guardian,
Britain’s “quality leftist daily gave the President credit for working out a deal with auto makers to improve fuel efficiency by 30%.
Not quite. The Obama Administration worked out a deal with the automakers under which they would not sue if the already approved 2020 fuel efficiency standards were advanced to 2016. In fact, the 30% improvement, which was in the 2020 standards, was passed by Congress in 2007 and signed by President Bush.
This is not to deny credit to President Obama for working out the agreement with the auto industry that removed the possibility of legal challenges to advancing the Bush 30% improvement by 4 years. The government’s substantial financial stake in General Motors and Chrysler probably helped seal the deal.
The impressive increase was made possible by comparing apples and oranges. Last year (2008) the Charlotte light rail service operated all year, while in the previous year (2007), service operated fewer than 40 days (the line opened in late November). Following its logic, the “Planning Pool” missed an even bigger story: apparently 2008 was 800% longer than the previous year (an increase from fewer than 40 days to 365).
Of course, it’s either apples or oranges and, one way or the other, a revision is in order.
First American CoreLogic, a real estate research company, recently released data on negative equity mortgages for the third quarter of 2009. The situation is stark. Nearly one in four U.S. mortgages (23%) is currently underwater, with the borrower owing more than the property is currently worth. According to First American, when mortgages "near" negative equity are tallied, the total number of mortgages near or currently underwater is around 14 million- "nearly 28 percent of all residential properties with a mortgage nationwide."
Being underwater does not necessarily mean that a borrower is at risk of default. Although foreclosures and payment delinquencies are currently at record levels nationwide in the wake of the popped real estate bubble, most borrowers facing negative equity continue to make their mortgage payments. While being underwater "is the best predictor for loan defaults," according to Sam Khater, economist with First American, "if you have your job and don’t encounter economic shock, you’ll most likely keep paying on your home."
But should you keep paying if you're underwater? Brent White, an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Arizona has examined the situation, and argues in a recent discussion paper that homeowners "should be walking away in droves." According to White, millions of homeowners "could save hundreds of thousands of dollars by strategically defaulting on their mortgages."
Such a strategic move comes with consequences for the borrower- most notably a negative impact on one's credit score. This has a quantifiable cost, but White states that "a few years of poor credit shouldn’t cost more than few thousand dollars," and notes that individuals can rebuild their credit rating over time, and can "plan in advance for a few years of limited credit."
Such costs are, argues White, "minimal compared to the financial benefit of strategic default." White makes use of the hypothetical example of a California couple purchasing an average priced ($585,000), averaged sized home in 2006 to demonstrate the case for default:
"Though they still owe about $560,000 on their home, it is now only worth $187,000. A similar house around the corner from Sam and Chris recently listed for $179,000, which, with a modest 5% down, would translate to a total monthly payment of less than $1200 per month – as compared to the $4300 that they currently pay. They could rent a similar house in the neighborhood for about $1000.
Assuming they intend to stay in their home ten years, Sam and Chris would save approximately $340,000 by walking away, including a monthly savings of at least $1700 on rent verses mortgage payments... If they stay in their home on the other hand, it will take Sam and Chris over 60 years just to recover their equity"
White argues that in such cases, borrowers are better off taking a short-term hit to their credit, and strategically defaulting to escape a long-term, crushing financial burden. By staying in the home, borrowers are taking money that could otherwise be saved for retirement or used for other purposes, and throwing it away to service a liability that is unlikely to show positive equity in their lifetime.
Such advice seems most likely to appeal to those upside-down in particularly hard-hit areas of the country, including California, Florida, Nevada and Arizona. However, as noted, most homeowners are sticking it out, and continuing to pay their mortgages. According to White, many who might otherwise make such a decision avoid doing so due to "fear, shame, and guilt," sentiments which are "actively cultivated" by the government and financial industry to keep homeowners from walking away.
It remains to be seen if underwater borrowers will overcome fear of the consequences and take White's advice to strategically default. Mortgage lenders most likely hope that his ideas remain firmly in the minority- as one mortgage executive stated in comments reacting to White's report, the argument for strategic default is "incredibly irresponsible and misinformed," and, if widely embraced, has the potential to "'tear apart the very basis' upon which mortgage lending rests". Losing otherwise performing mortgages to strategic default, whatever the economic sense for borrowers, could be yet another blow to an already reeling industry.
In the new Wall Street math of the post-9/08 world, it seems that some people turn to humor and others to rage. First they burned down our 401k plans: some people found this funny and made jokes about their “201k” plans. The French got angry and took CEOs hostage. Now, Goldman bankers are buying semi-automatic weapons to protect themselves from the angry mob. Matt Taibbi is desperately seeking humor in this, currently rating it a 7 on a scale of 1 to 10. Alice Schroeder, the story’s originator, finds it humorless, suggesting there could (should?) be “proles…brandishing pitchforks at the doors of Park Avenue.”
In true on-the-ground reporting, a Bloomberg reporter wrote a story after a friend told her that he had written a character reference so that a Goldman Sachs banker could get a gun permit. Alice Schroeder (author of “The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life”) also recounts a few examples of Goldman bankers using their other-worldly prescience to protect themselves: Goldman Sachs Chief Executive Office Lloyd Blankfein – only too well known now for saying that Goldman is doing “God’s work” – got a permit “to install a security gate at his house two months before Bear Stearns Cos. collapsed.”
All of this contributes to the view that Goldman Sachs is, indeed, “a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money.” I’m certain that Rolling Stone and Bloomberg have taken action to protect their right to be critical of Goldman. I’ve spent plenty of time on the phone with their fact checkers to know they put a lot of effort into being able to support every word they print. Blogger Mike Morgan, who founded www.GoldmanSachs666.com, had to defend his right to be critical of Government Sachs by going to court last April when Goldman lawyers Chadbourne & Parke threatened him with trademark infringement.
Part III in the video series on East St. Louis explores ideas put forward for (re)development of the city, including cultural tourism based on the city's African American heritage and use of vacant land for farming to create a local food source for the St. Louis metropolitan area.
Part II gives views of downtown today, shows how its history can be seen in the city, and explains why the city could still be a good place for new development.
Part I discusses the origins and development of East St. Louis as an industrial city.
Michael R. Allen is an architectural historian currently serving as director of the Preservation Research Office, a technical assistance and preservation consulting firm. Allen also serves on the boards of the St. Louis Building Arts Foundation and Preservation Action.
Alex Lotz is a graduate of the Film Production program of Chapman University's Dodge College of Film and Media Arts.